

ABSTRACT

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INTERVENTIONISM IN AFRICA: AN ANALYTIC COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE

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This study is an attempt to elucidate on the complex phenomenon of intervention in two African countries, i.e., Republic of Zaire and the People's Republic of Angola. Any study that examines the interventionist thrust of one polity on another, (if it lays claim to an exhaustive treatment of the subject matter) must recognize the multi-layered facets of intervention, for example, from politics, social institutions, religion to culture. Mindful of the variegated nature of this phenomenon, this study has only focused on politico-military intervention.

An attempt is made to provide the historical background of Western assault on Africa generally before shifting our emphasis on Angola and Zaire. Zaire and Angola, in our view, are only case studies of what is a continent-wide phenomenon.

INTERVENTIONISM IN AFRICA: AN ANALYTIC COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF THE POLITICS OF FOREIGN INTERVENTION
IN ANGOLA AND ZAIRE

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The study looks at the role and place of Africa in the world as the continent emerged into a mere juridical independence during the cold war that replaced the devastation of the second intra-European War of 1939-45. It suggests that with the institutionalized constraints occasioned by this juridical independence armed intervention remains the most potent force used to consign Africa to subordinate status in the world system.

After examining the phenomenon of politico-military intervention in Zaire and Angola, the dissertation examines what we see as a record of bankrupt political leadership offered by the African political class, existing as it does as local managers of the neo-colonial State, and therefore part of the infrastructure of external intervention in Africa.

The study suggests that only a democratic, continental socio-economic and political reality which will put an end to the African fragmented polities and thus end its structural weakness can effectively resist the interventionist propensity of extra-African powers.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

The nature of Africa's interaction with the world system is conflict prone. That is, Africa articulates with the world system within a set of interlocking but conflictual interactions which give rise to systemic schisms and crises. However, there is a historical basis for the schism; the unequal nature of this interaction, beginning from its very inception in mid-fifteenth century, has determined the contemporary continuum. In the contemporary epoch, with the demise of classic colonial occupation, interventionism has been the principal instrument of systemic regulation and maintenance. From the enslavement of her people to provide free labor for Euro-American capital accumulation, during the era of primitive accumulation,¹ to the forcible incorporation of the whole continent into Euro-American mercantilist empire,² European influence has been, indeed since mid-1400s and progressing therefrom, pervasive and decisive on the African continent.

¹Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Putnam, 1980).

²Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1972).

There are, in fact, those like Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal who subscribe to the concept of Eurafrica. Eurafrica as a concept posits a mutuality and convergence of interests between Europe and Africa and thus a natural link at the political, economic, and socio-cultural levels. Western Europe needs African raw materials and strategic minerals for its continued economic growth and development.³ Thus, the notion of Eurafrica represents a sophisticated rationalization of Europe's political domination and economic exploitation of Africa. Senegal represents one of the more acute cases of settler intervention and domination; after twenty-three years of juridical independence, French influence permeates virtually all aspects of life in Senegal, from the hotel owner to extensive military presence.

The phenomenon of interventionism has been a recurrent feature of the contemporary neo-colonial epoch of the African articulation with the world system. This era is characterized by indirect economic and political domination of Africa through a series of neo-colonial contractual and institutionalized multi-lateral arrangements, namely - Yaounde I (1964-1969), Yaounde II (1969-1975), Lome I (1975-1980), Lome II (1980-1985), and a plethora of milito-strategic, defense, cultural, and educational agreements.

³Olasupo Adedokun, "Franco-African Relations and the Use of Intervention as an Instrument of Foreign Policy Objectives: A Critical Study of Victims of French Foreign Policy Objectives" (Ph.D. dissertation, Atlanta University, 1982).

Many African countries achieved juridical independence between 1960-64, but the economic levers of the continent remained and still are with Euro-American economic and financial institutions. The various contractual institutionalized arrangements referred to earlier only help to deepen the unequal division of labor where Africa remains the supplier of commodities and strategic minerals for continued Euro-American industrial development. The most widely advertised aspect of Lome I convention for example - STABEX, (commodity price stabilization scheme) only served to ensure the stabilization of the price of African commodities for European industries. Yet, the West African regional group - ECOWAS is trying to develop means of industrializing the sub-region using the same commodities now directed to the European economy.⁴

The subject of our study comes under the general rubric of interventionism and counterrevolution in Africa. Specifically, we seek to examine critically, and analyze politico-military intervention by extra-African powers to determine the outcome of internal conflict in Angola and Zaire.

The Congo (Zaire) crisis of the 1960s effectively brought cold war politics to Africa and exposed the inadequacy of the juridical independence many African countries

⁴Ademola Adebo, "The Political Economy of the Lome Convention and the Relations Between European Economic Community, Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific States: A Study in the Political Economy of North-South Relations" (Ph.D dissertation, Atlanta University, 1982).

so loudly proclaimed at the time. In both Zaire and Angola, extra-African powers were to play a decisive politico-military role and exert strategic influence in the outcome of their struggle for independence.

In spite of the fact that the crisis of interventionism by extra-African powers presents an ever present danger in contemporary Africa, much of the published literature has dealt with the phenomenon in a fragmented fashion. There have been very few systematic studies on the subject. The published literature on Zaire has been more varied and can be classified into three: the polemical, the sophisticated apologies for western intervention, and lately, the critical/analytical. The works⁵ of Gran, Weissman, Jackson, Callaghy, and Young and Turner can be regarded as serious and worthy improvements on some earlier works.

Works on Angola have been fewer, but this paucity has been somewhat compensated by a certain rigor of analysis. The works⁶ of Marcum, Bender, and Nzongola fall into this category.

⁵Guy Gran, (ed), Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979); Stephen Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-64 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1974); Henry Jackson, From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy Toward Africa Since 1960 (New York: William Morrow, 1982); Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984); Crawford Young and T. Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairois State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985).

⁶John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume I: The Anatomy of an Explosion (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969); John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Volume II: 1962-76

The proposed study, therefore, fits into ongoing research concerning interventionism in Africa. Our choice of Angola and Zaire is neither haphazard nor arbitrary. The crisis of intervention in both countries occurred at different periods in contemporary African political history. More importantly, the interventions marked historic watersheds in ongoing African struggle against external domination in contemporary times. Zaire with its abundance of critical mineral resources, strategic geopolitical location in the heart of Africa and sharing borders with no less than nine African states, has attracted the interests of extra-African powers since its independence in 1960. Interventionism can be rationalized on economic, political, strategic, and ideological grounds. If we analyze the economic factor for interventionism in Zaire, we can hardly be guilty of narrow reductionism or a one-factor analysis of the complex nature or imperatives of interventionism as a foreign policy tool. In the case of Zaire, the economic imperative does provide unassailable evidence of the propensity for intervention by extra-African powers. Zaire is one of those countries in Africa that possess many of the strategic minerals Western countries can only obtain in some selected countries. Zaire today produces 60 percent

. . . (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978); Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality (Berkeley, California: University of California Press, 1978); Nzongola Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1980).

of the cobalt needs of the Western industrial economies and 39 percent of its industrial diamonds. Zaire is the world's leading producer of cobalt. Thus, protracted interventionism in Zaire is a function of Euro-American attempts to maintain an ideological, strategic, political, and economic stranglehold on Zaire in order to facilitate unimpeded access to Zaire's formidable mineral resources. In contemporary times, Euro-American intervention has been through proxies, via such client states as Morocco, Egypt, Sudan, and Senegal as manifested by the use of these countries' troops to prop up the regime of Mobutu in the Shaba I and II episodes of 1977 and 1978.

Zaire's crisis of 1960-64, occurred in a background of heightened cold war tension between the major powers. The reality of strategic superiority vis-a-vis their ideological adversary, combined with the hegemonic leverage of colonialism which was a reality in the subregion contributed in no small way in determining a favorable outcome for Western intervention in Zaire in this period. The critical point of convergence though, is that the outcome of intervention in both countries revealed the scope and nature of the structural and strategic weakness of Africa in combating overt military intervention by extra-African powers.

Angola is bounded in the North by Zaire and this geographical contiguity of territory was a strategic factor in interventionism in Angola. More importantly, Angola's case offers three interlocking theses: (1) the Angolan war

brought to a head the crisis of radical/nationalism counterposed to neo-colonialism in the Organization of African Unity; (2) it marked a critical watershed in African perceptions or misperceptions regarding Western interest in Africa; and (3) in the final analysis, the outcome of interventionism in Angola contrasts sharply with and is in contradistinction to same in Zaire. In this case, Western powers were effectively denied the benefit of a supplicant neo-colonial regime, and thus Angola opened up the real possibility of sustained struggle in Namibia from a liberated zone - Angola.

The fifteen year period that separates the two case studies allows us to study over time what factors facilitate a different outcome in Angola - changing political and strategic conditions, especially with reference to the international system at large. Objectively, therefore, Angola and Zaire provide us with adequate data for a thorough analysis of extra-African intervention.

Method of Research

The dominant paradigm in comparative politics, the subfield in which African studies is located in the Euro-American world, is the positivist school. Its mode of research and inquiry is the quantitative method. Its claim to respectable methodology is limited to its preoccupation with order, system maintenance and adaptability, plus an unconcealed fetishism for empiricism. Its

pragmatism conceals an ideological conservatism in that it fails to raise fundamental questions about the nature of the socio-economic reality and proceeds on the basis of what is empirically quantifiable. Its central concern is "with the day-to-day affairs of particular and diverse fractional interests and the empirical--focused on the visible, computational variables."⁷ Besides, this method of research conceptualizes the social phenomenon-(a dynamic social reality) in terms of "things," rather than "processes" and the social forces that impel and propel these processes. "It tries to sum up everything in a formula, which says that the whole world, or any part of the world which is under consideration, consists of just such and such things with such and such properties."⁸ As a consequence, empiricism and functionalism are epistemological obstacles to knowledge because they embrace a metaphysical way of thinking by seeking to comprehend and grasp the dynamics of social reality, apart and removed from their conditions of existence--in abstraction, separate from one another, ignoring their interconnections, and conceiving of them as "fixed and frozen."⁹ The metaphysical abstraction inherent in

⁷J.M. Barbalet, "Political Science, the State and Marx," quoted in Nzongola Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1982), p. 15.

⁸Maurice Cornforth, Materialism and the Dialectical Method (New York: International Publishers, 1978), p. 59.

⁹Ibid., p. 58.

structural-functionalism is not without a *raison d'être*; it "is related to the ideological commitment of Western social science to the justification and preservation of the existing social order".¹⁰ Thus, for example, seeking to measure the "degree" of dependency in the political-economic framework in Africa, McGowan and Smith¹¹ examined health, education, and social amenities provisions. By beginning with this specific factor analysis (which is a function of their methodology), they thought they could measure the reason for backwardness. Economic growth is thus confused with economic development, reduced to a technical matter, because development is conceived as an economic phenomenon, removed from its politics.¹² It is for these severe limitations adumbrated here, that we reject the methodology of structural-functionalism for this study. In summation, this methodology is inadequate for the study of crisis, conflict and radical change, because its basic concern is stability. It constitutes an impediment to knowledge of the real as a synthesis of multiple determinations, propagates mystification and metaphysical mode of thinking

¹⁰Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Essex: Longman, 1981), p. 3.

¹¹Patrick J. McGowan and Dale L. Smith, "Economic Dependency in Black Africa: An Analysis of Competing Theories," International Organization 32 (Winter 1978).

¹²Basil Davidson, Can Africa Survive?: Arguments Against Growth Without Development (Boston: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1974).

which for our purpose in the study will only inhibit us in finding out and analyzing the phenomenon of intervention.

The method of research in this study is historical materialism, that is the investigation will be based on interpretation of historical data. Therefore, one makes no a priori judgement, but looks at social reality abstractly and heuristically. This method frees the researcher from the metaphysical outlook of structural-functionalism, because it encourages the perception of social phenomena as elements of a continuum. That is, things do not just happen to be there, "fully formed and with set characteristics--as something with a natural history."¹³

Historical materialism encourages dialectical thinking and it is about the systematic and heuristic interpretation of history in the study of social reality. It encourages the understanding of the social phenomenon in its concrete form rather than its abstract form. It conceives of phenomena not in terms of "things" but "processes" not fragmented, autonomous, and unrelated, but coherent, cumulative, and comprehensive. It rightly gives recognition and premium to material conditions because by "creating and recreating his economic and other material conditions, man also creates his culture, history, and civilization."¹⁴ The method of

¹³Ake, A Political Economy of Africa, p. 6.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 9; see also Martin Carnopy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay Company, 1974), chapters I and II; Maurice Cornforth, Materialism and the Dialectic Method, p. 4.

historical materialism insists especially that we consider a phenomenon, not each by itself but always in terms of interconnections with other things, in their development and change, in their continuum but also dialectically in their reversal. The usefulness of this method for this study then can be summarized as follows:

1. It allows us to grasp the fact that the phenomenon of intervention has a historical basis in the predatory hegemony of first Western-controlled slave trade, and secondly, colonialism. In other words, even though our study is located in the contemporary epoch, it has to be properly studied in the background of history.
2. We can better study in history, the dialectical relationship of African underdevelopment and European development and the role that intervention, as a foreign policy, plays in this continuum. That is to say intervention does not just happen, it can be more meaningfully understood in the relational asymmetry that has informed Euro-African encounter from its inception. Intervention thus can be appreciated as but a tool in the hands of those that profit from this unequal relationship to keep those subordinated to it in check, within the socio-economic and political formation that has sustained it over time.
3. Intervention is a multi-faceted phenomenon. It cannot be reduced to quantifiable interpretation without doing serious damage to its multiple determination and motivation. Let us say we sum up the number of times France, for example, has committed or threatened to commit its armed forces for the defense of the regime of a junior ally in Africa; we might then say that since there has been no overt military intervention since 1983, French intervention (military) appears to have stabilized or even decreased. But quantifying them does not tell us what motivates or invites intervention, what particular class formation exists, and in whose hands the state apparatus is geared towards interventionism. We also fail to

analyze the objective relationship between the intervenor nation and the target nation. Thus by studying the phenomenon apart and removed from its contextual, situational, and historical milieu, we fail to place and understand it in its socio-economic context, and end up studying it only as an abstract phenomenon as opposed to the concrete. The study then becomes simply an attempt to celebrate the empirical method because this specific factor analysis which flows from the method only promotes mystification as opposed to enlightenment.

The Application of the Method in the Study

What are the objective interests of the intervenors in Angola and Zaire? How and why do these interests conflict with objective African interests? Our method of analysis is to examine and bring into relief the contradiction between the objective interests of the intervenor and the target country, i.e. the dialectical process of the consolidation of these interests by those who gain from them and the repulsion of their intervention by its victims. Our focus will be in the following specific areas. For Zaire, we will examine:

1. The contradiction of Belgian colonialism and Zaire resistance.
2. The post-colonial phase, the contradiction of sovereign independence and neo-colonialism, i.e. the specific ideological, economic and strategic interest of the West in a supposedly sovereign African state.
3. The Zaire political class and the contradiction of their existence and collusion with neo-colonial interests.
4. How the Zaire political class resolves this contradiction in favor of the intervenor.

For Angola, we examine:

1. The contradiction of stability in an African chiefdom and the Portuguese export of Angolans as human merchandise to provide free labor in Portuguese South American colonies during the era of primitive accumulation.
2. The contradiction of African nationalist aspiration and Portuguese colonial expansionism.
3. In the post-colonial phase, we analyze,
 - a. The strategic and political condition that facilitated a different outcome in the crisis of extra-African interventions in Angola.
 - b. The contradiction of the strategic and ideological interest of the West and the establishment of a nascent non-capitalist order in Angola.

Theoretical Framework

The philosophical imprimatur of modernization theory, i.e., the dominant theoretical analytic paradigm in which African studies is taught in Western social science, is rooted in empiricism. As a theory of social change, modernization theory has come under scathing and severe criticism for its static conception of society and its linear view of the history of human existence. Confronted with the rising waves of nationalist struggle against Western imperialism, after the war of 1939-45, Western social scientists came to the aid of their nations, in an attempt to deal theoretically with this phenomenon, by "stringing together a series of categories called stages of development and stating what form of social engineering

might be needed to realize a particular stage."¹⁵ Modernization theory conceives of human history as developing in a linear progression, from an original stage of underdevelopment to the epoch of mass consumption, abundance and prosperity. It arrives at this conclusion by examining the history of the United States of America, Britain, and some references to Japan and India.¹⁶ The critique of modernization theory can be divided into two: the general and the specific.

Generally, the assumptions implicit in the theory have been assailed by many authors,¹⁷ on the ground that it is ethnocentric, astructural, and ahistorical. Modernization theory posits in a static sense, the existence of an original state of underdevelopment, which will ceteris paribus lead to development; it rejects the historical process of the subjugation of the productive forces of the colonized world to the needs of the imperialist Western nations.

¹⁵Claude Ake, Social Science as Imperialism (Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, 1979), p. 4.

¹⁶This is amply demonstrated by W.W. Rostow, in Stages of Economic Growth (Cambridge: University Press, 1960).

¹⁷Aidan Foster-Carter, "From Rostow to Gunder Frank: Conflicting Paradigms in the Analysis of Underdevelopment," World Development 3 (1976): 167-180; Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review, 1977); Samir Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review, 1977); James D. Cockroft, Dependence and Underdevelopment (New York: Doubleday, 1972).

Having committed this ahistorical error, it fails to see that underdevelopment of one, rather than being an original stage, is actually dialectically linked to the development of the other.

Secondly, it reduces development to simply the absence of technical skills. The "greatest need" of the developing nations is for "private investment to aid the free sectors of their economies."¹⁸ It attributes the cause for underdevelopment to the absence of "appropriate" values and argues that the imbibing of these values would produce development. It isolates fragmented parts of the world without examining the entire structure of the capitalist system or its role in creating, facilitating and perpetuating underdevelopment.

Specifically, Ake has characterized modernization theory as a form of imperialism,¹⁹ disguised as scientific theory. He argues that the theoretical framework has as its central concern "how to make the developing countries more like the West." It "attempts to foist on developing countries capitalist values, capitalist institutions, and propagates mystification and modes of thought and action which serve the interests of capitalism and imperialism."²⁰

¹⁸Chester Bowles, "The Developing Nations' Greatest Need," quoted in Richard Barnett, Intervention and Revolution (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1968), p. 35.

¹⁹Ake, Social Science as Imperialism, p. 4.

²⁰*Ibid.*, p. 13.

It employs analytic themes and categories such as nation-building, national integration, stability and authority to define the reality of Third World nations. By so doing, it pays no attention to class analysis, thus masking class domination because its interest is really in maintaining the status quo.

Counterposed to the theory of modernization is the dependencia theory as exemplified by the works of Frank, Dos Santos, and Amin; there have been debates among these authors²¹ regarding what particular area within the broad theoretical field should command emphasis and the need to transcend the broad analytic categories. For example, while some works have concentrated on the old colonial dependency, based on trade export and characterized by the domination of big capital in the hegemonic centers at the end of the nineteenth century, emphasis has also been placed on dependency based on multinational corporations, the class forces and alignments in the periphery.²² The dependency theory suggests that underdevelopment of the Third World

²¹Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America: A Historical Study of Chile and Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967); Dos Santos, "The Structure of Dependency," American Economic Review LX (May 1970); Andre Gunder Frank, Latin American: Underdevelopment or Revolution (New York: Monthly Review, 1967); Samir Amin, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review, 1976).

²²For representatives of these differing emphases, see "Dependency Theory: A Reassessment," Latin American Perspectives 1 (Spring 1974).

far from being an original state is a result of the historical subjugation of these countries by the capitalist states.

We postulate that development and underdevelopment are the two faces of the same universal process . . . , and that its geographic expression is translated into two great polarizations; on the one hand, the polarization of the world between industrial, advanced developed metropolitan countries and underdeveloped, backward, poor, peripheral and dependent countries . . .²³

The dependency school argues that the process that has on one hand, led to the structure of dependency in the underdeveloped countries has also brought about the cooption of the ruling class of the dependent world as junior allies of the dominant class of the metropolises. They further argue this class alliance has facilitated the distorted and disarticulated economies of the Third World.

The problem that faces a researcher then, is, which of these two contending theoretical schools will be useful in elucidating the reality of the African polity characterized by crisis, change and conflict? Proceeding with our method of analysis, historical materialism, a method based on the interpretation of historical data, the dependency theory will provide us with a more exhaustive framework to study radical change and crisis. The dependency theory allows us

²³p.N. Ndue, attributes this quota to Osvaldo Sunkel, "The Underdevelopment of Cameroon: A Study in the Political Economy of Neo-Colonialism," (Ph.d dissertation, Atlanta University, 1983), p. 7.

to more meaningfully fathom and reveal the forces at work in the polity. Intervention as a foreign policy tool is not a phenomenon that just happens, it must be studied in its proper historical context. Colonial intervention in African polity cannot be divorced from the political-economy of the neo-colonial epoch. For example, if modernization theory is preoccupied with stability and continuity, dependency theory helps us to clarify the nature of this stability and for whose benefit continuity is to be maintained. It raises the question, stability for what and for whom? It is the specific factor tendency of the modernization school which isolates parts of a whole without looking at the entire world system and the class hierarchy that sustains it, that suggests to us that it is an inadequate theoretical framework for this study. As a theoretical school developed to explain the change and continuity of classical colonialism to constitutional independence within an unaltered socio-economic formation, it has little analytic and explanatory merit to elucidate the reality of radical change and conflict which is our concern in this study. In African studies, the works of Rodney, Magubane, and Ake²⁴ have been based within the theoretical framework of historical materialism and dependency school. They have in the main

²⁴Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa;
Makhosetwe Magubane, The Political Economy of Race and
Class in South Africa (New York: Monthly Reviews, 1979);
Ake, A Political Economy of Africa.

delineated the historical process that has brought about underdevelopment and the forces at work in the contemporary era, both to perpetuate it and dialectically to reverse it.²⁵

Hypothesis

Our premise for this study is, that mutually irreconcilable interests and antagonistic contradictions informed the encounter between Europe and Africa from its very inception. European colonial expansionism rationalized this encounter on the ground that it was fiduciary, an argument that was later supplemented by crude chauvinism.

According to Frederick Lugard:

As European imperialism laid the foundation of modern civilization, and led the wild barbarians of these islands (Britain) along the path of progress, so in Africa today, we are repaying the debt and bringing to the dark places of the earth, the abode of barbarism and cruelty, the torch of culture and progress, while ministering to the material needs of our civilization . . . We hold these because it is the genius of our race to colonize to trade, and to govern.²⁶

What is the socio-economic consequence for the victims of this false humanitarianism? Classical economic theory suggests, land, labor, and capital as factors of production. In ministering to the material needs of their own

²⁵ Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressure in Africa (London: Zeb Press, 1978).

²⁶ Frederick Lugard, quoted in Martin Carnoy, Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay, 1968), p. 7.

civilization, the harbingers of the torch of culture and progress recognized the futility of land and capital with no labor.

As land and capital were both useless unless labour could be commanded . . . and with limited population of Europe in the sixteenth century, the free labourers necessary to cultivate the staple crops of sugar, tobacco and cotton in the new world, could not have been supplied in quantities adequate to permit large scale production. Slavery was necessary for this and . . . the Europeans turned first to the aborigines and then later to Africa.²⁷

Nor is the slave a wage earner, who has sold his labor to the owners of the means of production, since this is the era of primitive accumulation - prewage labor. This means that the African provides his labor, free, cheap, and bounteous for life without the benefit of wage recompense. The encounter, thus, then was a relation of antagonist contradiction -- the African wants his labor to be used by him in his community to tame nature for production, consumption, and saving. The European wanted the African labor under compulsion, and coercion, to be provided free, without recompense and for life. It is, thus, a relation of antagonistic contradiction and of domination and subordination.

In concrete terms, what did this mean to Africa? It meant that, "labour was drawn off from agriculture and conditions became unsettled. Dahomey, which in the sixteenth century was known for exporting food to parts of

²⁷Williams, Capitalism and Slavery, pp. 4-6.

what is now known as Togo, was suffering from famine in the nineteenth century."²⁸ This massive loss of African labor force of the most productive categories of its population, i.e. young men and women occurred mostly in the "zones most notorious for human export (namely), West Africa from Senegal to Angola along a belt extending about 200 miles inland, and secondly, that part of East Central Africa which today covers Tanzania, Mozambique, Malawi, Northern Zambia and Eastern Congo."²⁹ For Angola and Zaire, this meant stagnation and even regression of socio-economic and productive life. In Zaire, as we shall see later, an estimated fifteen million Africans were sold out during the period of slave trade, while another eight million died during the period of forced labour on the Belgian plantation economy. Along with this stupendous misery and stagnation of economic life in Zaire, Belgian colonial adventure (through Belgian companies where Africans provided forced labour) was reaping enormous profits such that, "between 1893 and 1900, the revenue rose rapidly from 5,500,000 francs to 26,000,000 francs; by 1901, it had become 31,000,000 francs."³⁰

²⁸Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p. 108.

²⁹Ibid., p. 109.

³⁰Maurice Hennessey, The Congo (New York: Praeger, 1961), p. 27.

This understanding allows us to postulate the following hypothetical propositions for this study. Our charge is to evaluate them in the light of historical interpretation of what actors say motivate them on one hand, and what obtains in practice.

1. It is the realist conception of interest and consequently of power in pursuit of that interest that impels transnational action in the international system, i.e., contrary to the idealist conception of history which posits that it is the pursuit of peace and order in the abstract, that undergirds transnational action and interaction, we suggest that the pursuit of peace and order is not value-free, it is based on preference and is interest-laden.
2. Protracted intervention in Africa is a function of the need by the West to maintain the decisive influence it had exercised on the African polity since the European Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, when Africa was partitioned among the European powers. In the present epoch, this historical subjugation had crystallized in the conversion of Africa as markets for Western goods and sources of supply for critical industrial metals.
3. Zaire, in 1960, was the acid test of Western determination to maintain this strategic hegemony through the conversion of the United Nations operations (1960-1964), as an agency through which the forces of African radical nationalism were contained and neutralized.
4. Angola represented the example of 1970s; and even though the form and nature of intervention there were different, the goal was the same as in Zaire, except while Angola, if reduced to specific reductionist analysis may not necessarily be a source of critical metals (though Angola has oil and diamonds which are exported mainly to the West), the objective of strategic hegemony posits the 'loss' of one territory might have a domino effect on the subregion. We argue that

protracted Western assistance to Portugal to combat the forces of African nationalism and the attempt to subvert the sovereignty of the Peoples Republic of Angola were based on this premise.

CHAPTER II

INTERVENTION AS NATIONAL INTEREST: THE PURSUIT OF FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVE

What constitutes an interventionist act in transnational action and interaction? What is intervention in foreign policy and international politics generally? Intervention is a polychromatic reality and feature of international politics. According to Richard Falk,¹ the phenomenon of intervention is used to characterize "conduct with an external animus that credibly intends to achieve a fundamental alteration of the state of affairs in the target." Lamenting the monochromatic, catch-all nature of the term which is really trying to describe a polychromatic² reality, Falk cautioned that the term "is not very adequate as a comprehensive definition for it ignores the modern techniques ranging from subversion to hostile propaganda that are used to undermine the internal autonomy of another state . . ."³

¹Richard A. Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 343.

²The term, 'monochromatic' to define the catch all nature of the term intervention while noting its polychromatic features was used by John Norton Moore, "The Control of Intervention in Internal Conflict," The Virginia Journal of International Law 2 (May 1969).

³Falk, Legal Order in a Violent World, p. 160.

While agreeing with the polychromatic features of intervention, Rosenau cautions us to pay attention to a definition that is both exhaustive and discriminating enough. Thus, he suggests that the definition ought to "be broad enough to identify those phenomena that are generally associated with the term and yet not so broad that it fails to discriminate them from other aspects of international politics."⁴

Glahn bemoans what he sees as a "general lack of agreement"⁵ among scholars as to what in international law constitutes intervention, but some authors have attempted to lay this seeming ambiguity to rest. Oran Young, characterizes intervention as "organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority structures of the target."⁶ For Melvin Gurtov, intervention is the "calculated and partisan use of national power - military, economic and political - to influence the domestic politics of another state."⁷

⁴James N. Rosenau, "The Concept of Intervention," International Affairs 2 (1968): 166.

⁵Gerhard Glahn, Law Among Nations: An Introduction to Public International Law (London: Collier-MacMillan, 1970), p. 168, quoted in Nnamdi Obiaga, "The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention: An Analysis of the Humanitarian Organizations' Roles in the Nigerian Civil War," (Ph.D Dissertation, Atlanta University, 1983), p.3.

⁶Oran Young, "Intervention and International System," Journal of International Affairs (1968): 177-178.

⁷Melvin Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World: Anti-Nationalism and Intervention (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 2.

William Appleman Williams characterizes intervention as "the knowing and willful intrusion by one nation into the affairs of another with the purpose of changing its policies and even its culture."⁸

There is, thus, quite clearly a common agreement among these authors that intervention as a conceptual tool is a multi-faceted phenomenon in its exhaustive application. It is geared towards altering a whole range of behavior in a target country from a specific policy that is vexing to the intervenor to even culture. Intervention may be military - overt invasion, economic-espionage, sabotage of industrial plants or even illicit tampering of exports to target country; political - overt political meddling and even cultural and intellectual domination. Indeed, we suggest that because it is largely unrecognized by the target population, political, cultural, and intellectual intervention is all the more potent because its basic assumption and goal are largely uncomprehended by the target population. The planting of a 'news' or 'features' account by a well-paid, anonymous but strategically placed or connected correspondent, the secret funding of a journal of opinion or broadcast station are aspects of cultural and intellectual intervention whose impact is more potent than the forced presence of 100,000 alien troops. Education, for example, in colonized

⁸William Appleman Williams, "Understanding Intervention," The Nation, 9 July 1979.

nineteenth century Africa was an arm of colonial presence, whose intended function "was to help Europeans transform the local economic and social structure in ways which strengthened European commercial and political control over the region."⁹ It is thus a form of intervention whose potency is concealed in its subtlety. While cultural, intellectual intervention is, to some extent subtle, and not readily acknowledged in the popular consciousness, it is the blatant and quite overt nature of military intervention that is quite discernible. For example, when a non-Caucasian, non-Arab, or Moorish African runs a hot comb through her/his hair or subjects his/her hair to a hair straightening potion, one can begin to discern a psychological and cultural depravity or an identity problem that is rooted in his/her attempt to assimilate the cosmetic or beauty ethos of an alien culture. But this case of cultural intervention or disruption is often unrecognized by the targeted population.

Having conceded the polychromatic nature of intervention, the only type of intervention that is the focus of this analysis is politico-military intervention -- that particular mode of intervention that "seeks to manipulate the outcome of internal conflict (insurgency, political crises, revolution, or civil war) or through subversion to

⁹Martin Carnoy, "Education and Traditional Colonialism: India and West Africa," in Education as Cultural Imperialism (New York: David McKay Company, 1974), p. 82.

precipitate such conflict."¹⁰ Military intervention is really a mode of intervention of a last resort, that is, when preference for, or compliance with an objective cannot be obtained by any other means. All modes of intervention posit a preference, but military intervention goes further in that it seeks compliance with or preference for its objectives under compulsion. "It implies a peremptory demand for positive conduct . . . (which) if not complied with, involves a threat of recourse to compulsion . . ."¹¹

That is to say, that what we are seeking to analyze is the use of political and armed intervention to achieve a strategic objective, by manipulating the outcome of domestic conflict. Our point is that extra-African powers enter the terrain in order to influence or manipulate the outcome of the conflict in Zaire and Angola.

The merits and demerits of the motivational factors for an armed interventionist policy are related issues to the extent that they help to elucidate the reality of an African polity struggling to regain its own initiative in world affairs and terminate all relations of domination and exploitation. We are making a distinction¹² between this and

¹⁰Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World, p. 2.

¹¹H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights (New York: Praeger, 1950), quoted in Obiaga, "Politics of Humanitarian Intervention," p. 3.

¹²On the distinctions between the two parameters of interventionist activities, see W.E. Hall, (ed), A Treatise on International Law (Oxford: Pearce Higgins, 1924), p. 337;

interventionist policy directed against an actor's foreign relations. That is, we seek to analyze such actions which seek to penetrate, influence and prejudice the outcome of internal conflict.

The Purpose of Intervention

Is intervention founded and based on interest, or some abstract and abstruse doctrine of balance of power? Is an interventionist policy a humanitarian gesture or a concealed vehicle for the consolidation and defense of economic political and strategic interests? Is intervention motivated by pacific principles or guided solely and unambiguously by ruthless pursuit of interest? Is an interventionist policy a means to an end, an instrument for an objective whose unwavering purpose is the defense and consolidation of economic and geopolitical hegemony? Western social science, both its orthodox and liberal genres have attempted to answer this cardinal question. Slater, for example, wondered whether characterizing U.S. intervention abroad¹³ as "imperial," "imperialistic," or "empire-building" should be taken literally or metaphorically and if the

. . . T.J. Lawrence, (ed), Principles of International Law (London: P.H. Winfield, 1925), p. 119; Ann Van Wynen Thomas, and A.J. Thomas, Jr., Non-Intervention (Dallas, 1956), p. 71; Charles G. Fenwick, International Law (New York, 1965), p. 288.

¹³Jerome Slater, "Is United States Foreign Policy Imperialist or Imperial," in At Issue: Politics in the World Arena, ed. Steve L. Spiegel (New York: St. Martins Press, 1977), p. 38.

emphasis is on the metaphorical, whether this is an apt, accurate, insightful, enlightening or basically misleading characterization.

Taking issue with that they saw as the condemnatory and accusatory connotation of the word "imperialistic" some authors have suggested that the word "imperial" is more illuminating in elucidating the purpose of intervention.

They¹⁴ argue that:

- a. Imperial policies are primarily a function of the international rather than the domestic imperatives -- it was the need to maintain world peace and the absence of international institutions for the conduct and regulation of transnational transactions that lead to imperial policies.
- b. An imperial policy is not fundamentally economic in nature and not structurally rooted in any particular socio-economic system. The policy is just concerned with power for its own sake or the maintenance of world order.
- c. A great power (their example was the United States) may have an imperial role without having an imperial policy and interests and commitments of states expand (naturally and inevitably) as their power expands.
- d. Since imperial policies largely arose out of a need to regulate an "anarchic international system," it is the 'altruistic' philosophy that lies behind the policy that should be emphasized rather than the aberrations of the policy in practice.

¹⁴This is a summation of the central argument of these works, John Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York: Praeger, 1973); Raymond Aaron, The Imperial Republic (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1974); George Liska, War and Order (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968); Robert W. Tucker, Nation or Empire (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1968).

- e. Genuine security fears, expansionist idealism and ideological anticommunism and other political, strategic or psychological factors have been contributory factors for an interventionist imperial policy.

With respect to the psychological factor, Slater¹⁵ failed to specify whether this is some kind of Western neurosis or some other psychotic pathological dysfunction.

Thus, these scholars suggest, it was the "humanitarian and pacific tradition" to make the world safe as opposed to the logic of the pursuit of interest that gives birth to an interventionist policy. Slater, for example, appears to have been influenced by Herz,¹⁶ when he argues that obsession with security leads inexorably to acquisition of more power and influence. Thus, an hegemonic pursuit is disguised and explained away as just a security dilemma whose safeguard can only be 'guaranteed' by world domination.¹⁷

Consequently, according to the security and world policemen thesis of these authors, between 1500 and 1900, "the guarantors of world peace and international order" enslaved or colonized (both in Africa) most of the world with the exception of China and Japan. Two traditional expansionist outposts characterized the four centuries.

¹⁵Slater, "Is the United States Foreign Policy Imperialist or Imperial," p. 25.

¹⁶John H. Herz, Political Realism and Political Idealism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951).

¹⁷James Burnham, The Struggle for the World (New York: Praeger, 1947), this is the central thesis of this work.

In the first one, European settlers conquered the natives, appropriated their land and developed the country for the enclave European community. The natives were almost completely annihilated and exterminated and the remaining were confined by "treaties" to reservations and "autonomous" enclaves. The U.S., Central, South America, Australia and New Zealand represent this type. The second of these expansionist outposts are "occupied and administered colonies, where a few European colonists, primarily traders and soldiers, controlled the colony for the home country. Taxes and primary goods flowed into Europe from the colonies under tight trade monopolies."¹⁸ Africa, and the European Asian colonies represent this type. Within the same period, the thirteen original U.S. colonies expanded into a whole continent, that today, the strategic geopolitical frontiers of the U.S. run from River Elbe to the coast line of Asia. All these developments occurred in the service of world peace and orderly regulation and in consonance with "humanitarian and pacific traditions."¹⁹

No attempt is made in this school of thought to explain and analyze the history of the genocidal treatment meted out to the people domiciled in the areas in which these

¹⁸Carnoy, Education As Cultural Imperialism, p. 78.

¹⁹Frank Tannebaum, "The Balance of Power Versus the Coordinate State," Political Science Quarterly 67 (June 1952).

expansionist policies were visited, their enslavement for free labour and bounteous harvests forcibly extracted. In the spirit of this pacific tradition, the British virtually appropriated Indian textile production, that between 1780 and 1850, India went from almost self-reliance in textile production to importer of British Lancashire exports; the British, having now taken control of both production and distribution in the textile industry. According to Mandel, this was a result of the "fact that capitalism entered this country under conditions of imperialist domination, which transformed India from a producer of manufactured goods into a producer of agricultural raw materials."²⁰

In the modern era, intervention in the Third World is premised on a need to protect these countries from the untoward influence of communism so that they can have the freedom to develop Western attitudes and institutions that will guide them to the terminal station of prosperity and abundance. It is for this reason that Ake²¹ had characterized Western social science as a form of imperialism in that it attempts to foist capitalist values on Third World societies and sees their development only within the context

²⁰ Ernest Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory (London: Merlin Press, 1973); Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review, 1968), pp. 144-150; Ranjit Sau, Unequal Exchange, Imperialism and Underdevelopment (Calcutta, 1978), pp. 38-40.

²¹ Ake, Social Science As Imperialism, p. 7.

of capitalism. Latin America, for example, has had constitutional independence for 150 years, and rather than develop, the region is reeking under massive debt burden, agricultural stagnation and inhuman poverty and suffering. Brazil, the Western economic miracle of the 70's has \$99 billion of the total \$830 billion²² debt of the Third World, while Mexico's total debt is \$96 billion.²³ Brazil's debt service ratio in 1980 was over 60 percent and American banking and financial institutions are creaming off enormous profits from the miseries of Brazilian economy. In 1980, Brazil provided more than 10 percent of the earnings of Citibank and Chase Manhattan Bank.²⁴

With specific respect to the phenomenon of intervention in Africa, Colin Legum²⁵ has argued, in consonance with this world order thesis, the extra-African powers in the modern era had committed themselves to armed intervention to influence the outcome of internal conflict when, (1) insecurely based unpopular regimes trying to maintain power have invited them; (2) inter-African disputes spill over to extra-African concerns; and (3) liberation struggles seeking

²²C.A. Bogdanowicz-Bindert, "World Debt: The U.S. Reconsiders," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1985-86): 261.

²³New York Times, 6 October 1985; The Atlanta Constitution, 9 February 1986.

²⁴New York Times, 8 December 1980.

²⁵Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Africa," in The Yearbook of World Affairs (New York: Praegers, 1980), p. 80.

external support have appealed to extra-African sources. First, Colin Legum proceeds as if the political history of the target of intervention begins in the specific period his analysis covers. That is, what is the historical basis for the act of intervention? Legum fails to tell us what objective an intervenor hopes to achieve. His analysis ascribes the motive, mode and nature of intervention to its victim. By not locating his analysis in history, Legum renders a superficial and unenlightening analysis. Why, for example, will an intervenor support one disputant and not the other? Are the imperatives of intervention based on pacific and humanitarian instincts? That is, does a policy of intervention serve the self-interest of the intervenor? Legum provides no elucidation on this critical point except to locate all the motivating factors of intervention within the target area. Bon and Mingst²⁶ went further than Legum in analyzing the nature and range of an activist interventionist policy by France in Africa. They characterized French intervention in Senegal as both "continuous and subtle." They faulted what they saw as the undue "optimism" of decolonization perspective and the "pessimism" of the dependency perspective, but paid insufficient attention to what they themselves characterized as "French motivations as facilitators of an interventionist policy in general."²⁷

²⁶Daniel Bon and Karen Mingst, "French Intervention in Africa: Dependency or Decolonization," Africa Today, 2nd quarter (1980): 5-20.

²⁷Ibid., p. 6.

Taking issue with the world order thesis of Western social science, the Marxist analysis suggests that intervention is rooted in the rapacious character and nature of capitalism, its need for ever widening market area and commodity products, means that capitalism must "nestle everywhere, settle everywhere."²⁸ The dependency school also takes the Marxist interpretation of intervention as a point of departure. It is necessary, however, to state that there are two variants of the dependency school. The first represented by Raul Prebisch and the UN Commission for Latin American and including the writings of Osvaldo Sunkel and Celso Furtado²⁹ could be termed nationalist-capitalist. The other variant is represented by the writings of Andre Gunder Frank, Baran, Amin and Wallerstein.³⁰ In African Studies, Walter Rodney, Ake and Magubane are examples of this school.³¹ However, there is some convergence

²⁸Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1973), p. 35.

²⁹Celso Furtado, Economic Growth of Brazil: A Survey From Colonial to Modern Times (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963); Osvaldo Sunkel, "Big Business and Dependency," Foreign Affairs (April 1972).

³⁰Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: Monthly Review, 1976); Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge, 1979); Samir Amin, Accumulation On A World Scale (New York: Monthly Review, 1974); Paul Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly Review, 1957); A.G. Frank, Latin America: Underdevelopment or Resolution (New York: Monthly Review, 1967).

³¹Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa; Ake, A Political Economy of Africa; B. Mugubane, The Political Economy of Race and Class in South Africa (Boulder: Westview, 1980).

of viewpoint between these two variants of the dependency school, because they are both; (1) nationalist and anti-imperialist, (2) both accept externally based and directed capitalist domination as a historical legacy of capitalist intervention, (3) they both argue that the prevailing international economic system is structured to the disadvantage of the Third World countries whose surplus is now creamed off through various institutionalized mechanisms such as the Western dominated lending and banking institutions.

However, for the nationalist school this perceived anomaly can be remedied, if this domination were removed, the enclaves would then embark on their own process of accumulation, within and maintaining a capitalist relation of production and distribution. For the radical variant, what they see as the phenomenon of economic stagnation, compounded by social inequity and injustice can only be overhauled in a thorough going socialist reconstruction.

The radical variant went a little further in analyzing the social classes in neo-colony. We have stated earlier why we prefer the theoretical framework of dependency which takes the Marxist theory of intervention as a point of departure. This symmetry we see between the Marxist theory of intervention and dependency school (the radical variant) rests on two main points.

According to Marx,

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of

the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black skins, signalled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These Idyllic preceedings are the chief momenta of primitive accumulation . . . The treasures captured outside Europe by undisguised looting, enslavement, and murder, floated back to the mother-country and were turned into capital . . . Liverpool waxed fat on the slave-trade. This was its method of primitive accumulation. . . ³²

Mandel has also argued that,

. . . Indeed the unlimited industrial advance of the Western world has been possible only at the expense of the so-called underdeveloped world, which has been doomed to stagnation and regression.³³

This Marxist theory of intervention enabled the radical dependency school to argue that underdevelopment far from being the original state -- the state of nature as argued by the development theory is but the other side of a historical process.

Economic development and underdevelopment are the opposite sides of the same coin. Both are the necessary result and contemporary manifestation of internal contradictions in the world capitalist system . . . One and the same historical process has simultaneously generated -- and continues to generate -- both economic development (in the industrialized core states) and structural underdevelopment in the dependent peripheral states.³⁴

³² Karl Marx, Capital, Vol. 1; Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Putnam, 1944); Harry Magdoff, Imperialism: From Colonial Age to the Present (New York: Monthly Review, 1978); Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review, 1969).

³³ Mandel, Marxist Economic Theory, p. 441.

³⁴ Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, p. 9.

This process characterized by Frank as "the development of underdevelopment," in which the loss, plunder of one (the periphery) becomes the gain of the other (the core) enables us to suggest that the specific mode of intervention we seek to study here has an historical basis in both Angola and Zaire. Thus, we need to investigate whether it is the imperative need to maintain the unequal relations between an intervenor and the target that informs this particular type of intervention. Thus, we can find out if critical dependence of Western economy on vital strategic metals emanating from Zaire; the loss of market to the finished goods of intervenors is a factor and whether the domino effect of strategic "loss" of any territory compels an activist interventionist policy to forestall that eventuality. For Angola, apart from the economic imperative that may inform an interventionist policy, the political and strategic calculation vis-a-vis its ideological adversary, the process of potential radicalization of a subregion where Western hegemony had been uncontested for 500 years was at the heart of Western policy. Henry Kissinger seems to give credence to this thesis, when he said that,

Angola represents the first time since the aftermath of World War II that the Soviet Union has moved militarily at long distances to impose a regime of its choice. It is the first time that the U.S. has failed to respond to Soviet military moves outside their immediate orbit.³⁵

³⁵Henry Kissinger, "U.S. Involvement in Angola," Hearings Before the Sub-Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, March 1976, p. 56.

What Kissinger did not tell us was whether Africa has historically been within the Western orbit since that initial epoch of plunder and enslavement referred to earlier. Thus, we need to uncover, proceeding with the method of historical materialism, based on the interpretation of historical data, whether intervention as a foreign policy tool of extra-African powers is a phenomenon of the contemporary epoch, or one that has a long history.

An examination of the same historical data will help us determine the veracity or otherwise of the pacific nature of this encounter -- whether intervention was based on ruthless pursuit of self interest, that brought mass poverty, stagnation, humiliation and ruin to Africa politically, economically and even psychologically or whether it was truly an altruistic humanitarian venture to keep peace and order among warring natives.

The second point in the symmetry we see between the radical variant of the dependency school and the Marxist theory is in regard to the assessment of the dialectical relationship between the ruling classes of the centre and the periphery of the world system.

Lenin³⁶ wrote about the buying off of the workers by the ruling class in the Centres of imperialism; it was this theme of the cooption of the local bourgeoisie in the neo-colony to accept imperialist hegemony as grasped and

³⁶ V.I. Lenin, Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970).

further analyzed by the radical dependency school that glaringly exposed the error of the nationalist variant. For the ruling elites of a neo-colony far from being the progressive prototype of the European middle class in the first three centuries of capitalism, did not save, accumulate or produce nor oversaw an inward, autonomous capitalist development. Its room for manoeuvre corresponds to the respites it is able to gain during the boom and bust cycles of capitalism. Dominated and manipulated by the economic power³⁷ of its senior allies in the centre under whose broad aegis it operates, it functions in the main, as a conduit, to facilitate further imperialist penetration and domination. It operates the state apparatus, for its narrow class interest and in compliance with the interests of its senior allies. It is thus neither a proper nor a true bourgeoisie but a false one,

Its mission has nothing to do with transforming the nation; it consists, prosaically, of being the transmission line between the nation and a capitalism, rampant though camouflaged, which today puts on the masque of neo-colonialism . . . Because it is bereft of ideas, because it lives to itself and cuts itself off from the people, undermined by its hereditary incapacity from the point of view of the whole of that nation, the national middle class will have nothing better to do than to take on the role of manager for Western enterprise, and it will in practice set up its country as the brothel of Europe.³⁸

³⁷Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, p. 65; see also, Brazil: State and Struggle (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982), chapters 3, 4, and 5.

³⁸Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1963), pp. 152-154.

Lacking a material base, because the logic of colonialism conditioned its underdevelopment, the African bourgeoisie easily falls prey to the machination and manipulation of the dominant class of the imperialist centre; the contradiction it sees between its own country and the centre are resolved in favour of the centre. This analysis enables us to understand aspects of the conditions that facilitate intervention in a target country. With the demise of classical empire building and colonialism which has been replaced by juridical independence, the contradictions between the ruling elites in a neo-colony and the mass of the people become further exposed. Acceding to independence within an unaltered socio-economic formation, places the African bourgeoisie between two contending forces -- that of its own people and that of imperialism. If the bourgeoisie attempts to resolve these contradictions in favour of the people, it faces the implacable hostility of imperialism. If it attempts to resolve it in favour of imperialism, it faces the fury of the people. Consequently, the only way it can retain state power in the service of its class interest is to come under the tutelage of imperialism. The infiltration and cultivation of the ruling elites of a neo-colony by the intervenor in seeking to influence the outcome of domestic conflict in its own favour will be examined further in chapters IV and V.

The Idea of National Interest

If rationalization or justifications offered by intervenors are to be believed, an act of intervention is pursued in defense of "national interest." The rest of this chapter will be devoted to an attempt to understand this concept both in its theoretical ambiguity and its application by nation state actors. "The honest and just interests of this country (England) and her inhabitants, are the just and honest interests of this world."³⁹ The author of this statement in referring to the interests of England as "just and honest" also seemed to accept that the interests of all the other countries are honest and just, and hence there exists an "absence of all clashing interests."⁴⁰ "Interests dominate the actions of men."⁴¹ For Singer, elites will define national interests in terms compatible with their own international identity."⁴² Along the same line, Gurtov argues that "national interest"⁴³ or what elites say it is

³⁹John Bright and James E. Thorold Rogers (eds), "Speeches by Richard Cobden on Questions of Public Policy," in R. J. Vincent, Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton: University Press, 1974), p. 46.

⁴⁰Lord Salisbury quoted in Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1974), p.8.

⁴¹Max Weber quoted in Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, p.9.

⁴²M. R. Singer, Weak States in A World of Powers (New York: The Free Press), 1972.

⁴³Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World, p.4.

explains or rationalizes "governmental behavior in specific cases," while encompassing universalistic hopes and ambitions.

Predictably these authors have demonstrated some wariness in telling us precisely what they mean by national interest, because of the emotive connotative and denotative meaning the concept evokes in practice. However, Seabury provides us with a definition sufficiently abstract that we feel comfortable enough to adopt it as a working definition for the purpose of this study. "The idea of national interests may refer to some ideal set of purposes which a nation . . . should seek to realize in the conduct of its foreign relations."⁴⁴ Then, obviously in agreement with Singer, Seabury suggested further, "it might similarly be said that the national interest is what foreign policymakers say it is."⁴⁵

The ambiguity shown by these authors is a recognition of the fact that a nation's interest or national interest as a conceptual tool, does not lend itself to neat and tidy precision or terminological exactitude. National interest as a guiding principle for some weaker actors in the international system is much more focused than for others, for whom the term lends itself to expansionist or imperialist

⁴⁴Paul Seabury, "Power, Freedom and Diplomacy: The Foreign Policy of the United States of America," quoted in K.J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliff: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 139.

⁴⁵Ibid.

interpretation. In pursuits of their interests, states generally tend to prioritize the range and category of such interests to which finite resources can be deployed. The core interest obviously will be the preservation of the corporate entity, that is the inviolability or non-negotiability of the territorial integrity and sovereignty. In the sphere of foreign policy it is certainly the doctrine of national interest or the pursuit of same that impels transnational action and reaction. To be sure, the ideology of national interest as the underpinning philosophy of transnational action may be cloaked under such messianic and crusading jargon as, "manifest destiny," "proletarian internationalism" or such strategic doctrines as "deterrence," "containment", "massive retaliation," "salience of power" or "domino theory." As an analytic concept, the term national interest is truly an amorphous one that lends itself to eclectic and ever-changing interpretations and definitions. For the Soviet Union, in 1919, the pursuit of the objective of world revolution was of prime national interest, as Trotsky wrote, "our task is to mobilize the forces of all genuinely revolutionary parties of the world proletariat and thereby hasten the victory of the communist revolution throughout the world."⁴⁶ However, by 1927, the thesis of world revolution even at the level of rhetorics, as an objective of national interest

⁴⁶ Richard Barnet, Intervention and Revolution (New York: The World Publishing Company), p. 63.

had been abandoned. For Joseph Stalin, the thesis is an "idiotic phrase" and "a revolutionary," according to the Stalinist definition of Russian nationalist interest, "is one who is ready to protect, to defend the USSR without reservation, without qualification openly and honestly An internationalist is one who is ready to defend the USSR , without wavering, unconditionally: for," Stalin's messianic nationalism now runneth over, "the USSR is the base of the world revolutionary movement and this revolutionary movement cannot be defended and promoted unless USSR is defended."⁴⁷ Thus, for many states, the doctrine of national interest serves an open-ended catch-all purpose that serves to neatly justify or rationalize their behavior on the international scene. It's meaning and acceptance of same commands no universal allegiance. The eclectic nature of the definition and interpretation of what constitutes national interest transcends ideology, common culture or national heritage.

The self-serving propensity that characterizes trans-national action and interaction in pursuit of what all actors describe as national interest has been guided by what an author has described as the "seesaw of class and national motive force."⁴⁸ According to this author, there exists an everchanging, continually undulating phenomenon

⁴⁷ Joseph Stalin, Works (Moscow: Progress, 1927), Vol. X, pp. 53-54.

⁴⁸ Silviu Brucan, The Dialectics of World Politics (New York: The Free Press, 1978), p. 21.

that defies ideological, cultural or national categorization, that pits nations of varying and conflicting ideological persuasion and economic structure against each other in one era and then in an expedient alliance in another. For example, the U.S., Britain and France, while remaining bitter enemies of the Soviet Union found themselves allies of the same Soviet Union during World War II. In the modern era, the problems that divide the Soviet Union and China, include both their respective national interpretation and adaptation of Marxism, as well as their boundary problems. In spite of the fact that they both claim to be socialist states, these problems have not been resolved within a socialist fraternal accommodation.⁴⁹ During the Vietnam war, both the Soviet Union and China provided diplomatic, moral and material support to the Vietnamese people in their struggle against French colonial hegemony and later U.S. imperialist aggression, even though deep antipathy and suspicion characterized their bilateral relation. During the Vietnam war, the late Chairman Mao-Tse Tung characterized the close fraternal relations between China and Vietnam as one between the mouth and the tongue. Today

⁴⁹ For an analysis of the protracted nature of the issues that divide the Soviet Union and the Peoples Republic of China, see Walter S. Jones, The Logic of International Relations (Boston: Little Brown & Coy, 1982), pp. 37-41; Hans J. Margenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace (New York: A.A. Knopf, 1968), p. 351.

boundary problems and differences over their Kampuchea policies have led to armed hostilities between China and Vietnam. Perhaps, no event, within the spectrum of the international relations of Africa captured the essence of the phenomenon of the "seesaw of class and national motive force" more than the Chinese role in the Angolan war of 1976. The Peoples Republic of China, under the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung and Chou-En-Lai, had built an image of friendship, fraternity and solidarity with the people of Latin America, Asia and Africa, in their struggles to throw off the yoke of colonialism and imperialism since the establishment of the Chinese regime in 1949 to the 1960's when most African countries became formally independent. Having not been a colonial power in Africa, and only having recently cast off the yoke of imperialist domination themselves, the Chinese in the international fora had tried to cast their lot with progressive African aspirations and had played an important role in Afro-Asian solidarity. China had had long-standing association with most Africa liberation movements and to cap its feathers of fraternity with African struggle against imperialism of the West, Chinese expertise and materials, built the Tan-Zan railway that linked Tanzania and Zambia in 1971. This singular act enabled landlocked Zambia to break its dependence on white-supremacist ruled Zimbabwe for use of the Zimbabwean port facilities to transport the Zambian major foreign exchange earner -- copper. However, by 1976, the leadership

of the Peoples Republic of China had passed into the hands of Hua Kuo Feng and Deng Xiao Peng who apparently had a much narrower conception of Chinese national interest that transcends any ideological affinity with any nation in the world.

The maximization of Chinese foreign policy objective appears to have been reduced to one immutable thesis -- the sustained and inflexible hostility to any Soviet action on the international arena, irrespective of the objective merits or demerits of the issue involved and the sacrifice of the two decades of Chinese solidarity and fraternity with all peoples struggling to regain their national destiny and place in the comity of nations. In pursuance of this policy of seemingly implacable hostility to Soviet Union the Peoples Republic of China found itself against all progressive forces and its traditional friends in Africa, especially Tanzania and in the company of the pariah of the international system, South Africa, and its allies like the United States, Britain, etc., during the crisis prompted by the South African invasion of Angola in 1975. Chinese national interest and its strategic objective as now defined by the new rulership was then to counter what it saw as an ascendancy of Soviet influence in the new state.

If we count this instance as one determined more by national interest (national motive force in Brucan's term), then by the same token, Chinese cooperation with the Soviet Union to aid the Vietnamese people could be

explained on the grounds of ideological affinity and geopolitical considerations. It is the Byzantine irregularity that defies both constancy and consistency that makes it difficult to state precisely what objectively constitutes a nation's national interest. Be that as it may, the enunciation of a particular policy in the pursuit of what any given actor states to be its national interest clearly has to be made with a clear and unambiguous sense and acknowledgement of the nation's capability to defend that interest. Anything short of that is mere wishful thinking. The aggregate of weight given to a particular 'interest' varies, because some interests are so generalized and unimportant to the survival of the actor that their defense is hardly ever contemplated. All the same, the idea or the doctrine of national interest is clearly the lynchpin of the most rudimentary understanding of the actions of nation-states. The fact that what constitutes that particular interest is hardly ever fixed or resources (human and material) deployed towards its pursuit are finite notwithstanding, nations do indeed act according to however it is defined. We apply the word finite here because no nation on earth can defend any interest forever, otherwise nations will never surrender in wars. For example, Japan could not forever defend itself in the War of 1939-45; if it did not surrender, the outcome may have been too ghastly to contemplate. Likewise, when the United States devoted billions of dollars and lost 58,000 soldiers in Vietnam and

saw its national fabric bitterly divided, it learned that no matter how mighty or powerful an actor may be, the concept of national interest even when defined strategically as national security, can suffer irrevocable diminution that it be either fundamentally modified or completely jettisoned and abandoned.

In pursuit of the national interest or specific foreign policy objective, nations utilize means, channels and procedures, to realize or maximize the particular objective. Since all actors are in some form of contention or another, it is necessary to delineate the nature of the objective to be realized. Contention between actors ranges from friendly contention to one of acrimony, bitterness, hostility and mutual distrust. Therefore, relationships might range from one of relaxed competition, to a relation of coercion and intimidation. Diplomatic negotiations, communications direct and indirect, may attend a relation of friendly contention. Relations of coercion, though, are specifically addressed to adversarial contention. The means at the service of an actor in securing a change in the behavior of another actor might range from hostile propaganda, economic warfare (e.g., economic sabotage, quarantine and blockage of harbors), clandestine subversive action, outright military intervention and counterrevolutionary activities. That is to say intervention is based on the perception by an actor that its interest is

threatened, hence an intervenor directs its energies towards securing a change of behavior in the target.

We have suggested earlier that the nature of African articulation with the world system is conflict prone; the following chapter will attempt to provide the historical background of this conflictual relationship. We have also hypothesized earlier that it is the realist conception of power -- its acquisition in the pursuit of interest that characterizes action and interaction in the international system. But the acquisition of power by one actor in interaction with others posits at least theoretically a negation or "loss" by another, hence interaction becomes asymmetrical. But power though is not pursued for its own sake, it is pursued with an objective in mind, for a purpose. The chapter will attempt to analyze why extra African powers intervene in Africa -- why self interest and not order or peace motivates intervention. And if order and peace are to be maintained, they will be maintained on the terms and preferences desired by the intervenor. What we suggest is that order and peace are not abstract in practice, i.e., a certain order and the kind of peace that is conducive to the interests of the intervenor. The broad overview on power and conflict vis-a-vis Africa and extra-African powers will enable us to perceive that the problem of external intervention (to influence the outcome of domestic conflict in Zaire and Angola) is a continent-wide phenomenon, because

of the role and place of Africa in the world system as markets for finished goods and source of critical metals for Western capitalist nations. We trace the long history of the subordination of African resources (human and material) and suggest that intervention to influence domestic conflict in Angola and Zaire serve only: (1) as case studies of a continent wide phenomenon; and (2) to strengthen and consolidate this subordinate relation and prevent its termination.

CHAPTER III

AFRICA IN THE WORLD SYSTEM: DEPENDENCE, DEPENDENCY, INTERDEPENDENCE AND RELATIONAL ASYMMETRY

Africa as a subordinate unit in the international system meets all the identifiable characteristics advanced by system integration theorists and scholars.¹ Let us look at the characteristics of the subordinate regional system.

1. There is a clear and manifest geographical land mass which is clearly identifiable and recognized by the international system as an integral part.
2. There is an identity of systematic perception by the international community and the members of the subordinate system.
3. Little horizontal contact within the sub-system; contact is vertical -- towards the centre.

When treating Africa as a sub-system here, two caveats are in order; (a) the phenomenon of intractable colonial racial hegemony within the sub-system, and (b) the overlapping Mid-East and African land mass within the same sub-system.

¹See for example, I.W. Zartman, "Africa As A Subordinate State System in International Relations," International Relations, "International Organization XXI (Summer 1967): 545-564.

In the case of (a) above, we argue that the sub-system is still evolving and has not fully realized the limits of its land base. This is borne out by the fact that the last racial/colonial outpost is under international assault and is considered within the international system a pariah. Its enduring intractability notwithstanding, its inclusion ultimately within the sub-system is a matter of time. The lesson of history is that when the human and material cost of hegemony based on race becomes prohibitive for the whites of South Africa and their external collaborators, accommodation will be reached.

For (b) above, there is a convergence and confluence of interests partly based on colonial experience, religious identification and more importantly on the shared experience of neo-colonial subjugation. This is not to dismiss the arguments of those who see a mutual exclusivity of interests in Afro-Arab relations. But Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Sudan and Libya can be African as well as Arab. The underlying referent for the black exclusive school is essentially race. But such a position conveniently overlooks the fact that Algeria² has consistently championed the cause of "black" African liberation while such "black" countries like Malawi actively colluded with Portugal to frustrate the efforts of the Frelimo during the Mozambican independence struggle

²Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations: The Diplomacy of Dependency and Change (London: Heinemann, 1977), pp. 150-155.

Having looked at these two caveats, the African subregion in the international system for our purpose in this analysis, refers to the continental land mass proper and the outlying waters and islands. The term "black Africa" coined by Euro-American writers has no analytic utility whatsoever beyond that of a racial connotation. It emanates historically from the attempt of Euro-American historiography to divorce the Afro-Mediterranean subregion from its African continuum. It does become convenient to ascribe different social forces for the "black" African polity and thus its "uniqueness."

In the contemporary epoch, terms like "mutual dependence," "interdependence," "association," "partnership," and "mutual responsiveness," are the new conceptual tools being bandied about by scholars and lay people alike to describe and characterize the role and nature of the relationship of Africa vis-a-vis the world system. This is not simply a matter of terminological indiscipline or analytic confusion but it betrays an unwillingness to systematize the study of the role and place of Africa in a multi-polar or bi-polar system analysis. Perhaps attempts to explain or rationalize, as the case may be, the place of Africa in the world system has gotten quite sophisticated. After all, it was not so long ago, that the accepted conventional notion was that there was nothing really worth explaining. Euro-American scholars were uniformly convinced that Africa and her inhabitants were marginal in virtually

all spheres of human development. The accepted historiographic and scientific scholarship confirmed that "Seul de tous les continents, l'Afrique n'a pas d'histoire" ³ or in the quite definitive words of Sir Hugh Trevor-Roper, the Regius Professor of Modern History at Oxford University,

Maybe, in the future there will be some African history, but at the moment there is none There is only the history of Europeans in Africa . . . The rest is darkness, and darkness is not a subject of history.⁴

Nowadays it is no longer so socially acceptable to brazenly substitute bigotry and prejudice or cultural arrogance for scholarship.

This is not to suggest that terms like "association," "interdependence," etc., yield us any analytical or explanatory value in explaining the place of Africa in the world system. Our first duty is to attempt a conceptual clarity or definitional precision.

James Caporoso, in reviewing the nature of 'dependence and dependency'⁵ in the world system, drew an analytic

³Quoted in W.E. Burghardt DuBois, The World and Africa: An Inquiry Into the Part Which Africa has Played in World History (New York: International Publishers, 1975), p. 8. Also see Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), this work is in two volumes. For a fairly comprehensive historical and sociological analysis of Euro-American view of Africa and Africans, the two volumes ought to be read together.

⁴Quoted in Ali A. Mazrui, The African Condition (London: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 6.

⁵James A. Caporoso, "Dependency, Dependency and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," International Organization 32 (Winter 1978): 13-43.

distinction between the two concepts. According to Caporoso, "dependence" can be broadly defined as "external reliance on other actors" and "dependency" as "the process of incorporation of less developed countries (LDCs) into the world system."⁶ While conceding strong affinity between the two concepts and accepting the theme of relational asymmetry and vulnerabilities between actors as the main focus, he concludes that an analytic distinction is however, necessary because there are dissimilarities in the theoretical framework. Caporoso sees dependence as being focused on individual state actor and thus lending itself to empiricism, while dependency is concerned with the class structure.

A discourse, however cursory of the conflicting theories of the state, plus some analysis of the structure of the state in the hands of a particular class, would have been helpful in further clarifying Caporoso's position here. However, as an abstract intellectual distinction, Caporoso's explanation might be useful, but he himself concedes that "dependence" and "dependency" have relational asymmetry as their main focus. The distinctions between

⁶ Following Marx and Lenin, Immanuel Wallerstein sees the development of the mercantilist/capitalist era in global terms -- hence, the term world system. For an understanding of the world system and its development see, Wallerstein, The Modern World System; Amin, Accumulation On A World Scale; Andre Gunder Frank, World Accumulation, 1492-1789 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978).

them assumes a semantic form when one realizes that they both have the same theoretical antecedents and the basic conceptualization accepts the "chain of historical causation"⁷ that gave birth to both dependence and dependency. What is clearly important is that we see the central concern of dependence and dependency as the "asymmetric properties of the structure of the relationship among social entities."⁸ This is the proper and fitting context to analyze transnational or international relationship before we embark on a review of the constraints, possibilities, schisms and structure of that relationship. It is crucial to bear in mind that it is the question of relational inequality, and the uneven burden of vulnerability contained therein that lie at the centre of dependence/dependency theory. Various writers in their attempt to critique the theory have allowed their analysis to degenerate into circular argumentation by refusing to acknowledge the existence of relational asymmetry between the centre and periphery of the world system. Or in instances where relational inequality is acknowledged, insufficient or superficial attention has been

⁷ There is an implicit and sometimes quite explicit agreement in virtually all the works of the dependencia school that both dependence and dependency are both worldwide and historical. For a good review of the historical root or basis of the phenomena, see, for example, Peter C.W. Gutking and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Political Economy of Contemporary Africa (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), pp. 7-29.

⁸ Raymond D. Duvall, "Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes Towards Precision of Concept and Argument," International Organization 32 (Winter 1978): 51-78.

paid to it and hence the analysis lacks coherence.⁹ The obfuscation and inconsistency often betrayed by many of these writers is best illustrated by David A. Baldwin in an article that oddly enough claims to attempt a conceptual analysis of interdependence and power.¹⁰ Baldwin's attempt at analyzing dependence/dependency vis-a-vis relational power in the world system is flawed in a number of important respects. First, it would have served Baldwin's purpose better if he had stated his theoretical position at the onset, rather than alluding to it in the middle of his essay. Baldwin subscribes to the classical theory of international relations; says he,

This theory constitutes a powerful conceptual tool for the student of international politics . . . It should not be necessary to develop a separate theory to cover each issue area of international exchange relations.¹¹

But Baldwin's normative bias is concealed under a supposedly fresh and objective attempt to analyze what he sees as the analytic and conceptual confusion in the dependence/dependency theory. Baldwin's main fixation and

⁹See for example, Sanjaya Lall, "Is Dependence a Useful Concept in Analyzing Underdevelopment," World Development 3 (November 1975): 808. Lall pays little or no attention to relational asymmetry in transnational interaction, having made that fundamental error, he failed to grasp the crux of the dependence/dependencia theory.

¹⁰David A. Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," International Organization 4 (Autumn 1980): 471-506.

¹¹Ibid., p. 489.

preoccupation concerns what he sees as the distortion of the "conventional" and "normal" usage of the term interdependence by the dependencia school. "In explicating the concept of dependence, the simple most important question concerns conventional usage."¹² He accepts the etymological ancestry of the terms dependence and dependency but finds "rather mystifying" Caporoso's assertion that dependency, since it has no basis or roots in Baldwin's "conventional" fixation, "can only be understood within a certain body of historical, political, and sociological thought."¹³ Caporoso's certain body of sociological thought is, of course, the analytic framework of dependency school. Granted, Caporoso's coyness in not acknowledging that he was actually referring to this school of thought, what does one make of Baldwin's pretensions of a disinterested analysis? Was Baldwin aware of his own normative disposition with which his analysis is thoroughly informed? One would have to look long and hard to answer that in the affirmative. Baldwin refers approvingly and selectively to the concept of dependency in his own words, as employed by "Machiavelli, Montequieu, Rousseau, Adam Smith and Malthus."¹⁴ His so-called conceptual analysis is really

¹²Ibid., p. 475.

¹³Caporaso, "Dependence, Dependency and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," p. 19.

¹⁴Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," p. 484.

an unsophisticated defense of the orthodox school of international relations, his objective pretensions notwithstanding. According to Gunnar Myrdal,

Every study of a social problem, however limited in scope, is and must be determined by valuations. A 'disinterested' social science has never existed and for logical reasons, can never exist.¹⁵

Scholars and lay people alike are indeed entitled to subscribe to whatever normative and analytic perspectives that best illuminate the dynamics of social reality to them. What we are saying is that characterizing analytic terms as being of conventional or normal usage clarifies nothing. "Normalcy" and "conventionality" are based on specific valuations and norms, not on an immutable datum, like the order of nature itself.¹⁶

Beyond the theoretical exposition though, the ultimate irrelevance of Baldwin's analysis is his position on the use or non-use of power in international politics. Even at the level of ideas and abstraction, Baldwin's analysis approaches the fringes of irrationality and illogicality. In parts, it is nothing short of amazing. Conceptually he subscribes to the idealist conception of history, ignoring the fact that, according to Morgenthau, "the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the

¹⁵ Gunnar Myrdal, Objectivity in Social Research (New York: Pantheon Books, 1969), p. 55.

¹⁶ Kenneth R. Hoover, Elements of Social Scientific Thinking (New York: St. Martins Press, 1976).

landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined as power."¹⁷ Rosen and Jones, for example, characterize power as,

The ability of an international actor to use its tangible and intangible resources and assets in such a way as to influence the outcome of events in the international system in the direction of improving its own satisfaction within the system.¹⁸

Contrarily, according to Baldwin, there is an analytic distinction between potential power and actual power. Granted, but what do nations seek power for? It could be for national aggrandizement, prestige, but more importantly for the pursuit of the interests of that nation in the international system. Baldwin seems to suggest the contrary, "if some states find themselves dependent in some respects on other states, it does not follow that this situation is attributable to the preferences of the dominant states."¹⁹ Baldwin does not tell us how and why some nations become vulnerable to the machination of other nations in the international system, whether through the act of God or just the "natural" hierarchy of power. Furthermore, he goes on, "the dependency of children on their parents with respect to livelihood is probably more by biology and society than

¹⁷ Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, p. 5.

¹⁸ Walter S. Jones and Steven J. Rosen, The Logic of International Relations (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1982), p. 181.

¹⁹ Baldwin, "Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis," p. 499.

preference of the parents."²⁰ Properly understood, this is a Rostowian evolutionary concept of society/history. The dependency of some nations on others is therefore attributed to natural evolution (biology in Baldwin's analogy) rather than by the conscious machination of actors in the pursuit of their interests. Baldwin characterized this as "unintended influence." In analyzing motivation/intentions in power relations, he questions "whether the exercise of power must always be intentional on the part of the power wielder."²¹ Baldwin is in the company of Professor Peter Duignan²² who argued that the pursuit of colonial domination was simply fueled by feelings of national sentiments. He argued erroneously that Germany paid little or no attention to colonial acquisition and expansion. In fact, Otto Von Bismark on whose initiative the Berlin Conference on the partition of Africa was convened, came to believe that acquisition of colonies was essential "for winning new markets for German industries, the expansion of trade and a new field for German activity, civilization and capital."²³ This need for world domination through

²⁰Ibid., p. 499.

²¹Ibid., p. 499.

²²P. Duignan, "Africa's Colonial History and American Policy in Southern Africa," in Working Papers No. I (New Jersey: Africa Research and Publication, 1982).

²³Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Essex: Longman, 1981), p. 29.

expansion and conquest had reached such a plateau that by 1914, European colonial hegemony had 'extended over approximately 85 percent of the earth's surface.'²⁴ It is quite tempting to dismiss these authors' subjective and idyllic view of imperatives of relations between states off hand. It is hard to see how the subjugation of African peoples and resources for European capitalist expansion could be characterized as "unintended". Various scholars have written extensively on how the contemporary world system came to be.²⁵

There is nothing unintended nor idyllic about the systematic subjugation of Africans through slavery, colonial partition and ultimately neo-colonial exploitation for the ultimate benefit of Euro-American finance capital. Indeed contrary to Baldwin, various European powers had clear and unambiguous reasons and rationalizations vis-a-vis Africa and had no illusions of any neutral engagement. True enough the reasons are concealed under such trite statements as the French "mission civilatrice," the British "white man's burden," or religious mission to Christianize the

²⁴ Harry Magdoff, Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), pp. 34-35.

²⁵ See among various works: Magdoff, Imperialism: From the Colonial Age to the Present; Frank, World Accumulation: 1492-1789; Amin, Imperialism and Unequal Development; Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa; Sau, Unequal Exchange: Imperialism and Underdevelopment; Dan Nabudere, The Political Economy of Imperialism (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1977).

natives. By and large the Europeans in their bid to subjugate Africa and secure first free labor for European economic development²⁶ and later raw materials and markets for manufactured goods were secure in their knowledge that "their gain shall be the knowledge of our faith, and ours such riches as the(ir) country hath."²⁷ In subduing the East African city states, for example, European plunder and evangelizing went hand in hand, and not hand in glove. Here is how the Portuguese converted a city to Christianity,

In Kilwa, there are many strong houses several stories high. They are built of stone and mortar and plastered with various designs. As soon as the town had been taken without opposition, the Vicar-General and some of the Franciscan fathers came ashore carrying two crosses in procession and singing Te Deum. They went to the palace, and there the cross was put down and the Grand-Captain prayed. Then everyone started to plunder the town of all its merchandise and provisions.²⁸

Nzongola-Ntalaja had periodized the gradual but systematic incorporation of Africa into the world system.²⁹ The first period 1500/1-1885, the epoch of European mercantilist expansion, falls within and into what Wallerstein has characterized as "the long sixteenth century."³⁰ This

²⁶Eric Williams, Capitalism and Slavery (New York: Putham, 1980).

²⁷Sir Francis Drake, quoted by Chinweizu in, The West and the Rest of Us (New York: Vintage, 1975), p. 27.

²⁸Mai Palmberg, The Struggle for Africa (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 25.

²⁹Nzongola-Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omena, 1982), p. 5.

³⁰Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System (New York: 1976).

ruinous encounter virtually assured the doom of Africa as it facilitated the complete subjugation of social institutions and enterprises to the colonizing powers. More importantly, the most essential engine of social-economic advancement, the most important resource--people, were now the object of sale to provide cheap and free labor for Euro-American mercantilist expansion. When it is estimated that Africa lost 20-30 million people to the European slave trade and its attendant implications like social disequilibrium and stagnation, the net effect of this loss can hardly be gauged.

One scholar has given the figures³¹ below which indicate the virtual depopulation of the continent for two centuries:

| | <u>1650</u> | <u>1750</u> | <u>1850</u> | <u>1900</u> |
|--------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| Africa | 100* | 100* | 100* | 120* |
| Europe | 103* | 144* | 274* | 423* |
| Asia | 257* | 437* | 656* | 857* |

*million

Naturally, depopulation of the continent is compounded by widespread socio-economic stagnation.

The colonial period (the second period) of 1885-1920 merely put a juridical seal of international approval to the European de facto conquests.

Germany, Britain and France, the most industrially advanced countries, were now in possession of 80% of African

³¹Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa, p.106.

land mass,³² and they together with Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Belgium exercised the decisive formative influence on socio-economic and political development on the continent. Contrary to Baldwin's ludicrous notion of unintended influence and power in international relations, Frederick Lugard, the Briton who did more than most to bring Nigeria and Uganda under British rule was very succinct and clear about the nature of power and the pursuit of national interest. Regarding the European interest in Africa, Lugard had this to say, "the partition of Africa was, as we all recognize, due primarily to the economic necessity of increasing the supplies of raw materials and food to meet the needs of the industrialized nations of Europe."³³ Nzongola characterized 1920-1945 as "the high colonial period," and 1945-1960 as the era of nationalism and decolonization.

Apart from the trade economy of the colonial era and the virtual subordination of African economies to European industrial development, colonialism has a much more pervasive influence, including the subjugation of African sovereignty. Intellectually, the colonial epoch saw the birth of such notions of the alleged complementarity and interdependence of Africa and European destinies in economic

³²Palmberg, The Struggle for Africa, p. 15.

³³Chinweizu, The West and the Rest of Us, p. 55. On the role of power in international relations, an opposing school of thought, see Arnold Wolfers, "The Role of Power and Pole of Indifference," in George H. Quester, Power, Action and Interaction--Readings in International Politics (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1971).

and political levels. Thinkers and politicians alike began to espouse the great cause of "Eurafrica," then a new word. According to Guy Martin,

The ideology of Eurafrica is a body of thought, originating in the colonial period, according to which the fate of Europe and Africa is seen as being naturally inextricably linked at the political, economic, social, and cultural levels.³⁴

According to its proponents, this included military as well. What is the origin of this idea? It would appear that its earliest usage was in a 1925 survey by the General Electric Company on a proposal for a hydroelectric project in European-owned Africa. A Frenchman, Eugene Guernier, disputes this claim and credits himself as the genius who conceived the noble idea. Another German writer, Franz Ansprenger, claimed the idea as his in his 1933 work, "Politik in Schwarzen Afrika." All the same, it is quite evident the concept was a cloak for a national and colonial policy of an American hydropower finance spectator and some European states notably Germany, France, and Britain.³⁵

The rationalization for "Eurafrica" ranges from the absurd to the facile. For example, some speculators opined thus, "the African soil is too poor to be able to do without Europe. The African subsoil is too rich for Europe to be able to do without Africa. Thus, it must be admitted that Africa

³⁴Guy Martin, "Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica: Neocolonialism or Pan-Africanism," The Journal of Modern African Studies, 20:2 (1982), p. 222.

³⁵Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (London: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 134-149.

is an indispensable complement to Europe."³⁶

Such rationalization provided justification for continued European exploitation of African labor and resources.

Having created colonial preferential trade exchange via the Berlin conference of 1885, the Euro-African trade exchange was set up under the following regulations for the African colonies.

1. They could only admit goods that originated from the metropole.
2. They could only export to the metropole on a duty-free basis.
3. They could not set up their own manufacturing industries.
4. They had to rely on the carriers of the metropole for the transportation of both their exports and imports.

Thus was born and enforced an international division of labor in which the African colonies were reduced to the role of suppliers of raw materials while the Europeans arrogated to themselves in exclusivity the role of industrial production/export. This aspect only explains the unequal trade. What about unequal exchange? The most graphic manifestation of that is in the underpricing of African exports and overpricing imports from the metropole, paying slave wages for the African labor force and preventing them from growing food crops in order to free their labor for export crops. Another method was to draw more people into the

³⁶Guy Martin, "Africa and the Ideology of Eurafrica," p. 226.

money economy by introducing the capitalist mode of production in ever wider areas of the continent. British foreign trade (especially its infant industries) reaped bounteous harvests; the colonial trade which was less than 15% of the British total at the beginning of the 16th century, doubled, rising to 33% by 1775.³⁷ The colonial trade allowed British industries the possibility of expanded production and specialisation while the prices of the raw materials coming from the colonies were determined by the colonial state. It further allowed the accumulation of the economic surplus to further finance the industrial revolution.³⁸

This is the reality of socio-economic and political dependency which the apologies for Eurafrica call interdependence or cooperation. In our periodization here, we shall treat both the neocolonial era, i.e., from 1960 to the present, and the epoch of nationalism and decolonization together. This is because the nationalism/decolonization era was the gestation for the neocolonial era; one gives birth to the other, they are both intricately and organically linked. The devastation of Europe after the War of 1939-45 created widespread renewed impetus for the fruitification and institutionalization of the Eurafrica concept and many European countries, including Italy, Germany and Netherlands were desperate to recoup their economic position.

³⁷W. Schloete, British Overseas Trade from 1700 to 1930s (Oxford: Blackwell, 1938). See also J. Callagher and R. Robinson, "The Imperialism of Free Trade," in A. G. Shaw (ed.), Great Britain and the Colonies (London: 1970).

³⁸Ibid.

To suggest that it was only the economic need for post war reconstruction that spurred this renewed interest would be misleading indeed; there were political as well as military aspects. A dialectic juxtaposition and confluence of events, the economic imperative being only one of them, made the continuation of the subjugation/domination of Africa for European hegemony a matter of paramount interest in the post war era. Europe lay in splended ruin; old imperial Britain bloodied by massive Nazi air power; Germany divided in ruins; France laboring under political instability and unable to provide jobs for the citizens; but more strategically for the Western world, the bogey of communism and the hysterical fear of the vigorous assertive self-determination of the colonized people in Africa and Asia.

On the economic front, Europe started to devise strategies and tactics to fit the new era of neo-colonialism and grant juridical independence to the African countries while retaining economic leverage. According to Kwame Nkrumah,

The essence of neo-colonialism is that the state which is subject to it is in theory independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality its economic system and thus its political policy is directed from the outside.³⁹

In a foreign policy speech in 1948, Ernest Bevin, the then British Foreign Secretary in looking for economic support for the nascent idea of a European Union said, "In the first

³⁹Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: 1965), p. 9.

place, we turn our eyes to Africa We need the closest possible collaboration with the ... overseas territories, not only British, but French, Dutch, Belgium and Portuguese."⁴⁰ From the inception of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1949, the need to forge the closest links with Europe's African colonies was stressed. In 1952, the Strassburg Plan⁴¹ was born. This plan called for coordination of the economics of Western Europe with the colonial territories and dominions having constitutional ties with these same European states. This then is the genesis of the Eurafrica concept in the economic field which manifests itself in early years of independence of African countries in such neo-colonial contractual and institutionalized multilateral arrangements, namely Yaounde I (1964-1969), Yaounde II (1969-1975), Lome I (1975-1980), Lome II (1980-1985). Indeed the linking of these African colonies to the EEC was a condition for French agreement to the Treaty of Rome in 1957. Having exercised decisive formative influence in Africa from the era of primitive accumulation to that of colonialist unequal trade/exchange, the modern neo-colonial era is thus designed to ensure, as Tables IV and V show, unimpeded access to primary commodities, markets, and minerals of the African states. France and Belgium negotiated

⁴⁰ McKay cites an article in the New York Times, January 23, 1948; McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 138.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 144.

and signed the agreement that associated their respective African dependencies to the EEC. Doing away with the myths of "complimentarity," "cooperation," or "interdependence" between European and African economies, it was the need to continue the vertical international division of labor, unimpeded and unfettered access to, and free flow of African raw materials and minerals to Europe and the need for the security and defence of these sources that lie at the root of the concept of Eurafrika.

The EEC is resource deficient and dependent, especially in the fields of energy, raw materials and more importantly strategic metals and minerals. The near wholesale dependence on, and maintenance of African resources has been a cornerstone of European foreign economic policy since post World War II. One single African country--Zaire--produces 60% of the cobalt needs of the Euro-American, Japanese industrial complex and 39% of its industrial diamonds. Moreover, in Africa lies 97% of the total known world deposit of chromium --a steel hardener that has no known substitute in metallurgical and some chemical uses. The Western World ideological and political adversary, that is, the Soviet Union has the remaining 2.9% and is at best an unreliable and at worst a hostile supplier of this critical metal.

As Table V shows, the EEC is dependent exclusively on Africa for chromium importation. Japan is also 100% dependent, while the U.S. is 46% dependent on African chromium.

Thus, it takes no genius to deduce that even given allowance for massive stockpiling by these Western countries, a withdrawal of these critical raw materials and minerals will very likely cripple the modern industrial sectors of these countries.

The first part of this chapter has been devoted to an analysis of the genesis of the concept of Eurafrica which manifests itself in such terms as complementarity of interest; convergence of interest; interdependence between Europe and Africa. Our task here is to demonstrate how such terms are not only misleading, but they gloss over the brutal reality of subjugation of African interests to Euro-American (Western) interests.

The essential features of African economy can be characterized by three distinct and yet interlocking features.⁴² An economic triad that is both distorted and disarticulated. (I) Its domestic features are characterized by highly capitalized enclaves existing side by side with backward subsistence economies. Both the capitalized enclaves and subsistence agricultural sector do not articulate with one another, but with the world capitalist economy. (II) Mineral export and commodity production (for export) as opposed to food production for local consumption is the second feature. Africa produces 97% of the world's chromite; 62% of its

⁴²For an incisive theoretical exposition of African political economy, see Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Essex: Longman, 1981).

gold; 73% of the platinum group metals; 34% of the uranium; 82% of phosphate rock; 43% of the cobalt; 21% of the copper; 53% of the manganese; 25% of the asbestos; 36% of the vanadium; and 66% of tantalum.⁴³ Indeed Southern Africa--the region that encompasses all the countries from Zaire to South Africa, has appropriately been termed the "Persian Gulf" of the mineral world, nearly all of which are exported⁴⁴ to the Western capitalist industrialized states, while the continent itself has produced, in the modern industrial manufacturing sector, an unenviable 0.6% of the world output since 1960.⁴⁵

(III) Extra African Control: Africa consumes only one-sixth of its oil output (the rest being exported) and yet paradoxically Africa is not even self-reliant in the oil sector because of reliance on foreign markets, technology and capital. The region is served by unreliable and highly costly supply of petroleum products through multinational sales and distribution network. More importantly, Africa's vulnerability to extra-African control is manifested in the absence of any significant increase in intra-African trade and commerce. As our Table IV shows, the continent is virtually a captive market for EEC import/export trade. The economies of Africa depend primarily on extra-African trade,

⁴³Wolfgang Michalski, "Industrial Raw Materials," The OECD Observer, No. 93 (July 1978), p. 14.

⁴⁴Tony Hughes, "Africa's Uranium: Few Gains, Big Dangers," Africa, 51 (November 1975), pp. 18-20.

⁴⁵Survey of Economic Conditions in Africa: Part I (New York: United Nations, 1974), E.75.11K.

paradoxically, in a continent with an internal market in excess of 500 million. The trade dependency reflects the exploitative structural integration of the neo-colonial economy to the capitalist system of the metropole. The EEC, to which the African economy is anchored in the capitalist system also has its own equivalent of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). These are the European Development Fund (EDF) and the European Investment Bank (EIB). The EDF is capitalized by EEC members and Germany and France are to EDF what the United States is to IMF.

Contrary to McKay, Rivkin, Padeiford and Emerson⁴⁶ who wrote optimistically in the early years of African juridical independence of "cooperation" between Europe and Africa, and Cosgrove Twitchett⁴⁷ who characterized the EIB and EDG as agents of economic advancement, Africa remains a veritable appendage of the European Economic Community into which its economy has been progressively integrated from 1400 onwards. The continent remains a subordinate unit of an external system

⁴⁶Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); Arnold Rivkin, Africa and the West (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1962); Norman Padeiford and Rupert Emerson, Africa and World Order (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963). These three publications belong to the liberal historiography of the Western World that was widespread in the early 60s. They generally gloss over the real and direct role of African economy in the Post World War II reconstruction of Europe and the need therefore to maintain this unequal relationship.

⁴⁷Cosgrove Twitchett, Europe and Africa: From Association to Partnership (London: Saxon House, 1979).

whose controlling levers are located in the center of European-American finance capital.

Having elaborated earlier on the position of the realist conception of interest and pursuit of power in furtherance of that interest, let us see how relational⁴⁸ asymmetry and dependency is exercised in practice.

Dependency is defined as 'an asymmetrical structure of control or relations wherein a controller such as a state, a multinational enterprise, or a parent regularly and hence predictably, changes or maintains the behavior of a controllee such as another state'⁴⁹

In defining power in the global system we define power as ability to control the outcome of events or the capability of an actor in the system to "manipulate the choices, capabilities, alliance opportunities and pay-off that actors may utilize."⁵⁰

Caporoso in distinguishing bargaining power from structural power defined structural power as a "higher order power" in that "it is a power to govern the rules which shape bargaining power."⁵¹

Caporoso also analyses dependency in terms of the

⁴⁸James A. Caporoso, "Introduction to the Special Issue of International Organization on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," International Organization (Winter 1978), p. 1.

⁴⁹Patrick J. McGowan and Dale L. Smith, "Economic Dependency in Black Africa: An Analysis of Competing Theories," International Organization (Winter 1978).

⁵⁰Caporoso, "Introduction to the Special Issue of International Organisation on Dependence and Dependency in the Global System," p. 1.

⁵¹Ibid., p. 4.

structural distortions,⁵² that is, distortions resulting from relational asymmetry. It is the structural power located in dependency that manifests itself in dependence as relational control. That is when an actor or a group of actors have the capability (that is really located in the forceful subjugation of other areas, in the case of Africa, through slavery, colonialism or neo-colonialism) to manipulate the choices, capabilities or alliance opportunities of other actors. All the multilateral institutions through whose agencies systemic monetary commercial and trade transactions are regulated in the modern era work in a complementary and not in a conflicting manner; in fact they work in a cycle. These include the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT); International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other affiliates of the World Bank like the International Finance Corporation (IFC) or the International Development Association (IDA); all were created by the dominant transnational actors to regulate a system in which Africa is necessarily a subordinate unit.

For example, when the World Bank lays down its regulations such as the elimination of subsidies, wage-freeze, retrenchment in the labour force, devaluation of domestic currency, imposition of more liberal terms for foreign investment; all these are usually the conditions that need to be met before coming to a country's aid in adjusting a particular balance of payment situation. The World Bank

⁵²Ibid.

which regulates the imperial system into which Africa is a subordinate unit, is controlled essentially by five major capitalist powers. It, along with the International Monetary Fund, acts as the clearing house and coordinator of the system's finance. Working in conjunction with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the European Economic Community (EEC), it oversees an interlocking world-wide empire to whom the chances, and options of African economics are subordinated.

In the World Bank's choice of target or allocation, the motif is profit and not necessarily need. In the European Development Fund (EDF), established ostensibly to promote development of the associated states,⁵³ the EEC has absolute control over the management of the fund and allocation to any project in any of the African states. It is this leverage inherent in the structural power to determine choices of options within the system, that captures the subordinate nature of Africa in the capitalist world system. According to Tony Smith, the international system,

... has at its disposal sanctions for transgressing its basic rules which are all the more powerful since their greatest force comes not from an active threat of invention so much as from a threat of withdrawal which would abandon ... (these countries) to civil and violent conflict.⁵⁴

⁵³ Monique Garritty, "African and European Economic Community," The Review of Black Political Economy, Vol. 2, No. 1 (1971), p. 97.

⁵⁴ Tony Smith, "The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The Case of Dependency Theory," World Politics (31 January 1979), pp. 247-248.

This is a most curious statement indeed! Smith seems to be suggesting that Third World states were incorporated into the capitalist world system not for profit but to quell regional and conflict and civil war.

This seems to be a modern version of "La mission civilatrice of French colonialism, "The white man's burden" apology of British imperialism or the jingoism of "the manifest destiny" of the United States expansionism. That apart, Smith's assertion flies in the face of historical fact and reality. The sanction he alluded to came from not a threat of withdrawal, but from that of active intervention in various guises from covert manipulation to outright military intervention. The Belgian-Western ruse for military intervention 1964 in Zaire was to "save European lives" and not "stabilize" the situation for continued access to Zaire mineral wealth. Contrary to Smith, there is no evidence that the international system withdraws. The international system by which we mean the international capitalist system reproduces itself by expansion and further expansion, or in the definitive words of Henry Grade, "The capitalist system is essentially an international system. If it cannot function internationally, it will break down completely."⁵⁵

The term interdependence which is often used to characterize the relationship between African economy and

⁵⁵Dan Nabudere, The Political Economy of Imperialism (London: Zed Press, Ltd., 1977), p. 144.

that of the West does not enjoy a universally acceptable definition. For Edward Morse, the term refers to a situation where the action of one nation directly affects other actors.⁵⁶ Obviously this definition does not address the nature of the relations between actors, neither does it analyze the symmetry of power that informs the relationship. For Rosecrance, Alexander Koehler, Kroll, Laquer, and Stocker,⁵⁷ interdependence refers to "the direct and positive linkage of the interests of states where a change in the position of one state affects the position of others and in the same direction." Interdependence obviously, as a concept posits a mutuality of interest and reciprocity or mutual sensitivity to the sensibilities of the entities that are supposed to be interdependent. In our analysis here, this definition will suffice as an abstract notion. In the international relations of Africa though, it is both a misleading and an unilluminating concept with regards to the subordinate nature of Africa in the world system. A breakdown by percentage of vote of the International Monetary Fund will further reveal the nature of the power asymmetry in this interdependence. While the African bloc commands the numerical majority, the continent only has 7.54% of the votes of the Fund and successive quota reviews have not affected the

⁵⁶Edward Morse, "Transnational Economic Processes," in R. Koehane and J. Nye, Jr., Transnationalism in World Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1972).

⁵⁷R. Rosecrance; A. Alexandroff; W. Koehler; J. Kroll; S. Laqueur and J. Stocker, "Whither Interdependence," in International Organisation, Vol. 31, No. 3 (Summer 1977).

basis for the quota distribution. Contrarily, five industrial capitalist nations, led by the United States, have 41% of the votes in the Fund.⁵⁸ In a system of weighted voting in which the voting rights of members are determined by the size of the quotas, the subordinate status of Africa in the World system is assured. When the Fund puts together, or refuses to do same, a "stabilization scheme" for a country, its decision is based more on the strategic geo-political calculus of those who hold the decisive vote in the Fund and what they perceive to be the zero-sum derivation to their own systemic interests and less on the African country who to begin with had a negligible vote.

On the African continent, Mobutu's regime, for these strategic reasons, has been maintained and defended by a plethora of western financial interests including both the IMF, IBRD, and a consortia of Western private lending institutions. In the absence of any other compliant Zairen to oversee Western interests and make available unimpeded Western access to Zaire's formidable wealth, Mobutu's regime has to be maintained.⁵⁹

Perhaps nowhere does the concept of "interdependence" as an explanatory or analytic term become so misleading

⁵⁸ E. I. M., Mtei, "Africa and the IMF: An Evolving Relationship," Africa Report (September-October 1984).

⁵⁹ See Thomas M. Callaghy, "The Ritual of the Debt Game," Africa Report (September-October 1984), Guy Gran (ed.), Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1979), pp. 301-309.

than in the political economy of Franco-African relations. The structural power in the whole range of the properties of relational asymmetry vis-a-vis Africa in the world system is perhaps best captured in the mechanisms and modalities of this relational control. Structural power is necessarily both variegated and multifaceted and within the broad spectrum of relational control, its influence is both far-reaching in the decisive sectors of the subordinate power. The CFA Franc monetary zone is a case in point. The CFA Franc-zone is a monetary economic entity that links France and twelve African countries that used to be French West and Equatorial Africa. All these countries became, juridically at least, independent of France in 1960. In the present neo-colonial era, let us examine how their subordinate relationship is now mounted, indeed institutionalized. Before their independence, Mali, Benin, Togo, Burkina Faso, Ivory Coast, Niger, and Senegal grouped themselves into an organization called the West African Monetary Union which goes by the French acronym of UMOA. Gabon, Central African Republic Chad, Cameroon, and the Congo formed the Customs and Economic Union of Central Africa (UDEAC). The two organizations have a uniform monetary unit, the CFA franc which since 1948 has been fixed by the French treasury to the French franc (FF) at the rate of 1 FF to 50 CFA. Furthermore, as a reflection of this unequal relationship, the CFA franc convertibility is guaranteed by the French franc. The UMOA and UDEAC countries have to deposit two-

thirds of their foreign exchange earnings into the French treasury.⁶⁰ Therefore, control of these countries reserves, and the issue of currency rests with France; that is to say, the CFA franc is merely an extension of the French franc. Such unbridled manipulation is justified by suggesting that it gives CFA franc stability and international status. But this is monetary dependence, a means of exploitation which put those countries' reserves at the disposal of France. African savings can now be loaned to French investors seeking to invest in the countries where the capital had come from the first place.

Contrary to the myth of Euro-African "mutual" interests, or the misrepresentation of Zartman⁶¹ who states that "decolonization has its own logic, wherein each step creates pressures for the next and reduces the possibility of counter-action by retreating post-colonial forces," neither UDEAC or UMOA could influence French monetary policy. More importantly, all of the countries inherit the fluctuations and vagaries of French economy since FF guarantees the CFA franc. All of them with the exception of Gabon, Cameroon and Congo, are petroleum product importers, whose exports as well as those of other mineral products, are denominated in U.S dollars against which French franc has been losing value.

⁶⁰Antonio-Ganriel M. Cunha, "The CFA Franc Zone: The Other Side of the Coin," Africa Report (October 1984).

⁶¹I. William Zartman, "The Future of Europe and Africa: Decolonization or Dependency," in Timothy M. Shaw (ed.), Alternative Futures for Africa (Boulder, 1982), p. 261.

The FF cannot provide any cushioning against the rapid upward spiral in the price of petroleum products and other manufactured goods; they continue to experience downward trends in their terms of trade. It places a heavy burden of proof on those who characterize Euro-African economic relations as one of interdependence when all the UMOA and UDEAC countries within the Franc monetary zone have virtually given up their sovereignty over monetary, trade, and economic planning.⁶² Interdependence posits self-reliance between independent units, it is not characterized by relational asymmetry. A nation that has no control over its own affairs cannot enter any interdependent relationship; the relationship then will be characterized by exploitation and manipulation rather than by mutuality of interest and meaningful cooperation.

It is fashionable in Western liberal and conservative historiography on Africa to define the problematic of African international relations in strictly globalist terms shaped by the big power detente.⁶³ Both perspectives do share an

⁶²For a rigorous analysis of the political economy of Franco-African relations, see Olasupo Adedokun, "Franco-African Relations and the Use of Intervention as an Instrument of Foreign Policy Objectives," (Ph.D. dissertation, Political Science Department, Atlanta University, Atlanta, 1982); M. Corbett (ed.), French Presence in Black Africa (Washington, D.C.: Black Orpheus Press, 1972).

⁶³For the liberal historiography in this context, see William Zartman, "Coming Political Problems in Black Africa," in Jennifer Seymour Whitaker, Africa and the United States: Vital Interests (New York: University Press, 1978); Colin Legum, "Communal Conflict and International Intervention in Africa," in Colin Legum; I. William Zartman; Steven Langdon and Lynn K. Mytekla, Africa in the 1980s: A Continent in Crisis (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979). For the conservative

orientation in their understanding of internal African politics, they are both obsessed with what they see as consuming ethnic rivalry and conflict. Apart from the fact that their understanding is not based on any theoretically informed insights, it is rooted in an ahistorical, subjective and impressionistic framework. Both perspectives fail to grasp the fact that the basis of any reliable analysis of a social reality is historical data. Their understanding is therefore then more often than not factually flawed. Let us consider for example this trite observation:

Even if the major Western powers should wish to disengage from an interventionist role in Africa, it is hard to see how other global interests will allow this to happen so long as the Soviets, at least, remain unwilling to match such a Western disengagement.⁶⁴

This position rests on a number of interrelated but utterly fallacious assumptions:

1. The problematic of African international relations are shaped by the state of East/West ideological and strategic rivalry.
2. Any geo-political unit on the globe is a battle area for the conflict which is primarily on a zero-sum calculus. In other words there is a vacuum in any and every geographical area of the world which if the Western nations do not fill, the Soviets and their allies will.

perspective, see W. Scott Thompson, "U.S. Policy Toward Africa: At America's Service," in *Orbis*, 25:4 (Winter 1982); Roger Pearson (ed.), Sino Soviet Intervention in Africa (Washington, D.C.: Council on American Affairs, 1977).

⁶⁴Colin Legum, "Communal Conflict and International Intervention in Africa," p. 66.

3. The Western countries can simply disengage themselves from an interventionist role in Africa and are only there to counter the Soviets; the Western nations have no self interest of a pre-existing pattern of imperialist domination in Africa.

The assumption underlying these perspectives are utterly untenable because they cannot be supported by any historical fact. At the Berlin Conference of 1884, six European nations carved up the entire African continent among themselves into exclusive preserves of imperial overseas empire. Britain carved for itself 3½ million miles of African territory; France got 4½ million miles of African territory; while Germany, Portugal, Belgium and Italy divided among themselves in about equal proportion, 900,000 square miles to each nation. At this empire building exercise, the United States and Tsarist Russia were present as observers.⁶⁵ At the end of this exercise only 4½ percent of the entire continent remained under tenuous African sovereignty--the Ethiopian Empire and the Republic of Liberia. The fact is that Western interventionism in Africa is no dog-in-the-manger policy based simply on how to counter Soviet machinations. As tables IV and V show, Africa in the modern era has assumed a strategic importance in Western calculation as a market for its goods, and source of strategic minerals and metals, some of which have no known substitutes. The fact is that for five hundred years,

⁶⁵ See Anthony Nutting, Scramble for Africa (New York: E. P. Dutton And Co., Inc., 1971); Arthur Gavshan, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West (New York: Penguin, 1981).

the Western nations have exercised decisive formative influence on the continent. It is a useful ploy for domestic consumption to flaunt the bogey of a communist influence in order to conceal the formidable self-interests these Western nations seek to protect and to thwart African justifiable determination to control their own affairs and resources. Thus it is useful to play down or completely disregard African aspirations to regain control over their continent and to begin to take steps to regain African initiative and reassess all unequal relations that infringe on the sovereignty and integrity of the continent. In order to retain Africa as the exclusive preserve of the Western world and to frustrate genuine African aspirations, Western scholars often go to great lengths to flaunt the bogey of communism but the contradictions of their dependence on Africa is often difficult for them to ignore. For example,

A communist take over in any African country would be a dangerous opening wedge for entry into a continent that has hitherto been held as an inviolate preserve of the free world. To Europe, Africa holds the promise of a frontier land still susceptible of great expansion, better as a market and as a source of unexplored industrial potential. Its riches in strategic and other minerals are impressive. In industrial diamonds, columbium, cobalt, chromium and beryllium, Africa either leads the list of world producers or stands close to the top. It is a significant producer of tin, manganese, copper, antimony, and its reserves of iron ore and bauxite are just beginning to be tapped. The uranium of the Congo and South Africa has contributed to the unfolding of the atomic age To this mineral wealth, Africa adds through its agriculture a variety of foodstuffs and industrial materials such as cocoa, coffee, tea, vegetable oil, cotton, and pyrethrum. The United States has a direct interest in many of these products, but it is

probably of less importance to preserve its own access to Africa's resources and markets than to make sure that its European allies are not cut off from them.⁶⁶

This statement by Rupert Emerson is free to some extent of the usual obfuscation that often emanates from the Western liberal and conservative historiography on Africa. But it completely ignores the fact that the Western collaborative protracted interventionism is really designed to frustrate and thwart any African initiatives to terminate all unequal relations and existing imperialist domination.

It serves Western interests quite well to flaunt the old bogey of communist expansion to cover their own real interest to maintain neo-colonial imperialist relations of exploitation in Africa. Indeed it is an old game in the conduct and practice of transnational/international affairs to ascribe a thing to what is not, in order to deflect criticisms or conceal your own interest in the maintenance and strengthening of the status quo. In fact, before the War of 1939-45, no African country had any standing relations with the Soviet Union. Besides, much of the continent lay under the colonial tutelage of Britain, France, Belgium and Portugal, and the Western dominated League of Nations had shared out the trust territories of Somaliland, Togo, and South West Africa among Britain, France, and South Africa. By 1954, only Ethiopia, Egypt, and Liberia were independent on

⁶⁶ Rupert Emerson, The United States and Africa, Walter Goldschmidt (ed.) (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1963), p. 28.

the continent. And only Ethiopia and Egypt had relations with the Soviet Union.⁶⁷ All actors in the international system, pursue actions that are deemed necessary in the pursuit of their national objectives; the communist nations are not immune from this cardinal principle of international relations. Having consolidated their system in their homelands, the Warsaw Pact nations and China could be said to be guided by the following interlocking imperatives immediately after the War of 1939-45, in the conduct of their international relations vis-a-vis the countries that were emerging from colonial tutelage. Among others, these could be:

- a. A desire to promote their national influence while assailing that of their ideological adversaries.
- b. Present themselves as proponents of anti-colonialism to the people yearning for freedom from Western colonialism.
- c. Gain strategic facilities for their own geopolitical objectives.

Neither the Soviet Union nor the Peoples' Republic of China is different from any other actors in the system, in spite of the principle of proletarian internationalism which they pay lip service to, when it suits their national interests and objectives. For example, during the struggle for the independence of Angola, Chinese action under the reactionary leadership of Deng Xiao Peng in allying itself with South Africa, the Western imperialist nations and UNITA, was a function of its hostility to the Soviet Union which was an

⁶⁷Vernon McKay, Africa in World Politics, p. 227.

ally of the MPLA. Chinese action was decided less on the objective merits or demerits of the situation, than by a desire to combat what it perceives as a potentially ascendancy of Soviet influence. Chinese objectives consequently dovetailed with Western objective in this particular instance. Soviet objective to counter Western influence dovetails with genuine and just African revolutionary objective to regain their own initiative in Angola, deny the Western alliance and its settler surrogate in South Africa, the benefit of a neo-colonial suppliant government in Angola, that would later be used to frustrate and thwart the forward march of the African liberation struggle in Namibia and South Africa. To be sure, the African and Soviet objectives here might be judged to be similar; that does not make them one and the same. They might indeed appear to have particular and related characteristics and hence not mutually exclusive at a given period in history. But Soviet opportunism and chauvinism during the Stalin era when policies were subject to whimsical, arbitrary and capricious fluctuations, in the name of "socialism in one country first" is well known. Its attempt to subvert and manipulate the African nationalist aspirations, to frustrate their agitation, and blow hot and cold, according to the status of its relations with the Western nations is well documented.⁶⁸ Having said all this, it must be firmly borne in mind that, when we speak of the

⁶⁸ See especially, George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism (New York: Doubleday, 1972).

world system, we mean by that the capitalist world system into which Africa has been incorporated during the 16th century to the present. The Soviet Union is not a member of the capitalist world system: the convergence and confluence of the systemic and structural power within that system lies in the hands of the Western nations.

The various multilateral institutions through whose agencies the monetary, commercial and economic relations of the system are regulated and transacted, like GATT, IMB/IBRD, EEC-ACP axis and the plethora of variegated consortia of Western banks, the British owned Exports Credits Guarantee Departments (ECGD), etc., provide the institutionalized framework of unequal relations through which African interests are subordinated to Euro-American finance capital. Perhaps this convoluted statement by Zartman of the liberal wing of American Africanist historiography captures the essence of Africa's place in the international system. "Africa is a non-aligned part of the Western world. Its background, values, dependencies, exchanges and aspirations are primarily with the West as it works out its own future."⁶⁹ Never mind the gobbledegook that part of a whole is also not aligned to that whole. Apparently the distinguished professor does not recognize the contradiction of his claim of Africa being nonaligned, and yet a part of the Western world. Be that as it may, the statement is

⁶⁹I. William Zartman, "Issues of African Diplomacy in the 1980s," Orbis, 25:4 (Winter 1982), p. 1028.

true in essentials, except that Africa is not nonaligned and the professor did not tell how African aspirations came to be primarily with the West.

Even though the Soviet Union achieved near nuclear parity vis-a-vis its Western ideological adversary, the balance of strategic advantages, in so far as both sides see the African continent as a theatre of competition, is still very heavily tilted to the Western nations for the historical and present day structural reasons we have advanced. Relative to immediate post independence era of African countries, there has been a net increase of Soviet capability to project its power and influence to aid progressive and revolutionary states in the world. The upshot of the strategic parity though is that the Soviet Union now has the nuclear shield that provides a certain confidence to act boldly in defence of its own interest, or, when as the case of Angola, for example, provides, its interests and that of a given local ally are similar. Improvement in Soviet assistance delivery capacity apart, the most important change that has nothing to do with Soviet capability or absence of same is the sustained agitation for self determination that pervades countries under the yoke of neo-colonial tutelage of the Western nations.

It is the internal dynamics within these territories and the contradictions of their neo-colonial status that brings forth new and mounting challenges to the imperialist camp. Even if it wished to, the Soviet Union has not been

able to sustain any credible alliance in any African country, and in fact has nothing to compare to Western imperialist domination that has been present on the continent for five hundred years. Also, stiff and bitter systemic penalties whose efficiency lay in the structural power that the Western nations possess in the capitalist system in which Africa is a subordinate unit await any transgressor nation. For example, no African nation can default on loans of the IMF or the consortia of Western banks that dominate the international lending institutions. But Egypt can expel all Soviet diplomats within a week and Egypt can default on billion's worth of loans from the Soviet Union without fear of systemic repercussion or punishment. Conversely, one can argue that no Soviet-dominated state can do this but the point is that it is utterly nonsensical to begin to chart a possible comparative study of East/West imperialism in Africa. The fact is, for all practical purposes, imperialist domination in Africa is Euro-American in form, content, and substance. The Soviet Union, having not been a colonial power in Africa, does not have that historical leverage and advantage of an organic infrastructural base for imperialistic manoeuvres in Africa. Lacking this infrastructural base, it could only hope to gain influence by arming its clients. The Soviet's attempt to capitalize on whatever leverage it had in Guinea-Conakry, during the years of Western ostracism of that country met with preemptory rebuff and expulsion of its diplomats. All the same, the Soviet Union is an actor that seeks to advance

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its own interest, and its action in Africa as well as the rest of the world is geared towards the maximization of that interest.⁷⁰ But it could not even remotely begin to come near the kind of decisive and dominant influence the capitalist Western nations have exercised in Africa from the era of primitive accumulation. For example, after the inter-European tribal war of 1914-18, that engulfed the colonial peoples of Africa and Asia, the European dominated League of Nations dispossessed Italy and Germany of their African colonial possessions. Togo, which used to be a German colony was first turned to an Anglo-French condominium and then later a Trust Territory of France. Britain took Tanganyika and also Italian Somalia and Belgium administered Rwanda-Urundi, as a Trust territory. The sustained and protracted nature of the struggle Africans are now waging to free Namibia from neo-Nazi apartheid terror is a clear manifestation of the hypocrisy and bankruptcy of the position of the very powers who in the first place took away Namibia from German colonizers and handed the governance of the territory to an equally odious settler white supremacist state. The Russians had no way to build socio-economic and political institutions that parallel such entities in the colonizing countries and no

⁷⁰ Helen D. Cohn, Soviet Policy Towards Black Africa: The Focus on National Integration (New York: Praeger, 1972); Charles McLane, Soviet-Third World Relations, Vol. 3, Soviet African Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1974); Edward Wilson, Russian and Black Africa Before World War II (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1974).

entrepreneurial managerial class in the Army, Civil Service, bureaucracy who look to Russian society as the apex of civilization and therefore the source of their inspiration and example of what kind of society their own nations will evolve into. The fact is that the first generation of post-independence elites were often Sorborne or London School of Economics--educated Africans who were unashamedly Anglo-philic and Francophilic. Many indeed openly celebrate their "Frenchness" and "Westness." More importantly, for many of these leaders, Euro-American societies and system of government constitute the essential point of departure of their understanding of the evolution of any society.⁷¹ Many share the world outlook and ideological perspective of the ruling class of the Western world, whose orphans, they indeed are. More importantly, we suggest, having been firmly esconced within the Western capitalist system, it is crucial to understand the interlocking and reinforcing mechanisms that produce a condition where African elites as children of the system often act in the service of the system that has brought about the underdevelopment of their nations. Many see their reward and status attainment within the context of the system and really do have difficulty in distinguishing

⁷¹For example, after World War II, Lamine Gueye of Senegal, working in the directive organs of the Section Francaise de l'Internationale Ouvriere (SP10) in defending the idea of a French Community and denouncing the African nationalist aspiration for independence, thought France was the "inventor of liberty". Lamine, "Etape et perspectives de l'Union francaise" quoted in Claude Wanthier, Literature and Thought of Modern Africa (London: Pall Mall, 1966), p. 117.

what constitutes the objective national interests of their own country and the interest of the system they now serve. For example, from 1969 to 1972, Ghana's economic policy planning was effectively coopted by an interlocking international network comprising, (1) Harvard Development Advisory Service (DAS), (2) The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development--The World Bank, and (3) The International Monetary Fund--The Fund.⁷² This network was backed by an internal coalition headed by four Ghanaians who were either then, former executive officers of the aforementioned international lending institutions, or had been coopted into administrative positions in the Busia government. The economic stabilization scheme they counselled which included a massive devaluation of Ghanaian currency, reduction in domestic spending and removal of constraints in investment policy, could not be sustained politically. But these are the standard prescriptions of the International Monetary Fund, or perhaps more directly, the countries that control "the controlling three-quarters of the contributed quotas and two-thirds of the votes." The question of economic planning thus becomes an exercise in a futile attempt to reconcile the political-economic destiny of a given nation with the stated interest and objective of those who control these international institutions. The inter-government organization (IGO), IMB/IBRD axis and the Ghanaian internal

⁷²J. K. Thompson, "External Cooptation of the Economic Planning in Ghana, 1967-1969," World Politics, Vol. X (July 1977).

connection cannot represent the interests of these institutions and at the same time represent the interest of Ghana. If every administrative strategy fails, the Army, the veritable praetorian guards that defend by force the interest of the government against the interest of the people can always be used to make sure the patient takes his medicine "tout suite."

Imperialism in Africa in the contemporary era, of which interventionism in various guises is only one aspect, is premised on a zero-sum calculus. Its specific objective is to maximize the policy interests of the intervenor. In the modern neo-colonial era, interventionism as a foreign policy tool, emanates conceptually from a post World War II domino theory that postulates that the "loss" of Euro-American hegemony in one country will ipso facto lead to a chain reaction, where the whole region or sub-region as the case may be, will be radicalized and forces that do not make Euro-American business their own business will come to power. Interventionism, consequently is designed to contain, or neutralize the possibility of change in the status quo.

For example, the geo-political importance of Southern Africa to the Western nation rests on two critical and interlocking factors--

1. The abundance of the strategic and critical resources concentration in countries stretching from Zaire in the North to South Africa in the Southern most tip. Consequently, continued and unimpeded access to these resources is to be maintained by guaranteeing that whatever government is in power in any of these

countries (Zaire, Zambia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa) is aligned to the West.

2. The need to maintain control of the sea lane around the Cape of Good Hope, for unimpeded transportation of Strategic raw materials to Western economy.⁷³

In the contemporary era--the epoch of neo-colonialism which began as we earlier stated in 1960--Zaire then was and still is, the acid confirmation of the extent to which the Western nations would go to maintain their ideological/political and economic domination of Africa. Our contention is that Western policy is premised on a hard-headed recognition of the place and role of Africa in the economic and strategic configuration of the world capitalist system. The Western economies hold the African extractive industry in exclusive preserve. Nigeria produces 95 percent of the world's columbium,⁷⁴ Zaire and Zambia hold two-thirds of the world reserves of cobalt⁷⁵ while Guinea has the world's largest deposit of bauxite. Of the thirty minerals deemed

⁷³See Alvin J. Cottrell, "Strategic Routes, Key Passages and Choke Points in and Around Southern Africa: Threats Posed to them By Hostile Local and External Forces," Sino-Soviet Intervention in Africa (Washington: Council on American Affairs, 1977), pp. 44-57; Larry P. Bowman, "The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States; An Appraisal and Policy Analysis," African Affairs, Vol. 81, No. 323 (April 1982), pp. 159-191.

⁷⁴Africa South of the Sahara (London: Europa Publications, 1980), p. 766.

⁷⁵U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Commodity Summary 1980 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 96; U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Mineral Industries of Africa (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 13.

critical to U.S. national survival, Africa has no less than twenty of these metals and Table V provides the degrees of Western dependence on some of them. The table below identifies these critical metals and their percentage of world reserves.

TABLE I
AFRICAN MINERALS DEEMED CRITICAL FOR U.S. SURVIVAL

| Mineral | % of Estimated 1978 World Production | % of World Reserves |
|---------------------------|---|------------------------|
| Arsenic | 8.0 | 25.0 |
| Asbestos (Crocedolite) | 100.0 | 100.0 |
| Bauxite | 15.0 | 30.0 |
| Cesium | | 30.0 |
| Chromium | 40.0 | 97.0 |
| Cobalt | 66.0 | 40.0 |
| Corundum | 85.0 | 78.0 |
| Dramend | 65.0 | 90.0 |
| Flouspar | 13.5 | 32.0 |
| Gemstones | 75.0 | 65.0 |
| Germanium | 30.0 | 22.0 |
| Gold | 57.0 | 48.0 |
| Kyanite | 35.0 | 5.0 |
| Manganese | 31.0 | 50.0 |
| Phosphate | 25.0 | 75.0 |

TABLE I continued

| Mineral | % of Estimated 1978 World Production | % of World Reserves |
|----------------|---|------------------------|
| Platinum Group | 45.0 | 72.0 |
| Tantalum | 22.0 | 70.0 |
| Uranium | 20.0 | 32.0 |
| Vanadium | 41.0 | 49.0 |
| Vermiculite | 40.0 | 40.0 |

Source: U.S. Bureau of Mines, U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Mines, Minerals Year Book (Washington, D.C., 1977).

The policy is therefore designed to contain and if need be, to eliminate radical African nationalism that might seek to redress the systemic imbalance, regain African initiative, and end the relation of exploitation. The following chapter is an analysis of the evaluation of this policy in practice in Zaire.

CHAPTER IV

THE CRISIS OF STABILIZING A NEO-COLONIAL AFRICA: INTERVENTIONISM IN ZAIRE

Background of the Conflict - The Cold War Factor

The end of the War of 1939-45 presented Western capitalism with fundamental strategic, geopolitical and economic problems of great magnitude and complexity. European expansionist and colonial hegemony which began in the 1400s had brought about the founding of ruling European settlements in North and South America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the European colonial occupation or rulership of almost virtually all of Africa, all of South East Asia and also India (which then included Pakistan) Ceylon and Malaysia. Japan had occupied Korea and parts of China. This juxtaposition of expansionism and colonialism had crystalized in a world view which rests on a socio-cultural and political theory. The basic philosophical assumptions¹ of this theory are:

- (a) that the Western European nations and peoples represent the Zenith of civilization and advancement (a supremacist ideology).

¹These theses or paradigmatic assumptions are borrowed very heavily from Mack H. Jones, The Existing Paradigm of American Political Science--Some Inferences (Atlanta: Atlanta University, 1978).

- (b) that the material gap between European peoples and non-European has nothing to do with the European policy of extermination of these peoples, their subjugation and the subjection of their resources to European economic expansionism but that the perceived gap is due to certain virtues (thrift, for example) uniquely possessed by European peoples.
- (c) a belief in the hierarchy of people with Europeans at one end and non-Europeans at the other.
- (d) the acceptance of the economic system of Capitalism as the most efficient and rewarding, and reconcilable with the idea of human freedom and dignity.

In virtually all instances, European colonialism advanced sophisticated supremacist rationalizations for the subjugation of non-white people of the world. The official sloganeering of "manifest destiny," "white man's burden" was complemented by theological altruism.² Assumptions (a), (b), (c), and (d) were held true for the whole world but (d) was shattered by the Bolshevik revolution of 1917. Until 1917, the entire international system was controlled and dominated by the world's capitalist countries who had also carved up the whole world as their respective spheres of political and economic hegemony. Euphemisms like "sphere of influence," "Her majesty's empire" were the preferred terms under which national policies of aggrandizement, colonial subjugation and exploitation were cloaked. The Bolshevik revolution opened the first crack in the

²Edwin Smith (ed.), The Christian Mission in Africa (London: International Missionary Council, 1926).

hitherto seemingly impregnable armor of invincibility of the imperial system.

Theoretically, the new Soviet nation, armed with the revolutionary ideology of Marxism-Leninism rejected the Euro-American liberal and Republican definition of democracy which flows from a subjective idealist conception of society or "social contract" as developed from the writings of Locke and Rousseau. The Soviet people rejected the class mediation pluralist thesis and embraced the class domination position, believing that the ruling ideas in the society are the ideas of the ruling class.³ It rejected the false consciousness that has been fostered and perpetuated by the class control of all the major organs of the socialization process--the school curriculum especially, but also including the media and culture. From 1917, until the outbreak of the World War II, the United States subjected the budding new state to sustained and scurrilous hostility, first for defecting from the capitalist camp and perhaps more ominously, for the example it clearly portends for the world and the strategic problem it posed for the capitalist world. For example, it was not until 1933 that the United States recognized the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic after it had invaded it, along with Britain, France, Germany, Japan and Canada from 1917-21. The

³ See Maurice Cornforth, The Theory of Knowledge (New York: International Publishers, 1977); Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1967).

Soviets pursued an inward-looking economic policy of autarky, as a matter of survival and a strategic policy in line with century-old European balance of power dogma. All the same, the Soviet Union was in splended isolation from 1917 to the end of World War II, except for the brief period of the policy of mutual expediency that led to accommodation between it and capitalist countries during World War II. The Soviet people successfully rid themselves of this capitalist encirclement by (a) insulating their state from any political, cultural and economic penetration from the capitalist powers and (b) more importantly, in contradistinction to the United States which resurrected capitalist relations of production and attendant socio-political institutions in areas under its occupation after the war, the Soviet Union opted for the establishment of socialist governments in areas under its occupation.⁴ The establishment of socialist states in Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, East Germany, Yugoslavia and China, with minimum, maximum or no Soviet aid, heralded a fundamental realignment of power and a different correlation of forces from the one the world knew before 1939. The socio-economic system that the West had tried to destroy by military intervention or limit to the Soviet state by propaganda⁵

⁴Robert E. Osgood et al., America and the World, From the Truman Doctrine to Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

⁵James Nathan and James Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order (Boston: Little, Brown, 1981), pp. 14-15.

and encirclement had now taken hold and come to fruition in nine countries by 1949. The United States came out of the Second War, its economic strength bouyed by record-level production in its war effort and its casualties and lost infinitesimal compared to those of Japan, Britain, Germany, France and the Soviet Union. While the United States lost only 300,000 soldiers, one out of every 10 Russians was either wounded in the war or died.⁶ Strategically, the United States inherited the legacy of the erstwhile European powers as imperial hegemonic regulator,⁷ and an essentially doctrinaire bipolar division of the world came into being. A consensus began to develop within the foreign policy establishment of Western governments in which the world has come to be seen as divided between two mutually exclusive socio-economic and political systems--theirs, based on freedom and liberty, the socialist world, as the West understands it, based on coercion and intimidation.⁸

More importantly, strategically, the view had crystallized in which American interest now goes far beyond the physical security of its land mass and waters but is

⁶K.J. Holsti, International Relations: A Framework of Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 70.

⁷Joseph M. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1965), pp. 40-47.

⁸Harry S. Truman, "The Truman Doctrine: Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey," March 12, 1947, Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947).

intertwined with balance of power and an American conception of international order. To the prostrate countries of Western Europe, where American hegemony was unquestioned and American allies were in control of government, the conjunction of this world view was easy enough, but with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe where Soviet influence was dominant; even with the American economic coercion manifested in the brief termination of lend-lease aid to the Soviets, a world imperial system based on the hegemony of finance capital and backed by the coercive power of the state dominated by the same class was not reconcilable to the communist doctrine.

For the African world, the impact of the continent on the world scene was both parlous and ephemeral. There was the reality of the unfettered and uncontested European colonial hegemony as sanctioned by the Berlin Conference of 1884-85. Henceforth, the modalities for any change in the status of Africa would now have to contend with the prescriptions of those who hold the decisive formative influence on the continent--the colonial powers. Africa had come to be regarded in the European world as an object of history and Africans as pawns and cannon fodders in European wars. If, for example, in African historiography, (both of liberal or conservative genres) the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 have come to be regarded or termed "World Wars," the only rational and sane explanation is that a phenomenon, even when it has all the qualities and

elements that render its basic suppositions and assumptions invalid or questionable, if repeatedly asserted as true and constant, henceforth comes to be seen popularly and unquestioningly as being so. Objectively, the dominant African historiography which flows from the colonial historiography is, in the present neo-colonial era, in the hands of alienated elites and their mentors from the metropolises.⁹

While it is now quite true that Africa is now part of the world system, it is truer to say it is part of the European created world system, because the essential character of the problems that face that system, the range of options open, even the definition of what constitutes an international problem, are questions that Africa has no influence worth speaking of in defining, not to talk of proposing solutions. Objectively, the two world wars that Africans as objects/victims of European colonial expansionist hegemony were conscripted into various European armies, to fight for the respective colonial powers fighting among themselves to settle a problem that was of no direct relevance to the objective colonial reality. Both wars were fought to contain German expansionism in Europe. Indeed, the German chauvinistic Aryan race supremacist theory only particularizes to themselves the cultural supremacist

⁹We take this position, without prejudice to the fact that some tentative attempt at reconstruction has been made by some African scholars. See for example A. Temu and B. Swai, Historians and Africanist History: A Critique (London: Zed Press, 1981).

outlook common to the expansionist hegemonic ideology of virtually all colonial imperialist countries of Europe-- Italy, Belgium, England, France, Portugal, Spain, and the Netherlands.

The offence of German expansionism was two-fold: first it sought to invalidate and destroy the European balance of power by supplanting it with German hegemony in Europe. The second offence was attempting to bring colonialism to Europe. Colonialism, after all, had been rationalized as the natural hegemony of a superior people over an inferior one - a theory that was acceptable to all the colonizing powers¹⁰ and justified by the leading intellectual elites of the era. Africa's involvement in the wars of 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 can thus only be meaningfully understood in the light of the fact that these were European wars, which by the virtue of European hegemony and sovereignty over Africa, Africans were now conscripted to fight. It is thus then both a function of European partition of the continent, and colonialization of its people that can give any sensible meaning to the two wars being called world wars. Objectively, for Africans and Africans, both were intra-European wars brought to African soil and each European imperial power in desperation used African manpower to achieve its military

¹⁰See for example, Winthrop D. Jordan, White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro (Maryland: Penguin Books, Inc., 1969), Chapters VI and IV; Claude Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1977), pp. 83-84.

objective. Hence, we see, the victims of European colonial expansionsim now at war not to liquidate the colonial presence, but on opposite sides of intra-imperialist wars, forced to make common cause with his own enemy and indeed to defend him and his homeland. We are not by any stretch of the imagination stating that Africans did not militarily resist colonialism, nor making the claim that these two wars represent the first time Africans were conscripted to fight European wars. In the first place, active military resistance against colonialism had by then been long contained, or neutralized, and indeed Africans were used by France in the Franco-Russian War of 1870.¹¹ But now, it was on a scale unparalleled before, and a magnitude that brings into sharp relief the massive subjugation of African manpower in furtherance of European interest world wide. A grand total of 500,000 African soldiers fought to free France from German domination in the first war. In both Namibia and Tanganyika, both then German colonies, German resistance was composed of 11,000 Africans out of a total of 14,000 soldiers. French defence mobilisation policy called for annual supply of 12,000 African soldiers when the German threat grew in 1938. Africans were arrayed on both sides of the battle in North-west Africa in 1940. France, after the war of 1939-45, its German problem now neutralized/contained, sought to revert

¹¹C. M. Andrew and A. S. Kanya-Forster, "France, Africa and the First World War," Journal of Modern African History, No. XIX (1978), p. 14.

to its imperial colony-owing status, by maintaining the fiction of Algeria as a southern end of France and also trying to regain Indo-China as her colony. In the Indo-Chinese campaign, 15,000 Africans were conscripted to achieve this French imperial objective.¹² It was the battle of Dien Bien Phu that finally convinced France that the sun had set on its colonial adventures in Indo-China.

Large scale and organized insurrection in the immediate post-war era did break out in some of these African colonies, notably in Algeria, Kenya and Cameroon. Both the Cameroon insurrection led by the Union Populaire du Cameroun (UPC) and the Mau-Mau resistance in Kenya were effectively neutralized and destroyed by French and British colonial administrations respectively. However, the Algerian War of Liberation, assumed a protracted nature and lasted from 1954-1962. The colonialists now clearly perceived that they faced two strategic problems in Africa in the immediate post war period. One was how to reconcile their hegemonic control to the nationalist drive on the continent; the other was the Western fear of communist

¹²See James Mayall, Africa: The Cold War and After (London: Elek Books, 1971), pp. 54-55; Ruth First, Power in Africa (New York: Penguin Books, 1971); Jean Suret-Canale, "The Economic Balance Sheet of French Colonialism in West Africa," in Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman, African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: Monthly Review, 1977).

doctrine both as a body of thought and ideology, and their perceived aggressive design of the communist bloc. Consequently, in 1957, when the European Economic Community was about to be established, France, for example, made the granting of associate membership to her African colonies a condition for her signing the EEC treaty. Both France and Britain insisted on, even though the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ostensibly covered a given geographic area, incorporating their overseas colonies into the defence perimeters of NATO.¹³ Juridically, therefore, these colonies, including virtually almost the whole of Africa, were deemed to be overseas extensions of Britain, France and Belgium. The idea of overseas extensions of the metropole served French imperial resistance well during the second war, because the African city of Brazzaville served as the sanctuary and headquarters for defeated Frenchmen fleeing German occupation of their land. Since the Germans had effective occupation of France, Brazzaville served also as the provisional capital of the French resistance. It has to be one of the ironies of the unmitigated colonial arrogance that in spite of the massive sacrifice Africa paid in the liberation of France, the post-war French government asked Belgium to hand over the

¹³K. J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 124.

Congo (Zaire) to France on the strength of a provision contained in the articles of partition of 1884.¹⁴ Be that as it may, by the end of 1960, the colonial powers had granted juridical independence to Nigeria, Ghana, Dahomey (now Benin), Togo, Upper Volta (now Burkina Faso), Congo-Leopoldville (now Zaire) and Congo-(Brazzaville), Mali, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Libya, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Gabon. The British had delayed the process in East Africa, and pursued a policy of accommodation and continuity in Rhodesia. But it was the crisis that erupted in the then Congo-Leopoldville almost immediately after the granting of constitutional independence by Belgium that brought forcibly home the inadequacy and limitation of this independence and the peripheral nature of the African states as actors in the international system. It brought into clearer relief the contradictions between objective African interests and the systemic interest of extra-African powers.

Interventionism in Zaire

Belgium did not before 1959 design a carefully articulated vision of a prospective terminal goal of the colonial rule¹⁵ in the Congo, which effectively was from 1878-1960.

¹⁴Arthur Gavshan, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West (New York: Penguin, 1981), p. 42.

¹⁵On the colonial background of Zaire and genocidal nature of Belgian rule, see Alan Merriam, Congo--Back-ground of Conflict (Northwestern University Press, 1961).

Consequently, from the very beginning, prolonged Belgian tutelage was the goal, though the justification for this now required finer and finer refurbishment. Belgian colonialism was premised on a conviction that theirs was a mission to civilize the African. For example, the colonial settler mining company, Union Miniere echoed the philosophy on which colonialism of all European countries is based,

The colonisers must never lose sight of the fact that the Negroes have the soul of children, souls which mold themselves to the methods of the educator; they watch, listen, feel and imitate. The European must, in all circumstances, show himself a chief without weakness, goodwilled without familiarity, active in behavior and especially just in the punishment of bad misbehavior, as in the regard of good deed (The European camp head) must interest himself constantly in the life of the native, in their well-being; must guide them, examine their complaints; punish them when necessary with the tact, the calm and the firmness which are required.¹⁶

Kwame Nkrumah, The Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers), Chapter I; Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo (Princeton, 1965); Arthur Gavshan, Crisis in Africa: Battleground of East and West (New York: Penguin Books, 1981), pp. 57-58; Phillipa Schuyler, Who Killed the Congo? (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1962), Chapter 4. There exists no agreement on the number of the Congolese who perished in this period. The figures given by Gavshan and Schuyler range from 5 million to 33 million. Schuyler wrote that Congolese children and women were at the lustful mercy of Belgian officials. The Belgians forced, publicly, Congolese rulers to submit to sodomy in order to humiliate them in the eyes of the citizens. Schuyler remarked further that Belgian atrocities in the Congo and the international scandal that erupted when it became public was only exceeded in scope by those of Nazi death camps.

¹⁶ Young, Politics in the Congo, pp. 61-62.

Belgium faced its administrative problem in the Congo by first setting up a consultative organ-Conseil Colonial du Gouvernement in 1914 to deflect criticisms from its brutality in the Congo. But, with the end of the Second War and the nationalist struggles that had broken out in Asia and Europe, it was clear that a new plan had to be devised to stem the tide of the nationalist awakening that had broken out in all the colonies. Belgian then decided on a policy of controlled gradualism and a Belgo-Congolese Community was born in 1946, on the premise of internal autonomy for the Congo. The Belgo-Congolese Community idea was amended to suggest a parity association between two nations but linked by the Belgium crown. This Eurafrican idea found acceptance even among Congolese leaders, and Patrice Lumumba, later to become the first Congolese Prime Minister, wrote in 1956,

The New Eurafrican society which we are building today must be administered and directed jointly by Belgium and Congolese. Neither of the two factions of the Belgo-Colgolese Community should dominate or oppress the other¹⁷

Still popular insurrections broke out in the Congolese capital of Leopoldville and also in Stanleyville, October 30-31, 1959. Again, Belgium, in order to contain the rising tide of Congolese nationalism settled for the familiar neo-colonial arrangement whose basic thesis had been

¹⁷Ibid., p. 47.

formulated in a confidential memorandum by the European settler organization (Fedacol), to the colonial government in 1955. The document said:

We must organize a class of evolve natives, who will declare their acceptance of the ideals and the principle of our Western civilization, and who will be, if on equal standing, our equals in rights and duties, less numerous than the native mass, but powerful and influential, they will be allies it is indispensable for us to find in the native communities. These middle classes will be the black bourgeoisie which is beginning to develop everywhere, which we must help to enrich itself and organize itself and which like all the bourgeoisie of the world will be opposed to any disruption, internal or external.¹⁸

Political party activity accelerated in 1958 and indeed as many as 100 sprouted up when political party formation was finally allowed. Ideological split within the nationalist movement was immediately apparent. The schism within the bourgeois leadership was essentially one between progressive nationalists with country-wide followership with reformist ideological outlook and the conservative group who favored a highly decentralized state power with a confederal status or even secession of their power base from the national government. The conservative group enjoyed even at this initial state, considerable support and encouragement from Belgium colonial administration, the settler community, its mining sector and other western governments.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 44.

Patrice Emery Lumumba became the first Prime Minister of the independent Congo despite, and in spite of, manoeuvres of the Belgium colonial administration, the Catholic church and the settler mining community corporate power. Ganshof van de Meersch, Belgium African Affairs Minister and Resident Minister to the Congo, confirmed that he did everything possible to avoid a Lumumba government "at any cost."¹⁹

Lumumba represented in Western eyes the personification of what they saw as the threat to Western economic, ideological, geopolitical and strategic interest in Zaire (Congo) and Africa.

The paternalism of Western colonialism as cited by Lumumba himself "is the influence of a civilized people, on a people of lower civilisation, exercised with the aim of steadily transforming the latter by the development of its natural resources and the improvements of the moral and maternal conditions of the native people."²⁰ Western governments implicitly accepted this definition as the United States government had cause to "congratulate the government and people of Belgium on the many constructive contributions made to the well-being of the Congolese people."²¹ That is to say, European colonialism was a fiduciary and

¹⁹Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 309.

²⁰Patrice Lumumba, Congo, My Country (New York: Praeger, 1962), p. 11.

²¹Department of State Bulletin, Volume XLIII, No. 1100, July 25, 1960, p. 152.

the West envisaged, during the era of the Cold War, a Eur-
africa with close ties.²² Lumumba on the other hand saw the
Congo as a "focal point of African independence."²³ At the
Pan-African Conference of December 11, 1958, in Ghana,
Lumumba had this to say,

... despite the boundaries that separate us, despite
our ethnic differences ..., we share the same aware-
ness, the same anxious desire to make this African
continent a free and happy continent that has rid
itself of unrest and of fear and of any sort of
colonial domination.²⁴

He called for "a struggle against all those internal and
external factors standing in the way of the emancipation
of our respective countries and the unification of
Africa."²⁵ For Lumumba, as he himself defined it, the idea
of Eurafrica, is rooted in a relationship of "subjugation
and subordination."²⁶ Indeed on August 8, 1960, less than
a month after Zairois (Congolese) independence, Lumumba
entered into a secret agreement with President Kwame
Nkrumah of Ghana establishing the nucleus of a Union of

²² Ibid.

²³ Thomas Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba
(Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing Co., 1977), p. 58.

²⁴ Jean Van Lierde (ed.), Lumumba Speaks: The Speeches
and Writings of Patrice Lumumba 1958-61 (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1972), p. 58.

²⁵ Jean Van Lierde (ed.), Lumumba Speaks, p. 23.

²⁶ Ibid., p. 73.

African States with the capital at Kinshasa (Leopoldville).²⁷

Domestically, Lumumba had become head of government on a platform that stressed centralized authority as opposed to the separatist or loose federation of Zairois (Congolese) provinces and a strong federal control over the mining sector of the national economy. Twice before the attainment of independence, the Belgian mining interests in the colonial state attempted to force the secession of the mineral rich Shaba (Katanga) province.²⁸ Lumumba's program of "rapid Africanisation"²⁹ of the administrative, managerial and officer corps of the Zairois (Congolese) bureaucracy and the army also directly threatened Belgian interest. As we shall see, apart from the loyalty of the 10,000 colonial cadres in Zaire (Congo) in 1960 to the Belgian interest in the country, their replacement by Africans as planned by Lumumba would cost Belgium \$140-\$156 millions a year because these colonial cadres would now have to be reabsorbed into the Belgian economy recovering from the ruins of the European War of 1939-45.

The Congo became independent on June 30, 1960 and on

²⁷For a text of this pact, see Kwame Nkrumah, The Challenge of the Congo (New York: International Publishers, 1965), pp. 30-31.

²⁸Crawford Young, Politics in the Congo, p. 309.

²⁹Jean Van Lierde (ed.), Lumumba Speaks, p. 272.

July 5 elements of the army -- Armee Nationale Congolais (ANC), revolted against their Belgium officers over the slow pace of Africanisation of the officer corp. The following day Belgium troops invaded the country, beginning from the mineral-rich (Katanga) Shaba province. Tshombe, the provincial premier declared the province an independent state and elements of the Belgian army began to train a defence force for Shaba.

Lumumba attempted to resolve the situation by weighing the merits of seeking assistance from: (1) the Afro-Asian nations in the world community; (2) the United States; (3) the Soviet Union and (4) the United Nations Organization. Lumumba had one single objective, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of the Congo and the expulsion of the Belgium troops. Having in conjunction with President Kasavubu appealed in vain to the United States to help in achieving this objective and been directed to the United Nations, the Prime Minister was to learn a grave and ultimately fatal lesson in real politik. Beginning with the arrival of the UN forces on July 15, 1960 and progressively there from, Lumumba's power and influence, both as Prime Minister and consequently as an effective force in the Congo suffered dimunition and finally became extinguished. By his failure in not paying proper attention to the power configuration, both at the UN and in the global system, he

learned only too late that the UN does not exist in a vacuum--its objective and that of the Congolese people as personified by the Prime Minister were not the same. It will be necessary to go beyond the customary charter-based analysis of the role and place of the United Nations in the present neo-colonial epoch in order to unmask and reveal the forces at work, because the United Nations' role in the Congo came to be a victory for those who had the decisive influence ³⁰ within the organization or as a United States official was reported to have said "it was really a U.S. operation but using outstanding U.N. personalities."³¹

Zaire Crisis and U.S. Strategic
and Ideological Interest

The American operation in Zaire rested on a hard-headed recognition of its place and role as the foremost capitalist Western hegemonic power. In the fifteenth century, Spain had played this role, France had supplanted Spain in both the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and Britain, both in Europe and especially in the forcible and brutal hegemony it had fostered in the colonized world, was foremost power till the end of the first general European War (1914-1918), a war which incidentally laid the

³⁰Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations: The Years of Western Domination, 1945-1955, Vol I (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), Chapters, I-III.

³¹Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo: 1960-1964 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1974), p. 147.

ground work for the destruction of the European balance of power, and the emergence of the United States from a regional hemispheric power to a world power. The United States foreign policy establishment took proper stock of the insurrectionary trends in the colonized world, where European hegemony had held sway for centuries and its own hegemony in the western hemisphere. It viewed with extreme foreboding the emergence and strengthening of the rival social system in the world. Out of this rumification, came the National Security Council Document No. 68 (NSC-68). This document, whose central thesis provided the ideological guideline for western foreign policy and has survived to the present neo-colonial era, was drawn up in 1950, after the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was born in Brussels. The opening pages of this revealing document acknowledged the role that wars, revolutions and social upheavals played in the demise of other empires--notably the Ottoman, the German, the Austro-Hungarian, the Italian, the Japanese, and the relegation of both Britain and France to second-rate powers. The document further acknowledged the Soviet Union as the principal hegemonic adversary of the United States. According to the authors, in order for the United States not to go the way of the aforementioned empires, the country must employ "any means, covert or overt, violent or non-violent"³²

³²National Security Council, "A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950,"

to achieve its global objective.

Two concepts underlie United States hegemonic drive here. One is ideology; the other is interest - both economic/material and also strategic. For our purpose, we may define ideology as "a set of fundamental convictions more or less consciously held as the truth about the nature and destiny of man and the universe, with the explicit implication that every thing at variance with them is false."³³ Central to these convictions is the paramountcy of capitalism as an economic system and the socio-political institutions that sustain it worldwide. The document sees any upheaval, change, or a potential for same, as a challenge to the capitalist order. Interest concerns "material aims and the social and physical quality of life."³⁴ The U.S. interest here is both a combination of economic-material and then strategic interests. It is true, as some³⁵ have asserted, that American economic interest--here simply narrowly defined in terms of direct investment, in Zaire,

Naval War College Review, 27 (May-June 1975).

³³ Charles H. Malik, "The United Nations as an Ideological Battleground," in The United Nations in Perspective, E. Berkeley Tompkins (ed.), (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1972), p. 14.

³⁴ Stephen D. Krasner, Defending the National Interest, Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton: University Press, 1978), p. 334.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 276.

in 1960 was negligible. But such a position conveniently ignores the role that the mineral extractive sector of the Zairois national economy has played in the world capitalist economy since the colonial days. In the areas of three strategic metals, notably copper, industrial diamonds and cobalt, Zaire has been important. In the area of cobalt, Zaire is the world's primary producer; its 35.3% of total world cobalt production dwarfs that of its closest rival, as the Table below shows.

TABLE II

WORLD COBALT MINE PRODUCTION (1978)
(Estimated % of Total World Production)

| <u>Country</u> | <u>Percentage of total world production</u> |
|---------------------|---|
| Zaire | 35.3 |
| New Caledonia | 13.5 |
| Communist Countries | 11.8 |
| Australia | 11.2 |
| Zambia | 7.4 |
| Canada | 5.9 |

Source: U.S. Department of Interior, Mineral Commodity Summaries (Washington, D.C., 1979).

Zairois economic structure established under the colonial tutelage of Belgium, "was centrally designed to establish in Zaire, industries extracting minerals needed by Belgium industries first and other countries of the Western bloc,"³⁶ Of the total non-communist cobalt

³⁶Ghifem Katwals, "Export-Led Growth, The Copper Sector," in Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment

consumption, in 1972, the countries of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)--the United States, Western Europe and Japan, consumed 85% of the total while the so-called developing countries took 5.8%.³⁷ The mining-led economy of colonial Zaire furnished the uranium that enabled the United States to build the first atomic bombs.³⁸ The introduction of the atomic bomb in the history of warfare, not only signalled, at least temporarily, the supremacy of the United States within the allied ranks that fought the war of 1939-45, but from 1945 to 1949 when the Soviet acquired the nuclear capability, the strategic offensive and initiative was clearly and uncontestably with the United States.

Strategic interest of the United States in Zaire refers to the preservation and maintenance of a preferred socio-political and economic system. What is crucial to the strategic interest,

... to the business system as a whole, is that the option of foreign investment (and foreign trade) should remain available. For this to be meaningful, the business system requires, as a minimum that the political and economic principles of capitalism should prevail and that the door be fully open for foreign capital at all times³⁹

³⁷Ibid., p. 126.

³⁸Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 47.

³⁹Harry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969), p. 20.

The strategic interest here is the systemic interest. The systemic interest transcends the narrow interest of any particular actor, for example, a state, or a transnational conglomerate. It may transcend it but it is not irreconcilable with or exclusive to it. Hence, in Zaire, in spite of the superficialities of intra-imperial manoeuvring, there was a confluence and congruence of agreement--interest to maintain the strategic systemic order. To the Western world, the crisis of state power that developed a week after Belgium ceded juridical independence to Zaire, when Zairois soldiers mutinied and Belgium reinvaded the country, was a crisis of (1) how best to contain radical nationalism in an enclave where Western hegemony and capital has exercised decisive formative influence since 1492, and (2) how best to counter the USSR from making common cause with the Africans, and in the Western eyes from gaining influence and displacing them from a terrain where their influence and hegemony had been paramount and whose strategic minerals are sorely needed by Western economies.

The United Nations as an Instrument of Western
Response to Zairois Crisis and Ultimately as an
Instrument of American Foreign Policy

All members of the United Nations subscribe to an abstract notion of collective security. According to Section 1 of Article 24 of the United Nations charter. "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United

Nations, its members confer on the Security Council, the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on its behalf."⁴⁰ Section 2 of the same Article 24 further adds, "In carrying out these duties, the Security Council shall act with Purposes and Principles of the United Nations."⁴¹ But, in reality, all of the Security Council members saw the United Nations as merely a legalized form of their victory in the war of 1939-45. In a way there was a definite truth to this position; after all, the composition of the five permanent members of the Security Council was essentially a recognition of the power configuration that emerged from the ruins of the war. The UN was born at the onset of the cold war, when votes in the General Assembly were usually 55 to 5 in favor of the Western nations, "the UN had within it and in all its constituent bodies, a clear majority supporting Western position."⁴² Having created the Security Council as essentially the executive arm of the United Nations and having granted its

⁴⁰Leland M. Goodrich, Eduard Hambro, and Ann Patricia Simons, Charter of the United Nations: Commentary and Documents (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 202.

⁴¹Ibid., p. 202.

⁴²Evan Luard, A History of the United Nations: The Years of Western Domination, Vol. I (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982), p. 93.

five permanent members the right of veto on matters of peace, aggression or collective security, the world was treated by all the powers to a veritable display of capricious, arbitrary use and misuse of this power, since among none of these nations singularly and oftentimes collectively, was there a conceptual congruence and consensus of what "collective security" means. For example, the Western dominated United Nations in coming to the aid of their local ally and United States satellite, South Korea, in the Korean civil war thought they were "uniting for Peace," and consequently their UN resolution empowering them to take action was so dubbed. Thus, collective security was not a universal phenomenon but a crusade against "communist expansionism" and the United Nations went as far as characterizing both North Korea and the Peoples Republic of China as the "enemy." For the Soviet Union, "imperialism" was the threat to what it sees as "Collective Security," consistently outvoted, and out-manoeuvred, the Soviet position became increasingly obscurantist. Earlier in UN history, to protect itself against the tyranny of the western majority, it had made the wild suggestion that its sixteen autonomous republics be admitted to the UN as individual members. That, of course, was tantamount to the United States asking that its forty-eight states in 1948 be admitted as individual members. But the composition in the General Assembly was five communist states out of fifty-one members.

The Western powers, therefore, could normally expect to win each vote. They had no need to negotiate compromise solutions; they had only to mobilize the majority permanently for their own view. On most issues they would support strong action by the UN, since they knew they could control the action the UN took and they then proudly presented themselves, almost tautologically, as the supporters and upholders of the organization, and of its declared views; for to support the UN was to support themselves and their decisions.⁴³

To get around the incessant use of the veto in the Security Council by the Soviet Union, a process was established whereby the General Assembly was empowered to sanction the use of force, a usurpation of the powers of Security Council and violation of the organization's charter.

Uninhibited by the inconvenient veto power, inevitably Western views prevailed over the majority of the issues. This was not, of course how Western countries themselves viewed the matter. In their eyes, it was the majority within the UN whose views prevailed and if these happened to coincide with those of leading Western governments, this was happy coincidence⁴⁴

In the effort in Korea, supposedly under the UN flag, only sixteen nations sent military assistance; all were either NATO members or clients of the same.

The command and control of UN forces were structured in such a manner, that the United States had total control. All forces committed to the UN effort were under U.S. command. The UN flag was to be used, but the UN resolution in no way required that the U.S. commander report to the

⁴³Ibid., p. 94.

⁴⁴Ibid., p. 96.

United Nations. Indeed the Security Council established no machinery for administering the military effort. It was clear, therefore that the UN effort in Korea would be United States conceived, administered and implemented.⁴⁵

The Soviet Union cast 110 vetoes in the UN between 1946 and 1976. On the face of it this figure is staggering; in actuality, it does not tell the whole story and is therefore misleading. In the first place, three-quarters of the votes were circumvented, as for example, when the Western coalition used a special procedure to allow a special session of the General Assembly to empower the UN to an armed response in Korea. The Soviet Union in this case was absent, and its action, whether in the General Assembly or in the Security Council, could not have mattered in the light of the realities of the day. Secondly, those were the days of automatic majority and automatic leadership of the Western alliance. Before 1966, when the Security Council membership was enlarged, a majority were political/military clients of the United States, a situation which provided a "hidden veto" to the U.S.⁴⁶ When the ideological bi-polarity that characterized these manoeuvres became less rigid, with the entrance of many third world nations who attempted to move

⁴⁵See James A. Nathan and James K. Oliver, United States Foreign Policy and World Order (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1981), p. 126; John G. Stoessinger, Why Nations Go to War (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 79.

⁴⁶John G. Stessinger, The United Nations and the Super Powers, China, Russia and America (New York: Random House, 1977), Chapter I.

their own agenda to the international forum, the ideological, economic and strategic objective of the western world became more obvious. The United States cast its first veto in 1970 to block the censure of the Smith rebel regime of Zimbabwe. The United States, France and the United Kingdom collectively blocked the expulsion of South Africa from the world community in 1974. It is against this background of the use of the United Nations as a forum for the advancement of ideological and strategic interest that most African states became juridically independent in 1960.

The Economic and Geo-political
Dimension of Western Interest

The Western strategy for the Zairois crisis was a response of coalition diplomacy or solidarity based on a hard-headed recognition of the geo-political, strategic and economic calculus. Belgium's Societe' Generale, directly or indirectly controlled 70% of Zairois economy and it had near-absolute control of the copper, uranium, diamond and cobalt mining complex.⁴⁷ In 1960, the termination of Belgian economic strangle hold on Zaire would mean losing "about 30 percent of the overseas operations of transport and insurance firms, and the loss of about \$77 million in revenue from investment"⁴⁸ Belgian public sector would

⁴⁷Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 49.

⁴⁸Catherine Hoskyns, The Congo Since Independence: January 1960 - December 1961 (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), pp. 52-53.

have to come up with an "\$140-\$156 million a year" from the reabsorption of 100,000 colonial cadres manning its venture in Zaire. France, along with West Germany and Italy depended heavily on Zairois copper. A French colony, Congo-Brazzaville, shared continuous land mass with Zaire; a radical, non-western oriented neighbor to a conservative properly assimile' French-oriented state was viewed with alarm in France. Britain had put together an unstable settler-dominated Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland as her answer to African nationalism in South-Central Africa. The monopoly of economic and political power lay in the hands of the settler community in Salisbury and one of them, Roy Wellensky had indeed become the Prime-Minister of the ill-fated Federation. The other parts of the federation were Northern Rhodesia (now Zambia) and Nyasaland (Malawi). The Federation was also territorially contiguous with Zaire and the resolution of the Zaire crisis along the terms that pleased the settler interests was also in the best interest of British colonialism. In Zaire, Britain also had investment interest in the Belgian mining firm of Union Miniere. Union Miniere, produced 22 percent of Zaire's gross national product and 60 percent of the export, and the British investment included the ubiquitous Unilever conglomerate.⁴⁹ Portugal attempting

⁴⁹Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 26..

to hold on to its spurious and ultimately jettisoned theory of Angola and Mozambique as overseas extensions of its mainland was also concerned about what the outcome of the Zaire crisis portended for settler expansionism in Africa. Angola, a Portuguese Colony, shared a border too with Zaire. For the United States, the Zairois province of Shaba (Katanga) provided almost three-quarters of the U.S. cobalt imports in 1960 and the Katanga-Rhodesia mining complex provided 10 percent of U.S. copper import. While direct U.S. investment was small, the United States with a military strategic interest in the economy of Western European countries, also clearly had a strategic interest in keeping Zairois resources accessible. Also, American companies maintained a plethora of hidden and not-so-hidden interests in the complex Euro-American financial and investment interest in Zaire: American Metal Climax (AMAX) controlled 50-60 percent of Rhodesian-Katanga mining complex, and Mobil Oil had a \$12,000,000 investment in oil storage and distribution network in Zaire in 1960.⁵⁰ The Morgan Guaranty Trust, was "the traditional fiscal agent in the United States for the Belgian Congo government and often served as "banker to the Belgian government," according to Weissman.⁵¹ When Zaire became juridically independent of Belgium in 1960, Dwight Eisenhower was

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 29.

⁵¹ Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 35.

President of the United States. Eisenhower was properly imbued with the supremacist impulse that characterized the colonial hegemony of his political allies. His own pedestrian approach to the civil rights struggle of American racial minorities is well known. The 34th President of the United States thought that some things (civil and social inequality of the African-American included) "are not best handled by punitive or compulsory federal law."⁵² Eisenhower thought Zairois existed "in a state of gross ignorance"⁵³ and his State Department forbade African-Americans from travelling to Zaire⁵⁴ lest they arouse the "natives." The President recognized the paramountcy of Belgium economic interests and thought it was best that independent Zaire should let Europeans control strategic positions in the armed forces and government. Many of the President's advisors, including cabinet members, had extensive banking and mining interests tied up in Zaire and feared "that a pro-Communist Congo would jeopardize Western sources of strategic raw materials."⁵⁵ Their counsel and view were

⁵²Quoted in C. Vann Woodward, The Strange Career of Jim Crow (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), p. 139.

⁵³Dwight Eisenhower, Waging Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1965).

⁵⁴Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 44.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 9, 48-51; on U.S. favorable assessment of Western colonialism in Africa and Belgium in Zaire, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLII, No. 1100, July 25, 1960, p. 152; Vol. XLIII, No. 1110, October 3, 1960, p. 509.

therefore not unrelated to both their material and systemic interest.

The UN Secretariat, the UN Secretary
and Interpretation of Security
Council Resolutions

The second article of the Security Council resolution empowering the United Nations to commit troops to Zaire read,

... decides to authorize the Secretary-General to take the necessary steps, in consultation with the Government with such military assistance as may be necessary until, through the efforts of the Congolese Government with the technical assistance of the United Nations, the national security forces may be able in the opinion of the government, to meet fully its task.⁵⁶

This cynical and deliberately vague document, glossing over the fundamental differences in policy options internally among the Zairois leaders and seemingly oblivious to the external dimension of the crisis, was perhaps so worded in order to assume easy passage by all partisan interests represented in the Security Council. Thus, the character, extent, nature and modalities of assistance to be rendered to the Zairois government would now have to be determined by the UN Secretariat under Secretary Hammarskjold. It was from this Security Council resolution that Organization des Nations Unies du Congo (ONUC) was born.

Dag Hammarskjold, a Swedish national who served as Secretary-General of the United Nations from 1953 to 1961,

was uniquely instrumental and positioned to advance and consolidate the cause of Western interests in Zaire. The secretary, politically, has been characterized as a "tory Democrat."⁵⁷ Hammarskjold saw Marxist theory of imperialism "as a generalization in absurdum,"⁵⁸ and was, according to one worshipful account, "culturally and politically a Westerner and a European,"⁵⁹ who, in the opinion of an officer who worked with him, "shared the very widespread and sometimes unconscious European assumption that order in Africa is primarily a matter of safeguarding European lives and property."⁶⁰ Lippman thought Hammarskjold,

... was in fact the embodiment of noblest Western achievement--that laws can be administered by judges and civil servants who have their first allegiance to the law, and not to their personal, their class, or even their national interest.⁶¹

While conceding the intractable and complex nature of the severe limitations of the UN attempt to arbitrate in disputes between the dominant power blocs, Hammarskjold thought the

⁵⁷Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), p. 12. The author was quoting a Swedish Finance Minister under whom Hammarskjold worked.

⁵⁸Hammarskjold, quoted in Mark Zacher, Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations, p. 19.

⁵⁹Ibid., p. 10.

⁶⁰Connor Cruise O'Brien, "The United Nations and the Congo," Studies on the Left, VI (May-June 1966), pp. 7-8.

⁶¹Walter Lippman, "Dag Hammarskjold, United Nations Pioneer," in International Organisation, IV (Autumn 1961), p. 548.

area of UN action and possibility of success might be in the "uncommitted areas"--Asia, Latin America and Africa.

In the Annual Report to the 15th General Assembly for the Year 1959-60, in which the Secretary characterized Africa as an uncommitted area, virtually all of sub-Sahara Africa, with the exception of Ghana, were colonies of Britain, France, and Belgium. With particular reference to Zaire in 1960, the country was ringed by a plethora of European colonies, in the Southwest by the Portuguese colony of Angola, in the Southeast by the British colony of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, in the West by Congo-Brazzaville, a French colony, in the East by Uganda, a British colony; Ruanda-Urundi, a Belgian Trust territory, and Tanganyika, a British Trust territory. Hammarskjold was, in 1948, head of Sweden's delegation to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) that prepared the institutional fora for the establishment of EEC; he was in fact Vice-Chairman of the EEC's Executive Committee.⁶² It is, of course, quite entirely possible that a man so intimately associated with the founding of the EEC was not privy to the protracted negotiations that attended the birth of the Community and the vehement insistence of both Belgium and France that their African Colonies be admitted as associated members. To describe as Hammarskjold did, the African continent as an uncommitted area in which the United

⁶²Mark Zacher, Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations, p. 9.

Nations "has tried to counter tendencies to introduce Big Power Conflict ... and put the young African countries under shadow of the Cold War ..." will be a truly subjective reading and indeed a gross distortion of the UN activity in Zaire. The U.S. president also saw the UN role in Zaire this way.⁶³ In the first place, Africa could hardly, in 1960, be called an uncommitted area, having been wholly colonized by one of the ideological blocs of the Cold War. Secondly, political, economic and strategic role/place of Africa at the height of the cold war was determined by one of the partisan blocs under whose political and economic tutelage Africa had been at least since 1884, and whose hegemonic suzerainty had been uncontested and internationally recognized since that period. It will be truer and far more objective to suggest that the United Nations' intervention in Zaire was a crystallization of Western Coalition effort, maintained and sustained under the umbrella of the United Nations, to maintain and retain Western hegemonic initiative as a matter of economic, ideological and strategic imperative, in a continent where Western economic and political interests have been dominant and decisive since the advent of the European industrial revolution.

The mandate (The Security Council Mandate)--given to

⁶³For Hammarskjold's position, see Wilder Foote (ed.), Servant of Peace: A Selection of the Speeches and Statements of Dag Hammarskjold, Secretary General of the United Nations, 1953-1961 (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 327-328.

the Secretary General gave him the latitude of interpretation and implementation. The Secretary General came up with, as the basis of his understanding and interpretation of the Security Council resolution, a complex series of interpretations which he refined and refurbished as the UN activity progressed. According to Ralph Bunche, Hammarskjold held the

firm conviction that it was not only possible to conceive, but that actually have been built up at the United Nations--at the very heart of world events--a body of thoroughly objective if not "neutral" international officers who, under his leadership, when given opportunity and resources and the confidence of enough governments could play a vital role and at times even decisive role in averting conflict.⁶⁴

Hammarskjold thought himself an independent agent of the United Nations, a representative of the general will of the international community--"independent of the will of any individual member or group members ... and under him the Secretariat, could be and ought to be, trusted to act in the general interest of all."⁶⁵ Of the 102 high level or senior administrative positions in the United Nations Secretariat, 42 were held by American, French and British

For the U.S. position, see the U.S. president's speech in, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIII, No. 1111, October 10, 1960, p. 552.

⁶⁴ Ralph J. Bunche, "The United Nations Operation in the Congo," in The Quest for Peace, Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote (eds.), (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), p. 122.

⁶⁵ Connor Cruise O'Brien, as quoted by Mark Zacher, Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations, pp. 240-241.

advisers.⁶⁶ Policy positions in the Secretariat with regard to Zaire were in the hands of Hammarskjold and three Americans--Ralph Bunche, Andrew Cordier and Heinrich Wieschhoff--all the members of the Congo Club. Ralph Bunche was Under-Secretary for Political Affairs, Heinrich Wieschhoff was the Congo Club's African expert and Andrew Cordier the Executive Assistant to the Secretary General. The Under-Secretary for political and Security Affairs, a Soviet National, Georgia Arkader, was splendidly isolated,⁶⁷ had no policy input to UN activity in Zaire, his own subordinate--Wieschhoff bypassed him and reported directly to Hammarskjold. Arkader had no access to the information gathered by the UN apparatus on which ostensibly at least, the UN policy was based. When the Soviet Union offered material for the UN operation, the Secretary-General of the world body refused, proposing that the Soviet Union make financial contributions instead, but accepted, political, financial and logistical assistance from the United States.⁶⁸ One cannot run away from the conclusion that at least for Hammarskjold, he, himself and his

⁶⁶ Connor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1962), p. 50.

⁶⁷ On the Congo Club composition and operation see Connor Cruise O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, pp. 45-58; Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 308.

⁶⁸ Earnest Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of the UN Congo Operation (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 30.

three American collaborators met the thesis of "objectivity" and "neutrality" advanced in his fatuous and grandiloquent essay in Oxford in that they are "guided solely by the common aims and rules laid down for, and by, the organization"⁶⁹ they serve. The Security Council resolution of July 14, 1960, called for the Secretary General working with the government of Zaire, to provide the technical assistance, as necessary, until Zairois Security forces may in the opinion of the Zairois government meet their tasks. But Britain, France the United States and Italy, all members of the Security Council adopted the Belgian position that its military intervention without the invitation of the Zairois government was a humanitarian action. Belgium had tried to secure a retroactive legitimation by seeking to collaborate with the UN force. The United States position was that indeed Belgium had committed no aggression, even after its troops captured the Zairois bases of Kamina and Kitona. Hammarskjold took a position identical to the Western powers.

While the central government of Lumumba and Kasavubu were exploring ways of preventing the Katanga secession from consolidating into a fait accompli with Western Coalition support, Hammarskjold took the position that,

... the situation in Katanga does not have its root in the Belgian attitude Nor is the problem a

⁶⁹Dag Hammarskjold, "The International Civil Servant in Law and in Fact." Lecture at Oxford University, May 13, 1961.

desire on the part of the authorities of the province to secede from the Congo. The question is a constitutional one with strong undercurrents of individual and collective political aims.⁷⁰

Thus, a clear and fundamental difference had now risen on the purpose and role of UNOC. Whereas the maintenance of corporate entity of Zaire, i.e., its territorial integrity and the termination of Belgian invasion, and support of the secession was the government's interpretation, Hammarskjold interpreted his mandate from the Security Council differently, going so far as to suggest a confederal system in order to placate Tshombe and his allies.

The United Nations had come to Zaire under the explicit invitation of Lumumba government, whose central objective was to protect its newly-won independence and the territorial integrity of the sovereign state. It was for this cardinal objective that the UN assistance was requested; if the UN now felt it had a different set of priorities in Zaire, Lumumba now came to the conclusion that his government would now act independently of the United Nations. Lumumba now requested for and on August 29, 1960, in his provincial capital of Kisangani (Stanleyville), received military aid from the Soviet Union and on August 31, 1960, troops of the central government commenced action against the secessionist enclaves of Shaba (Katanga) and Oriental

⁷⁰Security Council Document 4417, August 1960.

Kasai. The aid included sixteen Ilyushin transport planes and one hundred trucks to transport troops to the areas of hostility.⁷¹ For this action, Hammarskjold denounced Lumumba as an irresponsible politician and "an incipient dictator who in his drive for power was prepared to wreck the Congo and the UN."⁷² The Prime Minister noted that since Zaire was not a trusteeship of the UN, it could seek assistance wherever it could. Now both the Western coalition and the UN working in concert⁷³ began to work towards dislodging Lumumba from power and/or eliminating him completely from the scene.

Meanwhile Ralph Bunche on whose recommendation Hammarskjold had based his Shaba policy of non-interference was now leaving to return to UN headquarters. A new Special Representative of UN Secretary in Zaire, Rajashwar Dayal, an Indian national had been appointed to take this place. However, to the surprise⁷⁴ of even Dayal, who was already in New York, Andrew Cordier, one of the American trio who along with Hammarskjold made up the Congo Club in the UN Secretariat

⁷¹Thomas Kanzas, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba (Cambridge: Schenkman, 1977), p. 276.

⁷²Ibid., pp. 174-175.

⁷³ Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables (New York: Macmillan, 1982), pp. 50-53; Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, pp. 88-89.

⁷⁴Rajeshwar Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 22.

was sent to Zaire. Cordier was sent to Zaire even without the knowledge of Dayal who Hammarskjold had publicly appointed at his Special Representative. Cordier was in Zaire for one week--September 1st - 8th, 1960, as the Special Representative of Hammarskjold and Head of the UN operations. His activities and actions during the space of one week enabled the UN, working in concert with Western nations, to consolidate their opposition to Lumumba and set in motion both the legal, and military coercive process that led to his downfall from power and ultimately to his physical demise. According to Kanza, Cordier in effect became the Zairois head of State with American Ambassador Clare Timberlake his "personal adviser and vice-president."⁷⁵ Cordier, upon arrival in Zaire, refused to meet with Prime Minister Lumumba; he sent "an urgent recommendation" through Hammarskjold⁷⁶ to the government of the United States to boost its intelligence network in Zaire. Cordier, now acting for Hammarskjold under the UN plan, with the CIA, French emissaries⁷⁷ and Belgian advisers began to advise that Article 22 of the Loi Fondamentale--the Republican constitution of Zaire--empowered Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba

⁷⁵Thomas Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba, p. 276.

⁷⁶Madeleine Kalb, The Congo Cables, pp. 74-75.

⁷⁷Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, pp. 88-90.

from the post of Prime Minister. Kasavubu accepted this interpretation of the constitution but asked for certain guarantees. On the night of September 5, 1960 Kasavubu announced the dismissal of Lumumba. Cordier immediately closed the airports and the radio station the following day. With the airport closed, Lumumba could not airlift troops who were engaged in action against the secessionists and cabinet members wishing to return to the capital were prevented from doing so. But Belgian planes operating in support of the Secessionist regime in Shaba were allowed to fly by the UN command. Kasavubu too had access to the radio station of Congo-Brazzaville. Though Lumumba countered by dismissing Kasavubu, the two leaders tendered their cases before the Zairois joint houses of parliament on September 7, and 8, 1960. The parliament annulled the dismissal and counter dismissal and opted for national reconciliation. Clearly caught off guard by Lumumba's parliamentary support, the UN and the United States began to look towards the army. Unwilling to abide by the choice of Lumumba again being returned as Prime Minister, the Western coalition working under the UN auspices began to court assiduously the Zairois Army. As Western contact and infiltration of the Zairois Army began to mature, the Kasavubu-Ileo governmental pretension was abandoned. Through the auspices provided by the Deputy Commander of UN forces in Zaire, Major General Kettani, a Moroccan general who served France well in the Second general

European War, the U.S., through the United Nations began to take over the payments and emoluments of units of Zairois Army, using Joseph Mobutu as conduit. Joseph Desire Mobutu was, in the words of Kanza, "the closest official collaborator Lumumba had," and as one of his two private Secretaries "had access to all the information, public or confidential, official or personal, that Lumumba was given."⁷⁸ During the initial army mutiny over the slow pace of the Africanization of the Officer Corp, Lumumba had upgraded Sergeant Mobutu to the rank of Colonel of the Army and Chief of Army Staff. But his loyalty had been sufficiently questionable, that he was excluded from the planning and execution of the military action against the secessionist enclaves. Kettani became Mobutu's military adviser and with U.S. diplomatic, moral and most importantly pecuniary support, Mobutu secured the necessary support of the Army--neutrality between Lumumba and Kasavubu and ultimately answerable to Mobutu only. On September 13th, Zairois parliament voted full powers to the Lumumba government. Hammarskjold acknowledged the political dominance and influence of Lumumba in the country and he had confided to the U.S. that he was trying to remove Lumumba without having to do so by "extra constitutional means," in a sort of "gamesmanship--how to win without actually

⁷⁸Thomas Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Lumumba (Cambridge: Schenkman Publishing House, 1977), p. 112.

cheating."⁷⁹ A day later, the Western coalition and the United Nations finally abandoned all constitutinal and legal pretension and niceties. Mobutu now came to the fore. He arrested the General Officer commanding the Zairois Army, General Lundula, his superior officer, and announced the take-over of power by the army. He simultaneously expelled all Russian and Czechoslovakian diplomats and gave them forty-eight hours to leave the country.⁸⁰ The national radio and the airports were now reopened, the military action against the secessionists enclaves of Oriental Kasai and Shaba (Katanga) were halted. Mobutu purported to rule the country thorough a college of commissioners and more importantly he was now the pay master⁸¹ of the ANC, with the generous support of UN liaison officers and Western military attaches, and the CIA. After the inauguration of the commissioners, they issued jointly a proclamation expressing gratitude to Mobutu as the "man who has delivered us from Communist colonialism and Marxist-Leninist imperialism" while giving their full support to Kasavubu as "sole head of state."⁸²

⁷⁹ Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. 80.

⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 90.

⁸¹ Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold, p. 66; Kalb, The Congo Cables, pp. 96-97.

⁸² Ibid., p. 98.

Meanwhile Rajeshwar Dayal of India had now assumed office as Special Representative to Zaire. When the African diplomats produced a reconciliatory document for Lumumba and Kasavubu to sign, Dayal hailed it "an excellent and entirely workable compromise."⁸³ The Zairois parliamentary group and African diplomats continued with their efforts at reconciliation, but the U.S. government's reaction to the possibility of reconciliation bordered on hysteria. Forged documents⁸⁴ began to appear in the Zairois press alluding to Lumumba's alleged attempt to expel the UN and replace it with Soviet aid. Even though American Ambassador Timberlake told Dayal that he was keeping his distance and not giving Mobutu⁸⁵ any more funds, the American state department insisted that Kasavubu publicly renounce any deal with Lumumba.⁸⁶ One can quote ad nauseum, the Charter of the United Nations, the Staff Regulations of the UN Secretariat, the principle of sovereignty of nations and non-interference, but objectively all these abstract precepts have no bearing on nor explain the forces at work, because ,

... having agreed to pay a third of the cost of the UN operation in the Congo, to say nothing of the invisible expenditure needed to keep the country within the Western sphere of influence,

⁸³ Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold, p. 86.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 88.

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 86.

⁸⁶ Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. 100.

the Americans were in command. The Congo became rather like a business company, in which the largest shareholder could determine how the governing board was to act.⁸⁷

When Dayal issued his progress report in November 1960, he returned to the theme of returning the country to legality. The Americans then decided to bring Kasavubu to New York to face the General Assembly. With Lumumba virtually incarcerated under house arrest, Thomas Kanza was chosen to represent the Lumumba government. The Western alliance was able to convert Chile, El-Salvador, Peru, Senegal, Chad, Austria, Bolivia, Brazil, Cyprus, Denmark, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Iceland, Israel, Japan, Norway, Thailand, Uruguay, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and most of the African members of the French Community to vote for the Kasavubu delegation which was confirmed 53-24-19.⁸⁸ The United States had co-opted the UN organ as part of its crusade against communism, and acting in collusion with Kasavubu-Bomboko and especially Mobutu had rendered the sovereign decision of the Zairois parliament invalid; and had used cajoling, intimidation and out-right bribery to force Kasavubu government as the only one it was willing to accept. On November 27, 1960, Lumumba, having recognized

⁸⁷Kanza, The Rise and Fall of Patrice Lumumba, p. 305.

⁸⁸Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, pp. 105-107; Kabl, The Congo Cables, pp. 154-155; on U.S. support of Kasavubu, see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIII, No. 1110, October 3, 1960, p. 527; Vol. XLIII, No. 1120, December 12, 1960, pp. 907-908.

the legal implication of the UN vote and in spite of the personal assurances of Dayal⁸⁹ as to his safety under UN command, decided to move to his home base of Kisangani.

Lumumba was captured by Mobutu troops on December 2. Kasavubu met Lumumba in captivity with an offer of a ministerial appointment in his government. Lumumba refused and on January 17, 1961, Lumumba and Okito and Mpolo, two of his Ministers, were transferred to Tshombe in Shaba, where they were put to death.⁹⁰

Change and Continuity: The Kennedy Policy

By the time of the demise of Lumumba, John Fitzgerald Kennedy had assumed the presidency of the United States. Contrary to the mythology of open-minded engagement and New Frontier ideology entertained by some⁹¹ and maintained and perpetuated by reverential and worshipful renditions of his

⁸⁹Ibid., p. 158.

⁹⁰On the relationship between Mobutu-Tshombe governments and the CIA on plans to assassinate Lumumba, see Rene Lemarchand (ed.), American Policy in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C., 1978), pp. 382-432. Also, Select Committee to Study Government Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Interim Report, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, 94th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C., November 20, 1975), pp. 13-70. The Church Committee tried albeit in vain to play down the CIA role in the murder of Lumumba. Also, Madeleine Kalb, Congo Cables, Chapters VI-VII.

⁹¹Dayal, for example, failed to grasp the politico-strategic basis in which U.S. policy in Zaire was rooted. He thought a Kennedy administration would distance itself from the Western Coalition strategy. See, Dayal, Mission for Hammarskjold, p. 702.

publicists and image-makers,⁹² Kennedy only saw Africa as an unoccupied terrain brimming with potential allies or tools in his crusade against communist nations. According to a secret study which he commissioned at the inception of his administration, and which subsequently set the basis for policy, Kennedy advisers came to a definitive conclusion:

... what we do--or fail to do--in Africa in the next year will have profound effect for many years We see Africa as probably the greatest open field of maneuver in the worldwide competition between the (Communist) Bloc and the non-Communist world.⁹³

The Kennedy anti-communism was without the bellicosity associated with the Eisenhower administration; it was one conducted with flair and grace though this did not prevent it from drawing up a contingency plan⁹⁴ for limited war when it feared the creation and consolidation of a rival government by Lumumbist forces and the increasing likelihood of support by the Soviet bloc and neutral nations. The administration knew that it needed another Cordier, though without

⁹² See Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Doubleday, 1967); Theodore Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days (Boston: Houghton-Mifflin, 1965).

⁹³ Edgar Lockwood quotes the study in "The Future of Carter Policy Toward Southern Africa," in Rene Lemarchand (ed.), American Foreign Policy in Southern Africa (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978), pp. 453-436.

⁹⁴ Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 142.

his blitz approach to policy execution that would only direct further attention to the collusion between the UN and the U.S. The Americans had now conceded that the parliament should be convened; but they wanted to ensure that the outcome of the choosing of a new government and a Prime Minister would be favorable this time. Neither the Americans nor their Zairois clients had any use for Dayal's even-handed approach towards the Zairois political factions nor for what they saw as his excessive obsession with legality. Kasavubu began to call for Dayal's withdrawal while Mobutu's troops began a campaign of harassment against UN troops in order to embarrass Dayal; Western governments began to describe him as "muddle-headed neutralist,"⁹⁵ and "ineffectual,"⁹⁶ and American Ambassador Timberlake had cabled that Dayal was not amenable to American pressures.⁹⁷ With characteristic unctuous hypocrisy, Hammarskjold put out the story that Dayal was being recalled for consultation for two weeks; Dayal never returned to Zaire. After an interim replacement, Hammarskjold and the Western Coalition now launched a new command arrangement, naming Sture Linnen, a Swedish entrepreneur to be in charge of overall operations and assisted by General McKeown in charge of the UN forces.

⁹⁵Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. 84.

⁹⁶Phillippa Schuyler, Who Killed the Congo? (New York: Delvin-Adair Co., 1962), p. 145.

⁹⁷Kalb, The Congo Cables, pp. 247-248.

The U.S. now began to call for a reconvening of Parliament. Cyrille Adoula was the candidate favored by the UN and the U.S. government⁹⁸ to be Prime Minister, and ten days before the parliamentary election, the U.S. preferred list of the new leaders of Zaire were already known to the United Nations operations in Zaire.⁹⁹ The United States embassy officials in Zaire admitted that the purported parliamentary election was a result of their working-relationship with UN Chief Linner, that "it really was a U.S. operation, but using outstanding UN personalities."¹⁰⁰

By finally reconvening parliament, Lumumbist forces having been decimated or physically eliminated, the U.S. had achieved its strategic-political objective by neutralizing effectively the forces of radical nationalism; its domestic allies, the Mobutu-Kasavubu-Bomboko axis had assumed state power in the interim and expelled the entire diplomatic missions of the Eastern bloc. Now, the new government of Adoula had won in Parliament on July 31, 1962; the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had sponsored both Adoula

⁹⁸Roy Wellensky, Wellensky's 4,000 Days (New York: Roy Publishers, 1964), pp. 221-222.

⁹⁹O'Brien, To Katanga and Back, p. 189.

¹⁰⁰Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 147. The U.S. thought the Adoula government was "moderate;" see Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLV, No. 1165, October 3, 1961, p. 676.

and his political organization, Rassemblement des Democrates du Congo (RADECO).¹⁰¹ At the inception of the Adoula government, the U.S., bilaterally and through the aegis of the UN had invested \$178.6 million in the UN/Western coalition effort. Indeed, in the four-year effort, the U.S. provided 42% of the total \$411 million.¹⁰²

However, the political problems of the Adoula government were hardly over; it had sought to strengthen itself by eliminating the Lumumbists, both in the Parliament, the country at large, and the Council of Ministers. Its goal was to reduce or eliminate the influence of those who shared the late Prime Minister's radical nationalism. By December, 1963, twenty-one Lumumbist Cabinet members had been removed, their political organization dissolved, the Zairois Parliament had been closed.

Popular rebellion and insurrection which had broken out in July, 1963 in Western Zaire had now spread to the East. They were led by the Committee of National Liberation, CLB, and the insurrections in the West were coordinated by Pierre Muele and in the East by Christopher

¹⁰¹John Hatch, "Hostages, Mercenaries, and the CIA," Nation (December 14, 1964), p. 11

¹⁰²Earnest W. Lefever, Crisis in the Congo: A United Nations Force in Action (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965). Also, Lefever, Uncertain Mandate: Politics of UN Congo Operations (Baltimore: John Hopkins Press, 1967). On U.S. support of financing the UN Congo operation, see, Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV, No. 1138, April 17, 1961.

Gbenye.¹⁰³ In the kiyu province, another Lumumbist, Gaston Soumialot organized the Armee Populaire de Liberation (APL). The deteriorating political and military situation of its client government alarmed the U.S. government. With Cuban exiles, European mercenaries and American pilots on contracts to the state department, combat missions began to relieve the hard-pressed Mobutu troops; counterinsurgency experts, along with C-47s and T-28s planes manned by 100 advisors were sent to Zaire by the end of June, 1964. That same day, the government of Cyrille Adoula fell and Moise Tshombe was brought back from exile from Europe to head a new government.

The United Nations operations had come to an end June 30, 1964--almost exactly four years after the late Prime Minister Lumumba's ill-fated invitation for UN assistance to deal with Belgian invasion and the Tshombe's Belgian-supported secession. Consequently it was Tshombe's task to preside over a post-ONUC government, with Kasavubu as President. Tshombe, widely regarded as a pariah in Africa (a legacy of his role and complicity in Lumumba's murder) was sponsored by the U.S., Belgium, and Britain. For his sponsors, Tshombe had impeccable credentials--his former secessionist army hitherto rusticated at the Portuguese colony of Angola was needed to supplement the security gap occasioned

¹⁰³Crawford Young, Politics of the Congo, p. 9.

by the UN withdrawal. Tshombe himself referred to this army of South African and Rhodesian mercenaries as foreign volunteers.¹⁰⁴ After all, these "volunteers" supplanted by Belgian paratroopers in contrast to Mobutu's dismal performance, were able to roll back the rapid advances of the Mulele Gbenye-Soumiolot forces. But Tshombe had to share his powers with Kasavubu, who has been a constant factor in the political configuration since 1960 irrespective of whatever regime was in power. Tshombe was not an American candidate; his advisers were British and Belgian in contrast to Adoula whose regime was sponsored by the Americans. An aspect of the American strategy was to break the economic colonial monopoly Belgium had hitherto exercised. In order to eclipse the rising ascendancy of Tshombe who was poised to challenge him in the coming election in 1965, Kasavubu refused to renominate Tshombe, and chose Evariste Kumba for the position of Prime Minister and a constitutional crisis ensued again. On November 24, 1965, Joseph Desire Mobutu, the American candidate, intervened, dissolved parliament and sacked the government of Kasavubu.

¹⁰⁴Moise Tshombe, My Fifteen Months in Government (Translated) by Lewis Bernays (Plano: University of Plano Press, 1967).

The Rise of Mobutu: Authoritarianism,
the Neocolonial State and Its Defence
in the Western Strategic Interest

The second coming of Mobutu finally signalled and consolidated American hegemonic interest in the neo-colonial state; Mobutu had been, after all, the phantom discovery of the Eisenhower administration; his role had been pivotal in reducing or eliminating perceived communist influence in Zaire since 1960.¹⁰⁵ His assistance had been acknowledged by successive U.S. presidents, as John Kennedy conceded, "General, if it had not been for you, the whole thing would have collapsed and the Communists would have taken over." Mobutu responded, "I do what I am able to do."¹⁰⁶ Mobutu even though not a politician, belongs to that arm of the neo-colonial elite which the positivist school--the dominant paradigm of the Western social science, views as agents of modernization and development in the Third World. These societies are said to be in "transition"¹⁰⁷ to an age of abundance and prosperity. While fragmenting the bulk of human history, Rostow, the preeminent

¹⁰⁵In his first coup in 1960, he expelled the entire mission of the Eastern bloc of Nations; in 1963, he engineered the expulsion of the USSR mission again; Kalb, The Congo Cables, p. 377.

¹⁰⁶Ibid., p. 372. This quotation is attributed to a memorandum of conversation between Kennedy and Mobutu on May 31, 1963.

¹⁰⁷Harvey G. Kbeschull (ed.), Politics in Transitional Societies: The Challenge of Change in Asia, Africa and Latin America (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968).

theorist of this school, grouped all human societies into a vulgar linear concept of development, compartmentalized into five stages. Rostow sees all societies as lying within one of the following five categories: the traditional society; the preconditions for take-off; the take-off; the drive to maturity; the age of mass-consumption. He suggested as absolute, the need for a new elite with an appropriate value system.¹⁰⁸ According to Lucian Pye,

... the story of underdeveloped countries is one of countless efforts to create organizations by which resources can be effectively mobilized In most of the new emergent countries, armies have tended to emphasize a rational outlook and to champion responsible change and national development.¹⁰⁹

Thus, for Pye, the Armed Forces in his newly emergent nations, are "the new elites" with an "appropriate value system" in Rostowian terminology; they are apolitical, and "extremely sensitive to the needs of modernization and technological advancement."¹¹⁰ The bankruptcy of this kind of analysis is revealed by the fact that far from being apolitical and championing responsible change, the military is in power in twenty of the fifty odd states in Africa. The politics of authoritative allocation of resources, how

¹⁰⁸W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth* (Cambridge: University Press, 1960), p. 26.

¹⁰⁹Lucian W. Pye, "Armies in the Process of Political Modernization," in H. G. Kebschull, Politics in Transitional Societies, p. 185.

¹¹⁰Ibid., p. 186.

to divert more of the scarce resources to the military and the strategic concerns of Extra-African powers have shown that Army is more often than not, the armed faction of the ruling elites. Arguably, Mobutu's coup responded to a severe crisis of order and authority at its inception. But Zaire under Mobutu is not ruled by an organisation dominated by a "highly professionalized bureaucratized and development-oriented military."¹¹¹ It is a patrimonial organization run along authoritarian principles, under the autocratic and arbitrary rule of Mobutu. Having said that, it must be emphasized that only a truncated reading of the dependency theory would allow a simplistic dismissal of Mobutu as a Western puppet. He indeed is, but it is a symbiotic relationship of mutual dependence between the Bonapartist¹¹² House of Mobutu in a monarchical sense, in control of the Zaire State and the Western Alliance in desperate need of a strategic ally. Mobutu's publicists hail him as the "helmsman," "the guide of the nation," and his rule has been characterized as a kleptocracy. He rules over the "unending crisis" that is Zaire.¹¹³ Behind him is an entire social

¹¹¹Thomas Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Struggle (New York: Columbia University Press), p. 25.

¹¹²Nzongola Mtalaja, "The State in Post Colonial Africa," in Class Struggle and National Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1982), p. 47.

¹¹³This is the characterization of Zaire by C. Young in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 57, No. 1 (Fall, 1978).

class which enriches itself at the expense of the country in his name. Mobutu's personal fortune is reportedly \$4 billion with palaces in each region of Zaire and seven mansions in France and Belgium.¹¹⁴ The strategic interests of the Western alliance compels its support for Mobutu: U.S. economic and military aid was \$468 million in 1977, from \$76 million in 1964, and from \$6.1 million in 1964 to \$589 million respectively. In its worst year of indebtedness, 1977, Zaire's debt to U.S. public institutions including the Export-Import Bank (Eximbank), U.S.A.I.D., PL480, was \$333.46 million, while in the private sector, it owed \$377.17 million to U.S. banks like Bankers Trust, Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, CitiBank, Commerce Union Nashville, Equibank, Federal Home Loan, Merrill Lynch, Morgan Guaranty, Manufacturers Hanover, Private Export, and Continental Illinois.¹¹⁵ It's debt to public institutions and private banks was \$710.10 million. Emergency measures to restructure the Zairois economy were taken by the Paris Club countries in 1976, 1977, 1981, and 1983, but still by 1983, Zaire owed over \$4 billion and \$1 billion in arrears on amortization and interest

¹¹⁴Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle, p. 179.

¹¹⁵Guy Gram, "Zaire, 1978: The Intellectual and Ethical Bankruptcy of the World System," in Africa Today (October-December 1978), p. 18; C. Young and T. Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairois State (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 378-386.

payments.¹¹⁶

Twice in 1977 and 1978, the threat of termination of Mobutu's rule appeared real; in March 1977, forces of the Front de Liberation du Congo (FLNC) domiciled in Angola, invaded Zaire, and routed Mobutu's army. The invasion was put down after eight days by Moroccan troops with the logistical and intelligence assistance of France and the U.S. The invasion threatened the mining complex--the key interest that, (1) provides a preponderance of Mobutu's revenue, (2) provides key minerals to France and Belgium. To supplement the 1,500 Moroccan troops were smaller units from Egypt, Gabon, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Central African Empire, and Kenya. A second stronger and better-led invasion ensued in May 1978 and was again put down by French Legionnaires, Belgian paratroopers, supplemented by logistical and tele-communication equipment from the U.S. In a move that only recalls the Berlin Conference of 1884-85, when European nations partitioned Africa among themselves, NATO, on May 30-31, 1978, met to discuss and coordinate their strategy on containing the crisis in Zaire. Present were Greece, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Denmark, Canada, Belgium, United Kingdom, Turkey, United States of America, Portugal, Norway, Netherlands,

¹¹⁶Callaghy, "Patrimonial Rule and Absolutist Finances," in The State Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Politics (New York, 1984), pp. 104-194. Also see U.S. Government, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977).

Luxemborg, Italy and Iceland.¹¹⁷ Espousing the slogan "Africa for Africans," which concealed their strategic economic interest, they sought to police Zaire not with their own troops, but by raising a spurious Inter-African force composed of their client states who would thus perform this sub-imperial role. Thus, by June 1980, a total of 2,500 troops¹¹⁸ notably from Egypt, Togo, Morocco, Gabon, Senegal, and Central African Republic, replaced the 1,500 French Legionnaires. The idea of a supposedly Pan-African Army sponsored by NATO occasioned a strong rebuttal and denunciation from Nyerere of Tanzania who denounced it in no uncertain terms;

Whatever the agenda, the Paris or Brussels meeting are not discussing the freedom of Africa. They are discussing the continued domination of Africa by Western powers. They are intended to be taken, as a second Berlin Conference There is only one reason why the idea of Europe setting up initiating a Pan-African Security Force or an African Peace Force does not meet with immediate and world-wide amazement and consternation. It is the continuing assumption that Africa is, and must always remain part of Western European 'sphere of influence.' This assumption is hardly questioned yet¹¹⁹

¹¹⁷ The Department of State Bulletin, The Official Records of the United States Foreign Policy, Vol. 78, No. 2016 (Washington, D.C., July 1978).

¹¹⁸ Galen Hull, "Zaire in the World System: In Search of Sovereignty," in Guy Gran (ed.), Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment (New York: Praeger, 1979), p. 176.

¹¹⁹ Julius Nyerere, Foreign Troops in Africa, Text of a special message delivered to foreign envoys accredited to Tanzania on June 8, 1978, Africa Report (July-August 1978).

But for Mobutu, the sovereignty of Zaire is merely an article of trade to be used in barter, to further ingratiate himself with his western sponsors, or to improve his political position vis-a-vis their reliance on him. By so doing, he seeks to so completely interweave his own continued control/manipulation of state power with continued Western domination of Zaire. Occupation of Zaire by Belgian paratroopers and French Legionnaires supplemented by a spurious African Force is not the most spectacular assault on Zairois sovereignty; on March 26, 1976, Mobutu signed a document with a German-based firm by the name of Orbital Transport un Raketen A. G., more popularly known by its acronym OTRAG. According to Article 1, Section 2 of this contract, its agreement enjoining the Mobutu government to provide a suitable site for launching missiles into the atmosphere.¹²⁰ The land area Mobutu ceded to this German firm is 150,000 square kilometers, located in the Shaba region and Mobutu was "paid 47 percent of the profits by the company that transports material to the site"¹²¹ Mobutu's kleptocratic autocratic rule in Zaire, while guaranteeing the ideological, economic and political affinity between Zaire and the West can be tolerated by these

¹²⁰For the full contract, see, Race and Class, Vol. XIX, No. 2 (1977), Guy Gran (ed.), Zaire: The Political Economy of Underdevelopment, pp. 214, 280.

¹²¹Ibid.

imperialist countries given that a convergence and confluence of class, political, economic and strategic interests unite them.

We have stated earlier in Chapter II that the particular mode of intervention that is the focus of this study is politico-military intervention, i.e., the mode of intervention that "seeks to manipulate the outcome of internal conflict (insurgency political crises, revolution or civil war) or through subversion to precipitate such conflict."¹²² For Zaire, this politico-military intervention has been a constant and recurrent feature of the country's existence and retention under the political, ideological and economic order favorable to the intervenors. The existence of Zaire from July 1960 to November 1965 under the UN-Western Coalition-Binza Group¹²³ axis was a result of this intervention. The existence and resilience of Mobutu regime, from November 1965 to the present cannot be understood or grasped without reference to this intervention.

¹²²M. Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World: Antinationalism and Intervention (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 2.

¹²³The Binza Group refers to the Zairois allies of the UN/Western Coalaiton--Mobutu (Military) Nendaka (Security) Kandola (Internal Affairs) Ndele (National Bank) and Bomboko (Foreign Affairs). See Nzongola Ntalaja, "The Continuing Struggle for National Liberation in Zaire," in Class Struggle and National Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1982), p. 67. See also, Dayal, Mission for Hammar-skjold, pp. 312, 316; Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, p. 109.

Zaire in the Western Strategic
Interest in Africa

At the core of this politico-military intervention are the NATO powers, notably the United States of America, France and Belgium. Their coalitional strategic interest, and intervention is underlined by the Summit meeting of the 15-member NATO alliance called to map a joint response to the crisis of stability that faced their ally, Mobutu during the second Shaba uprising in 1978. During this second uprising, rather than intervene through proxy as in March 1977, the NATO powers intervened directly, the French Legionnaires and Belgian paratroopers were now used to repel the advances of the forces opposed to Mobutu. The United States assisted in the effort by providing "eighteen C-141 Starlifters and C-5 Galaxies and crews, plus a sophisticated telecommunication system."¹²⁴

Supplementing the core interventionist states and operating at the second tier, i.e., acting as proxies for the states in the contemporary era are a group of African states. The neo-colonial nature of the independence of Africa from Europe has meant that this supposed independence was no more than a juridical affair, facilitating a residual organic base for imperialist assault on Africa which is occasioned by the ideological alliance between the African political class and the core intervenors, "The essence of

¹²⁴Thomas Callaghy, The State Society Struggle, p. 207.

neocolonialism," according to Kwame Nkrumah,

... is that the state which is subject to it is, in theory, independent and has all the outward trappings of international sovereignty. In reality, its economic system and thus its political policy is dictated from outside.¹²⁵

The phenomenon of neocolonialism has given rise to the rule of a political class that acts strategically in the interest of imperialist intervention in contemporary Africa.

Thus, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Burundi, Gabon, Egypt, Kenya, Morocco and Central African Republic constitutes this second tier of intervention for the West in Zaire as occasioned by the use of their troops to replace the French and Belgian troops in Zaire in June 1978. They act as proxies and thus share the burden of the mutual ideological commitment that binds them and the core intervenors. They are all client-states of the NATO powers. Egypt is in an alliance of "strategic consensus"¹²⁶ with the U.S. in the mediterranean region and provides landing and communication facilities for the U.S rapid deployment force. Kenya provides berthing facilities and base for the U.S Armed Forces in the Kenya port city of Mombassa. Some authors¹²⁷ have chronicled

¹²⁵ Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism (New York: International Publishers, 1980), p. ix.

¹²⁶ Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., "Arabs, Israelis, and Americans," in Foreign Affairs (Summer 1984), pp. 1194-1209.

¹²⁷ Edward M. Corbett, French Presence in Black Africa (Washington, D.C.: Black Orpheus, 1972); Olasupo Adedokun, "Franco-African Relations and the Use of Intervention as an Instrument of Foreign Policy Objectives: A Critical Study of Victims of French Foreign Policy Objectives," (Ph.D. dissertation, Atlanta University, 1982).

extensively the pervasive French military, economic, and political domination of Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Central African Republic and Morocco. The support of these core states and the second tier group is critical to Mobutu's rule. At critical junctures in his rule, i.e., when his hold on state power is threatened, Mobutu could only rely on these intervening forces; he trusts neither his own troops nor those trained by his sponsors to support him in times of crisis.¹²⁸

The most crucial question though is the role and place of Zaire, now seemingly firmly ensconced within the Western strategic orbit. Zaire is strategically placed in Central Africa, sharing a border with no less than nine African states. This geopolitical advantage of being situated in a position of almost equidistance from any given area of Africa could provide a definite strategic advantage to the West when pro-Western regimes are threatened. Thus Zaire provided support for its ally-Morocco in the Western Sahara conflict and was able to send¹²⁹ a contingent of 2,700 of its own troops to a beleaguered pro-Western government of Hisne Habre of Chad in 1983. Thus, an

¹²⁸ Mobutu announced the discovery of a coup d'etat against his government early in 1978. Many of the Zairois soldiers trained by American, French and Belgian academies after the Shaba I episode to defend the Mobutu regime were executed or dismissed from the Army. Gallagher, The State-Society Struggle, p. 208.

¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 203.

overextended French security network situated in most French-speaking African states can rely on supplemental support role from countries like Zaire in defence of Western interest. This kind of role underlines the strategic and geopolitical impact of the success of the West in containing the forces of radical African nationalism in Zaire in the period 1960-1964. Having contained and neutralized these forces and installed and supported the arm of the Zairois political class willing to make common cause with the West, Zaire could now be used as a relay-station and terrain for directing and influencing the outcome of similar struggles that pit the forces of African nationalism against those of the West.

If the theatre of contention is contiguous with Zaire, so much the better for Western interest. Nowhere is this geopolitical advantage of the Western co-option of Zaire so manifestly demonstrated as Angola. Zaire shares its southwestern border with Angola. As we shall see, having installed a neo-colonial regime in Zaire, the West led by the United States of America, as the principal hegemonic systemic regulator, embarked on two interrelated policies towards African nationalist aspiration to free Angola from 500 years of brutal colonial tyranny of Portugal, a fellow member of their NATO alliance. But the attempt to decisively influence the outcome of the nationalist struggle in Angola by the West failed. It did for a number of strategic and political reasons. The most important reason is that the forces in contention ultimately

in the Angolan struggle were qualitatively and quantitatively different from those in Zaire in similar periods of struggle, especially in the crucial years of 1960-64. The years 1960-64 were crucial because they marked the crucible of Western effort to contain and essentially decimate the forces opposed to Western hegemony in Zaire. Consequently, the years 1965 to the present have essentially been an era of further consolidation of the victory and warding off threats to it as in the Shaba uprisings of 1977 and 1978.

However, the Western effort in Angola is also organically linked to the same in Zaire. For the Western attempt in Angola was one designed to duplicate its work in Zaire. The following chapter is an effort to elucidate on this continuum, provide points of familiarity in the two cases, as well as delineate essential factors that facilitate a different outcome in Angola.

CHAPTER V

INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA: THE COLONIAL PAST AND THE CONTEMPORARY PRESSURES

Intervention in Angola can be delineated into two phases, corresponding generally to the era of Portuguese colonial intervention from 1575-1975 and the post-colonial epoch--from 1976 to the present. The post-colonial interventionist epoch attests to the unique nature of the two largest former Portuguese colonies in Africa. The uniqueness of Angola and Mozambique stems from the fact that while the attainment of constitutional independence on the continent has meant a formal ceding of political power to African nationalists, this has been with qualifications in both of these countries. This is because there exists a continuing armed attempt to influence and penetrate the domestic order on the assumption that its existence is not compatible with the interest of the intervenor. We shall pay some attention to the colonial phase of intervention in order to demonstrate the connection between contemporary and historical phases of the Western assault on Angola and to help us to grasp the fact that the same hegemonic interest informs the present continuum. We have suggested earlier in Chapter II that our concern in this study is with that mode

of intervention that "seeks to manipulate the outcome of internal conflict (insurgency, revolution or civil war), or, through subversion to precipitate such conflict."¹ The post-colonial phase of intervention in Angola can be more narrowly defined as the counterrevolutionary phase and the phenomenon can thus be characterized as counterrevolutionary intervention. Theoretically a counterrevolutionary intervention is based on the following interlocking supposition--

1. The need to preserve the status quo or tolerate minimal change therein,
2. The need to control the rate of change in the status quo,
3. A need to reverse the advances of a particular social formation whose interest is considered to be antithetical to the interest of the countering power--the intervenor.²

Supposition number 3 here best characterizes the purpose of the sustained U.S.-South African policy towards the Peoples Republic of Angola; when interest is reduced to Zero-sum calculus, the ascendancy of one is equated with the diminution and elimination of the other. Counterrevolutionary intervention is thus based on the need to counter the hold of the MPLA on State power, dislodge and ultimately supplant it.

¹Melvin Gurtov, The United States Against the Third World (New York: Praeger, 1974), p. 2.

²Richard Falk, "Exporting Counterrevolution," The Nation (June 9, 1974); Adam Yarmolinsky, "The Control of Revolution and Counterrevolution," in The Military Establishment (New York: Harper and Row, 1971).

The Colonial Phase

Angola fell under Portuguese tutelage completely between 1575 and 1675,³ even though Angolan chiefdoms had been allies of the Portuguese in their attempts to subdue the Kongo Kingdoms to the north of Angola. However, as the military capability of the chiefdoms deteriorated vis-a-vis the Portuguese strength, the objective contradictions between their own interest--to be free from warfare from the Kongo Kingdoms--and the Portuguese interest--slave trade--became quite obvious to these chiefdoms. By the time the Portuguese gained complete control over Angola, the ruling cliques had been vanquished in the ensuing wars of resistance to Portuguese colonialism, been co-opted as allies or vassals, or exiled to Portuguese colonies in America, Asia or Africa.⁴ The Portuguese then proceeded to pursue their real intent in Angola--the consolidation of the monopoly of the slave trade, which was so thorough that in the following two and a half centuries, four million Angolans⁵ were sold to work the Portuguese plantations in South America, notably in Brazil. The era of Portuguese attempt to consolidate its colonial hegemony in Angola was also the period of bitter

³Douglas Wheeler and Renee Pelisier, Angola (New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 32-34.

⁴Ibid.

⁵Ibid., p. 38; James Duffy, Portuguese Angola (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 136-141; Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese: The Myth and the Reality (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978), p. 205.

rivalry and disputations between contending European powers over what part belonged to whom, and when, in Africa. It was for this reason Bismark of Germany convened the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885. However, from the foremost imperial maritime power in the 15th century, Portugal by the time of the Berlin Conference had suffered such precipitous decline within the intra-imperial expansionist orbit that it very nearly came to losing all pretensions of an imperial power when it clashed with Britain over rival claims to present day Malawi (then Nyasaland) and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia). At the end of the Conference, the Angolan territory was juridically delimited and recognized as Portuguese. In 1926, after Namibia was taken from the vanquished Germany and given to South Africa, Portugal and South Africa reached an agreement on the disputed question of the Namibia-Angolan border. Portugal then exported her prison population⁶ to consolidate the Portuguese settler community and proceeded to establish decrees, pronouncements and statutes that could guide their relationship with the Africans. The justification for this was said to be an attempt to establish an egalitarian multi-racial society. In point of fact and practice, Portuguese colonialism in Angola was premised on the same supremacist philosophy, as a Portuguese governor of Angola conceded:

⁶Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, pp. 51-57.

These so-called civilized Africans, all colonial sociologists have recognized, are generally no more than grotesque imitations of white men. With rare exceptions ... the 'civilized Africa' maintains a primitive mentality, poorly concealed by the speech, gestures and dress copied from Europeans.⁷

"Civilization," according to Portuguese colonialism was synonymous with a sufficient imbibement of Portuguese culture, hence as recently as 1950, Angola colonial census categorized the citizens into "civilized" and "uncivilized." In 1940,⁸ according to these censuses, the degredados transplanted from the brothels and penitentiaries of Portugal were classified 100% civilized, their offsprings from miscegenation with Africans--82.9% civilized, the African majority was 0.7% civilized. The figures for 1950 were: 100%; 88.8%, the mestizo did move along on the scale; and the African remained frozen and stagnant at 0.7% on this spurious unilinear scale of human development. Taking their cue from nineteenth-century pseudo-scientific Western polygenism, colonial Portuguese socio-psychologists, anthropologists and sociologists marshalled an avalanche of statistics of anatomical and cranial indices that purported to demonstrate the inherent inferiority of Africans.⁹ This social variant of Darwinism consequently informed their

⁷Ibid., p. 7.

⁸Ibid., p. 151.

⁹Gerald Bender and Allen Isaacman, "The Changing Historiography of Angola and Mozambique," in Christopher Fyfe (ed.), African Studies Since 1945: A Tribute to Basil Davidson (London: Longman, 1976).

colonial policy. The Portuguese were convinced that the idyllic interracial community of metropolitan Portugal and what they saw as the mere extension of it--the African territories of Angola, Mozambique, Sao-Tome and Guinea-Bissau, was the answer to the virulent and bitter nationalist struggles being waged by the peoples of Africa, Asia and the Caribbean Islands after the war of 1939-45. Consequently, when Belgium, for example, belatedly as we showed in Chapter IV, began the process of ceding juridical independence to the African colonies, Portugal remained splendidly and smugly removed from the mainstream of neo-colonial hegemonic strategy.¹⁰

In February and March 1961, Angolan nationalists in the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA), commenced the first general armed resistance to Portuguese colonialism.¹¹ Portugal, in dealing with the situation, employed a combination of reform and militarization of the colonial presence, first by abolishing the more odious of its discriminatory practices, then by arming the settler community in search and destroy operations, and indiscriminate bombing of the African sections of the country. Within three months, the death toll stood as 2,000 whites, and 50,000 Africans, but the most traumatic, from the point of view of the Africans, of these

¹⁰For a review of Portuguese colonial intervention in Angola, see (1) Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); (2) James Duffy, Portuguese Angola (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959).

¹¹Gerald Bender, Angola Under the Portuguese, p. 154.

pacification campaigns was the forcible regrouping of the Africans into artificial villages--'strategic hamlets' as the Americans characterized similar schemes in Vietnam. Ironically, the Portuguese in Angola called the forced resettlement senzalas do paz--peace villages.¹² The Portuguese Security Agency (PIDE/DGS) also established cells of spies and informers, whose loyalty they thought they could obtain by exemption from taxes. The nationalist groups in existence at the inception of the armed struggle were the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and the Union of Angolan Peoples (UPA). The MPLA was founded in 1956. The UPA, which was founded in 1958, began early to seek the moral and material support of the newly independent African countries as well as the nationalist groups. It attended the first All-African Peoples' Conference in December, 1958, in Ghana, where its leader Holden Roberto met Lumumba, Kaunda, Fanon and Mboya.¹³ Efforts to merge the MPLA and the UPA were unsuccessful. While the UPA was established in the capital of the then Congo-Leopoldville,¹⁴ with powerful ethnic affinity in the Bakongo power structure, the MPLA was externally based having its headquarters in Guinea-Conakry. Its leaders had also attended the Second All-

¹²Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (New York: Doubleday, 1972), p. 13.

¹³John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I: The Anatomy of Explosion (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1969), p. 67.

¹⁴Ibid., p. 70.

African Peoples' Conference in Tunis in 1960.¹⁵ The decade of 1950-1960 was one of universal Nationalist agitation and the international community was not unmindful of the Angolan situation.

The brutal Portuguese repression of the nationalist struggle in Angola provoked a furor at the UN. On March 15, 1961, the UN Security Council called for an inquiry into the colonial Portuguese handling of the insurrection in Angola. By a vote of seventy-three to two (South Africa and Spain voted against while Britain, France and Nationalist China were among the nine abstentions) the General Assembly called on Portugal to introduce measures that would lead Angola to independence. Contrary to the practice of the Eisenhower administration which usually abstained on issues pertaining to European colonialism, the new Kennedy administration voted for both resolutions.¹⁶ However, a combination of aggressive pro-Portugal lobby, the Eurocentric nature of the U.S. foreign policy, and the strategic utility of the Portuguese refueling facilities in the Azores military base, led to a reconsideration and reversal of the American enlightened policy of self-determination.

Collectively, the NATO alliance now began to support Portugal to resist by force of arms the forces of African

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 159.

¹⁶ Department of State Bulletin, Vol. XLIV, No. 1136, April 3, 1961, pp. 497-499.

nationalism. Diplomatically, they thence acquiesced in the Portuguese characterization of the African territories as her overseas extensions. For Britian for example, the question of Angolan insurrection was an internal affair¹⁷ of the Portuguese nation and hence not subject to international arbitration.

Within the nationalist forces in Angola, Holden Roberto of the UPA, whose pro-American stance was now well-known, received support from the United States, while the MPLA doubted from the beginning the sincerity of the purported new policy of the American administraiton when in fact NATO weapons were being used by Porgugal in Angola. The MPLA moved its headquarters to the capital of then Congo-Leopoldville and began a world-wide campaign to bring the problem of Angola to many countries' attention and once again renewed its call for a common front to unite the nationalist groups. The UPA enjoying the advantage of its ethnic affinity with the Bakongo in Zaire, had been able to establish some influence in Northern Angola while North-Central Angola was MPLA's stronghold. When Jonas Savimbi joined the UPA and became its Secretary-General in 1961, the

¹⁷Patrick Wall, "Britain and Angola: The Attitude of the British Government," in Angola: A Symposium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 130-137. The U.S. was in fact now arming Porgugal; see, U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Angola, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs, 94th Congress, 2nd Session, 1976.

organization was able to remove its ethnic image, Savimbi being of Ovimbundu ethnic stock, from Southern Angola.

In April 1962, Holden Roberto felt confident enough of victory to set up the Revolutionary Government of Angola in exile (GRAE), based in Congo-Leopoldville, even though the Portuguese were now bombing and strafing Angolan farms and towns with napalm bombs.¹⁸ The Democratic Party of Angola (DPA) formed in Leopoldville in January 1962, now joined with Holden Roberto's UPA to form the GRAE. The UPA and PDA now formed a single organization called the Angolan National Liberation Front (FNLA) and proceeded to isolate the MPLA by canvassing for recognition of its government in exile by the international community. The pseudo-ideological split that attended intra-African continental diplomacy in the early 60's, in which a monarchy like Morocco, with Ghana, Guinea, Mali, the United Arab Republic (UAR), represented the Casablanca Bloc while the Monrovia Group accounted for the less overtly Pan Africanist countries, also spilled into the Angolan intro-nationalist struggle.

The Casablanca bloc backed the MPLA, while the Monrovia Group backed the FNLA-GRAE. But efforts to effect unity continued. Augustin Neto, honorary MPLA President, was languishing in a Portuguese jail in Lisbon in 1962, having been moved there by Portugal due to the international

¹⁸ John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. I, pp. 229-230.

outcry against his treatment when he was being held in Cape Verde in 1961. Neto escaped in July 1962, landed in Leopoldville and in a face-to-face negotiation with FNLA-GRAE leadership, called for union of all Angolan nationalists,¹⁹ but the unity talks were abortive.

The inception of armed effort to dislodge Portuguese colonialism also coincided with the UN/Western collaborative effort to contain the forces of radical African nationalism in Zaire. Beginning from July 1960, this cold war outlook also began to inform the U.S. perception of the Angolan struggle - i.e., Western ideological, systemic and strategic interest must be given priority over African self determination, even though the United Nations Special Committee on Portuguese territories had characterized the Portuguese continued rule in Angola as an impediment to world peace.²⁰ But even in trying to place the Angolan struggle before the world, the nationalist organisations faced both domestic organisational problems and extra-African infiltration and control of their struggle. The MPLA, its leadership structure revamped, began a series of attempts to regain the initiative. Neto, who was chosen president at the Party congress in December, 1962, began a major campaign in foreign relations that took

¹⁹ John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, pp. 263-365.

²⁰ United Nations General Assembly, Report of the Special Committee on the Situation in Angola, Document A/5160 (August 15, 1962), p. 142.

him to New York, London, Paris, Italy, Switzerland and North Africa;²¹ but intra-party struggles within the MPLA punctured its new aggressive image. In July 1963, the newly formed Organization of African Unity recognized the FNLA-GRAE as representative of the Angolan people.²² In spite of MPLA's efforts to gain support in the United States, the U.S. government saw the MPLA as a pro-communist organization. The U.S. was in actuality conducting a two-face policy. While the Kennedy emissary, George Bail, was calling for Eur-African²³ solution to the Angolan situation, the U.S. had in fact coopted the leadership of the GRAE and its leader Holden Roberto had been retained as an American Central Intelligence Agency operative at an annual fee of \$10,000.²⁴ The American client government of Cyrille Adoula of the then Congo-Leopoldville, was the first to grant GRAE recognition and then expel MPLA from its capital.²⁵ While the problem for the MPLA was to gain credibility as a nationalist organisation, for the FNLA/GRAE the problem was one of personal ambition and organisational structure. Jonas Savimbi left

²¹John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978), pp. 14-16.

²²Lawrence Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict (Ithaca: University Press, 1979), p. 194.

²³Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 127.

²⁴John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton Co., 1978), p. 52.

²⁵Don Barnett and Roy Harvey, The Revolution in Angola (New York: Doubleday, 1972), p. 9.

the GRAE in July 1964, and after a two-year educational, military and ideological sojourn, that took him to the Peoples Republic of China, North Korea, North Vietnam, Algeria, the Eastern bloc of nations, and Western Europe, he founded, with regegades from both MPLA and Roberto's FLNA, the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA at the Muangai Conference, inside Angola in March 1966.²⁶ Savimbi planned to introduce his forces from Zambia, where MPLA was operating. The GRAE fell into decline between 1964-1966, a period that marked the military and diplomatic ascendancy of the MPA. Unwilling to antagonize its European sponsors, the Tshombe government which replaced the Adoula administration in July 1964, froze the freedom of action of GRAE and put its foreign procurements and assistance under the general supervision of its own government. While conceding the illogicality of exile based war of liberation, both UNITA and the MPLA began extensive political, ideological and military preparations of their partisans between 1966-1970. The GRAE completely floundered and in 1971, the OAU withdrew its recognition of FNLA/GRAE as the sole representative of Angola. The 1971 OAU action vindicated the correctness of Kwame Nkrumah's analysis of the premature nature of this recognition at the OAU conference in Accra in 1965. By the end of 1971, only the Mobutu

²⁶Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 1966; Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, p. 207.

government which had replaced Tshombe in November 1965, in the then Congo-Kinshasa recognized GRAE.

The ethno-linguistic regional and ideological polarization between these three nationalist groups occasioned an OAU reconciliation attempt again in 1971. Hopes were raised when an accord in principle emerged in 1972; but two years later, these hopes were dashed. The FNLA operated in the North; the MPLA in Central Angola, and the periphery of the Luanda, and UNITA was dominant in the South on the Angolan-Namibia border. More importantly, and perhaps forebodingly for the eventual outcome of the nationalist struggle, the Super-powers had corralled each of these nationalist groups into their respective ideological camps. The MPLA consistently received Soviet assistance; the FNLA was American-sponsored with Mobutu's Zaire as conduit, and UNITA was espousing Mao-Tse-Tung's variant of peasant revolution.²⁷ Both the United States and the Soviet Union sought to influence and induce what could be a favorable outcome of the Angolan situation through their preferred surrogates. According to Klinghoffer, the Soviet Union began to supply the MPLA with arms "after Neto's visit to Moscow in 1964"²⁸ and used this supply leverage to lobby against factionalism in the MPLA leadership. The U.S. was in fact underwriting the

²⁷ Ibid., pp. 231-233.

²⁸ Arthur Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: A Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World (Boulder: Westview, 1980), p. 17.

Portuguese colonial effort in Angola, as the Portuguese were experiencing severe economic dislocation as a result of the war effort. The Portuguese inflation rate of 23% was the highest in Europe and the country had a \$400 million trade deficit. But while the Angolan situation was a low-key priority of the Johnson administration, the globalist perspective of the succeeding Nixon administration fundamentally transformed the regional character of the Angolan struggle.

Containment, Correlation of Forces and
Resolution of the Colonial Phase of
Intervention in Angola

The symbolic support that the Kennedy administration had given to the Angola nationalists by voting against Portugal in the UN had been replaced by an essentially cold war perspective under Lyndon Johnson in 1965. The Nixon and Ford administrations of 1969-1976 gave teeth to the cold war perspective. The Nixon National Security Assistant, Henry Alfred Kissinger, virtually translated into policy a thesis he had advanced in 1965, in which he equated African nationalism with anti-Westernism.²⁹ According to this thesis, while a case might perhaps be made for change, i.e., from colonialism to independence, the validity is recognized only of that kind of change acceptable to the strategic interests of the West. Specifically, the genesis of the Nixon response to the Angolan situation lies in a policy

²⁹ Henry Kissinger, The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of Atlantic Alliance (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965).

review³⁰ prepared by the Interdepartmental Group for Africa of the U.S. National Security Council. After analysing the various options open to the administration, the reviewers opted for the 'tar baby' recommendation. This recommendation questioned the durability of the African resistance and advocated increased collaboration with its NATO ally--Portugal. Consequently, Portugal was granted \$400 million in EximBank financing for industrial projects and up to \$30 million to purchase American products under the PL480 food program, a free loan of agricultural support technology, and \$1 million for education reform.³¹ The U.S. also granted authorization for sale of Boeing 707s to the Portuguese Air Force. Elite troops of Portuguese Armed Forces also received specialized training at NATO facilities and U.S. counterinsurgency programs. Then on April 25, 1974, elements of the Portuguese Armed Forces--Armed Forces Movement (AFM) overthrew the civil administration that was waging the colonial war in Angola. The bottom had now fallen out of the 'tar baby' option--rather than the durability of the justified African struggle against Portuguese colonialism, it was the Portuguese people having lost 11,000 dead, and 30,000

³⁰ Mohammed A. El-Khawas and Barry Cohen (eds.), National Security Study Memorandum 39, The Kissinger Study of Southern Africa (Westport: Lawrence Hill and Company, 1976).

³¹ Department of State Bulletin 66, No. 1697 (January 3, 1972).

wounded or disabled,³² that could no longer countenance the continuation of the war. In January 1975, the new junta in Lisbon recognized the MPLA, FNLA and UNITA as representatives of Angolan nationalist groups. Between January 3 and 5, the three signed an accord under the aegis of the OAU to "end all types of hostilities and propaganda that could impede frank and sincere collaboration,"³³ while also guaranteeing the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Angola, and agreed to begin the task of internal reconstruction. At the Alvor talks the three nationalists groups and the Portuguese government, on January 10, 1975 agreed to fix the date of the Angola independence at November 11, 1975 and a transitional government was set up comprising the three groups. But, the election that was agreed upon to determine the subsequent government of independent and sovereign Angola never took place. A month after the Portuguese coup of April 1974, "112 military advisors from the Peoples Republic of China led by a major-general of the Chinese army, arrived in Zaire to train the FNLA forces."³⁴ To the extent that one can determine the introduction of extra-African forces to this struggle (the Portuguese colonial forces belonged to the pre-coup Portugal) this Chinese action

³²Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 241.

³³Colin Legum, Africa Contemporary Record (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1981), pp. 74-75.

³⁴John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton, 1978), p. 275.

effectively transformed an African nationalist struggle into a global power struggle, in that their presence in such a large number, albeit as instructors in a country that was aligned to a faction in the struggle, raised the strategic and military stakes.

U.S.-Zaire-FNLA Axis

The theoretical imprimatur of American response to the post-colonial phase of intervention in Angola is rooted in George Kennan's strategy of 'containment.'³⁵ According to this American Kremlinologist, the Soviet foreign policy is conceived as a "fluid stream which moves constantly, wherever it is permitted to move, toward a given goal"--which in his view is total world domination. The Western response, to contain this Soviet probing and pressure, is "by the adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy."³⁶ For the U.S. Angola represents the new shift to geographical terrain where it is now to "contain" Soviet "adventurism." An interpretation of the Angola struggle, in terms of the cold war, informed by the correlation of forces view of the world system, lies at the basis of this policy.

One may equate the term correlation of forces here to

³⁵ George Kennan, American Diplomacy, 1900-1950 (New York: Mentor Books, 1952).

³⁶ Ibid., pp. 89-106.

the term "balance of power" which could be "equal distribution of power among the states of the international system" or an "approximate equilibrium of power in the system as a whole."³⁷ Two problems immediately arise from equating these two terms with special reference to the African sub-unit of the world system. The term "balance" more often than not suggests a bipolar analysis of the world system, but in Africa to the extent that we accept that the bipolar analysis is reflective of the politics of Africa, the balance of power theory does not exist in the subregion. This is because the balance is tilted very heavily in favor of the capitalist camp for historical and contemporary reasons which we advanced in Chapter III. Secondly, the strategic parity which has characterized the bipolar system since 1970 did come into play in Angola--the fact that Soviet assistance delivery capability was a strategic fact that played a fundamental role in the outcome of the conflict. We shall pay more attention to this later in this chapter. It came into play because the Soviets now could and did act boldly in defence of their own ideological ally in a way that was not only infeasible but impracticable in 1960-64 because of (1) Soviet strategic inferiority, i.e., capability, and (2) negative political conditions in the world at large, especially the colonized world. We define correlation of forces

³⁷R. J. Vicent, Non-Intervention and International Order (Princeton: University Press, 1974), p. 342.

as an aggregate of forces that inform and influence the strategic/ideological/nationalist formations in the world. The U.S. response in Angola was designed to keep both the balance of power--(state power) and the correlation of forces (influence) tilted towards the interest of its ideological camp--(NATO and its ruling allies in Africa) and specifically to co-opt the incipient state of Angola. Consistent with this, the U.S. National Security Council 40 Committee authorized the CIA to make \$300,000 available to the FNLA; the FNLA was characterized as the best equipped of the three Nationalist groupings and the one most committed to a military solution to the struggle.³⁸ Reinforced by supplies from the Zaire, FNLA forces attacked MPLA on March 23, 1975, and a week later, a motorized contingent of five hundred FNLA soldiers arrived in Luanda from Zaire.

Through successive client governments in Zaire the United States had exploited the geographical proximity between Zaire and Angola to influence the nature of Angolan nationalist response to Portuguese colonialism. The American-sponsored Adoula government was the first to recognize the FNLA/GRAE government in exile in 1963.³⁹ Between 1972 and 1974 the Zairois government of Mobutu began again to actively promote FNLA within the Pan-African caucus, after the

³⁸ Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 257; Henderson, Angola, p. 249.

³⁹ Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 99.

withdrawal of OAU recognition to GRAE in 1971 and paved the way for Holden Roberto's visit to China.⁴⁰ While it is true Mobutu intervened in the Angolan war as an ally of the U.S., it is quite equally true that Zaire, also, had important economic and strategic interest in Angola, as well as a need to have to its Southern border a pliant, ideologically compatible neighbor. Besides, the port of Matadi and the 23-mile strip of Zairois territory that separates Angola from Cabinda is Zaire's only direct access to a sea port. The Benguela railway which runs into the Southeastern border with Angola, transports Zairois major foreign exchange earner--copper. Zaire was to pay for its actions in Angola when the railway was closed due to hostilities during the Angolan Civil War.⁴¹ Holden Roberto owed logistical, diplomatic and even personal security debts to Mobutu; he was once rescued from mutinous units of his FNLA by Mobutu's soldiers, after which the Zairois army took over the supervisory duties in the FNLA, and deprived of Zairois support in all its ramifications, FNLA could not exist as a credible faction in the alignment of forces in Zaire.⁴²

⁴⁰Ibid., pp. 227-228.

⁴¹Nzongola Ntalaja, Class Struggles and National Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1980), Chapter VII.

⁴²Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm (New York: Doubleday, 1972).

MPLA-USSR: The Strategic and Political
Foundation of a Victorious Alliance

The Soviet Union had enjoyed almost a virtual monopoly of influence with MPLA from its inception; however, intra-party conflicts within the MPLA led to a Soviet reassessment of continued MPLA support in 1972 and 1973, and support was actually terminated wholly by 1974.⁴³ In the heyday of Detente, MPLA leader Neto reportedly began pondering the possibility of the Soviet Union sacrificing the interest of the Angolan people in order to reach accommodations with the West on strategic negotiations. By October 1975, however, the Soviet Union began to send military supplies to MPLA through Pointe Noire in Congo-Brazzaville. What factors for example facilitated the process by which the Soviet Union intervened in Angola in such a magnitude, that, along with a set of other co-variables, affected decisively the outcome of both the colonial struggle and the resultant civil war?

The Soviet role in Angola must be recognized and analyzed in the context of certain objective strategic and political developments in Africa specifically and the world at large since 1960. It is in the context of these strategic and political conditions that the outcome of the Angolan struggle can be properly grasped. The Western

⁴³U.S. Senate, "Angola: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on African Affairs of the Committee On Foreign Relations," 94th Congress, 1976, p. 185.

Collaborationist foreign policy agenda since 1945 has been premised on a need to contain what is seen as Soviet adventurism world wide and especially in the colonized areas, where centuries of Western hegemony had built up an organic base for neo-colonialism, disposed towards the West and manned by their ruling class allies in the Third World. For example in Zaire in 1964, Belgian paratroopers with U.S. Army logistical support were deployed to combat the Gbenye-Soumialot forces that had set up a rival government to the American-backed Adoula government. Fourteen years later, i.e., 1978, with Mobutu facing another rebellion in Shaba, the NATO collaborationist agenda again became quite discernible. French Legionnaires and Belgian paratroopers came to the fore, while the United States assisted in this collaborationist effort by providing "eighteen C-141 starlifters and C-5 Galaxies and crews, plus a sophisticated telecommunication system."⁴⁴ As the West understands it, all "disorders" crises and insurrections in the World are apt to be exploited by the Soviet Union or when this argument becomes quite exaggerated, the disorders and crises are actually due to Soviet "adventurism." Localized oppressive forces do not give rise to schisms and frictions, and hence counterforces to oppose them. If we believe this mechanist thesis though then five hundred years of brutal Portuguese colonial

⁴⁴Thomas Callaghy, The State, Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Struggle (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), p. 207.

hegemony in Angola was not a factor--the Angolan crisis began in October 1975, when the Soviets began massive airlift of sophisticated armaments to the MPLA in order to stem the rapid advance of South African forces. The Soviets of course did not start the Angolan Civil War between the contending forces, neither did they invite Angolans to take up arms against Portuguese Colonialism. The Soviet airlift was a factor, true enough, but also among a set of co-factors which brought a fundamental difference in the correlation of forces in 1975, as opposed to those that faced Western coalition effort under the aegis of the UN in Zaire in 1960-64. We shall divide these conditions that facilitate a different outcome in Angola in two--(a) Generally--to the world at large--in terms of the correlation of forces; (b) Specifically--to Africa--in terms of different political conditions that also then influenced the outcome.

Generally, the first objective condition is the near strategic nuclear parity that exists today between the Soviet Union and its ideological adversary. This means that the Soviet Union cannot be blackmailed into a "reasonable" behavior by its ideological adversary when it takes actions on the international scene. This near parity in strategic nuclear terms frees the Soviets from fear of unacceptable retaliation (in a nuclear sense) or the threat of use of nuclear weapons. Relative to the epoch of 1950 to the early 1960s, the existence of this strategic parity

frees the Soviets from the anxieties of Western response. The acquisition of naval and air capability that could be used selectively, and with minimal risks to help Third World liberation movements or beleaguered states becomes now a credible reality. In both Angola in 1975 and Ethiopia in 1977, during the Somali invasion of Ogaden region, huge Soviet Antonov-22 planes, not as big as the U.S. Air Force C-130s used in the Shaba I and Shaba II, but with a flying range of 3,000 miles, were pivotal in the massive airlift of assistance. This situation did not exist in 1960-64 in Zaire when the Soviets attempted to aid Mulele-Gbenye-Soumialot forces in Zaire in 1964. Concurrent with the strategic parity and the acquisition of naval capability that could project Soviet power in all the waters of the world, the airlift capability of the Soviet air force also increased by 130 percent between 1965 and 1978. This capability made the Soviet factor a crucial one in the series of factors that facilitated a different outcome in Angola from the consolidation of the pre-existing Western imperialist domination which was the outcome in Zaire.

Secondly, the Soviet Union relative to the 1960-64 period in Zaire, has narrowed the gap between itself and the U.S. in terms of Third World military assistance and political military capability to support Third World states and liberation movements under realistic conditions--the Soviets now have a fleet and air force capable of acting

throughout the oceans of the world. This is crucial to the extent that both the Soviet and its ideological adversary, NATO, view the Third World as areas of competition. It means that the Soviets are now a force to be reckoned with, and their influence, especially in an adversarial sense, must now be reckoned with in areas that have hitherto remained the exclusive preserve of the West. The bitter Western denunciation of Soviet "adventurism" in Southern Africa is essentially a forlorn reaction to and recognition of the fact that the Soviet factor, while peripheral in the past, is now a strategic reality.

The combat assistance that the Republic of Cuba rendered to the MPLA must also be seen in the context of the general strategic environment referred to earlier. Without the massive increase in the Soviet assistance delivery capacity, the logic of proximity could have worked in favour of Savimbi and his South African allies. The position of South Africa was unique in the interplay of alignment of forces in Angola because its support while crucial for its allies also carried the seed of their moral and political defeat. It is not the accident of geography alone that informs the South African intervention, the Settler regime also enjoys a convergence and confluence of interest with the Western alliance. For one, it stood for continued Western imperialist domination in Africa as part of Western civilization. Secondly, South Africa, like the European

powers is a colonial power in Africa. Indeed, South Africa is at once a colonial power, a settler power and also an imperialist power. It invades its neighbours at will to force and compel conformity with desired security objectives. But, paradoxically, once the existence of the South Africa factor became known to the world as part of the alignment of forces in contention in Angola, South Africa and its allies in UNITA and FNLA, including the Western alliance began to fight a defensive war to remove the South African albatross.

Thirdly, in our general conditions category here, is the recognition of the forces of nationalism as counterposed to the ideological in the world. This is particularly relevant for the West, because Western social science, so convinced by its modernization theory, views all Third World countries as "developing"--with no identity of their own, but in transition to a replica of Western society. Consequently, perhaps merely out of force of habit, fostered by centuries of Western colonial hegemony, an attempt is then simply made to coopt these Third World nations into Western collaborationist agenda of anti-Sovietism. In Angola, the most eloquent testimony to this phenomenon is the bitter rebuttal and denunciation the U.S. received from Nigeria when it crudely and surreptitiously tried to pressure the OAU summit of 1976. Unwilling, for reasons of self interest, to perceive any phenomenon outside and beyond its crusading

ideology of anti-Sovietism, the Western alliance failed to see that the process unfolding in Angola was in response completely and wholly, and counterposed to the one it had initiated and sustained in the territory since colonialism. Indeed before the April 1974 coup in Portugal, Western strategy in Angola was: (a) to support the status quo of Portuguese colonialism by arming Portugal against the forces of African nationalism; (b) simultaneously ally itself to two of the nationalist factions (UNITA and FNLA) by sponsoring them to assume state power and ultimately to coopt them in the anti-Soviet orbit after independence. While the Kennedy Administration had voted once at the United Nations in 1961 to pressure Portugal to grant independence to Angola, the strategic importance of the Portuguese-owned Azores facilities began to override the principle of self-determination. NATO arms were now being given to Portugal to combat the forces of African nationalism in Angola.⁴⁵ Consistent with their long-range neo-colonial strategy, the leaders of both UNITA and FNLA had been recruited as paid operatives of two NATO members. The Portuguese Secret Police, i.e., Policia Internacional de Defesa de Estado (PIDE) had recruited Jonas Savimbi of UNITA as an operative and had ceded a portion of Angolan territory as his base of

⁴⁵Arthur Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 17. John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile, Politics and Guerilla Warfare (Cambridge, M.I.T. Press, 1978), p. 23.

operation to boost his guerilla liberation image.⁴⁶ For the U.S. the leader of the FNLA was a paid CIA operative.⁴⁷ Indeed, the rival government that Roberto and Savimbi set up in Huambo after the establishment of the MPLA government in Luanda was established with the assistance of "former members of the Portugese secret police ... PIDE."⁴⁸

Specifically with reference to the objective political conditions in Africa during the final stages of the colonial phase to the beginning of the post-colonial phase of intervention (roughly beginning from April 1974 to the consolidation of state power by the MPLA in February 1976) the following considerations come into play and can also be contrasted with the situation existing in Zaire at the onset of Western collaborative intervention in 1960. The year 1960 had been called the year of Africa because many French colonies in Africa and the British colony of Nigeria became juridically independent and joined the United Nations that same year. However, this was a phenomenon that was particular especially to the West Coast of Africa; in Southern and East Africa the reality of Western colonialism remained.

⁴⁶ West Africa, 20 August 1984. For excerpts on secret correspondence between Savimbi and Portuguese colonial high command, see West Africa, March 17, 1986.

⁴⁷ Marcum, The Angolan Revolution: Exile Politics and Guerrilla Warfare, p. 17.

⁴⁸ Klinghoffer, The Angolan War, p. 19.

The then Republic of Congo-Leopoldville was surrounded in the East by the British colony of Uganda, and Trust territory of Tanganyika, the Belgian Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi, the now defunct settler dominated colonial Federation of Rhodesia (Southern Rhodesia is now Zimbabwe and Northern Rhodesia is Zambia) and Nyasaland. Nyasaland is now Malawi. In the South, Congo-Leopoldville was bordered by the Portuguese colony of Angola, in the West by Congo-Brazzaville and in the North by the now Central African Republic, then a French colony. To the extent that African countries were a force in the outcome of the intervention in Zaire, the aforementioned European colonies, for obvious reasons of colonial occupation, were not part of the equation. But certain African countries did try to exert some influence; if the outcome ran counter to the thrust of their efforts, it certainly was not for lack of trying. Ghana, Guinea and Morocco, for example, remained consistent supporters of Lumumbist forces in Zaire throughout the duration of the active interventionist period of 1960-1964. But they did not have the infrastructural capability to exercise decisive influence, so the moral, diplomatic, and even material support which they marshalled in favor of the Lumumbists were easily contained and neutralized by their Western adversaries.

The objective juridical political situation in Africa during the Angolan civil war contrasts very sharply

and is in contradistinction to what obtained during the Zairois crisis. With the exception of the settler regime in Southern Rhodesia and the racist settler colony of Namibia, and of course South Africa, the reality of juridical political independence was a factor in Africa. That is to say, the classic empires of direct colonial rule, even though now present in a new form, were over. It is a factor even though we recognize that this juridical sovereignty is no more than constitutional independence, and that without economic independence it will never be complete and always susceptible and subject to the danger of imperialist domination and submission. The factor of this phenomenon--direct colonial rule being replaced by constitutional independence, can be grasped when it is realized that in spite of the severe limitations of this constitutional independence, the existence of certain states, which we characterize as "states of radical nationalist orientation" have been facilitated by the demise of direct colonial rule. We make no claims that these states have chosen a socialist path, or non-capitalist path, nor do we classify them into any neat ideological category. The ideological orientation spans a wide political spectrum, from state capitalism, to scientific socialism, to African Socialism. But we suggest that one common denominator unites them all--an abiding and enduring commitment towards aiding and sustaining the forces of nationalism in Africa in overcoming the forces

of racist reaction, imperial and settler colonialism. In Africa, these countries belong to this category--Algeria, Tanzania, Congo-Brazzaville, Guinea-Conakry, under Sekou Toure. (It is too early to determine the orientation of the Conteh regime.)

For Angola, the existence of Congo-Brazzaville and Tanzania was especially crucial for many reasons. Firstly, the existence of contiguous land mass which during the period of insurgency can be used as a logistical base and terrain of operational manoeuvres was present. Tanzania and Zambia served this purpose for the MPLA and UNITA, respectively during the years of insurgency to overthrow Portuguese colonialism. In the years of Mozambique's struggle against Portuguese colonialism, Tanzania also played this role. For Congo-Brazzaville, its seaport of Pointe Noire served as delivery and relay station for onward transmission of sophisticated Soviet armament to the MPLA-Cuban forces during the civil war. From this, Algeria, Congo-Brazzaville, and Guinea-Conakry all encouraged Cuba to offer combat assistance to MPLA. The different outcome of the Angolan struggle must be understood in the context of the dynamic interplay of the general strategic nuclear parity in the world, the net increase in the Soviet assistance delivery capability and the specific geopolitical condition in Africa. The upsurge of protracted African struggle against Portuguese

colonialism took place against this background and in the context of these general global objective realities and political situation in the African sub-region.⁴⁹

As the end of the colonial phase of intervention in Angola approached, and with MPLA-FNLA now locked in battle, UNITA looked like it could assume post-colonial state power by default. As noted, UNITA was the last of the three Angolan nationalist groups to be established. After fruitless attempts to effect a merger with both MPLA and FNLA, UNITA had hoped to exploit the advantage of its large Ovumbumdu ethnic base as a propeller to an electoral victory. The outbreak of hostilities however, between the FNLA and MPLA completely thwarted the UNITA hope of electoral victory because the elections never took place. UNITA then turned ironically to both the Peoples Republic of China and South Africa hoping to exploit the anti-Soviet reflex of Chinese foreign policy, and South Africa's geo-political and ideological concerns. The Peoples Republic of China, whose leaders Chou-En-Lai and Mao-Tse-Tung provided great inspiration to peoples resisting colonial domination worldwide after the successful execution of their own revolution in

⁴⁹ The analysis has been based on these works: Fred Holliday, "Moscow and the Third World: The Evolution of Soviet Policy," Race and Class, Vol. XXIV (Autumn 1982); Hans Kohn, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Co., 1965); Jack Woddis, Introduction to Neo-Colonialism: The New Imperialism in Asia, Africa and Latin America (New York: International Publishers, 1967).

1949, had, by 1975 radically modified its anti-imperialist image. For China, counteracting Soviet "social imperialism" now constitutes abiding state policy. The Chinese foreign policy of which its African policy is a subunit now centers around a veritable Russophobia--an unreasoning and vulgar equation of Soviet support of any issue in the international arena as an impetus for Chinese non-support of the same. Thus, contrary to the historical background of the Angolan struggle--and the fact that the Chinese by May 1974 were actually the first to introduce foreign advisors into the developing war, China continued to berate the Soviet Union for transforming the struggle into Civil War.⁵⁰ However dissatisfied by the poor performance of its FNLA allies, even before independence was proclaimed in November, China ceased all assistance to both UNITA and FNLA. When China phased out its assistance, Savimbi threw in his lot with the South Africans.

By June 1975, South African regular units began to take up positions inside Angola; apparently convinced now that it could not control the government that might emerge from FNLA-MPLA fighting. In August South Africa began training detachments of UNITA units and in conjunction with UNITA and Zairois regulars, South African troops began action against MPLA. The South African government insisted

⁵⁰Washington Post, July 28, 1975.

that its intervention was with the explicit agreement of the U.S. government which has promised to replenish its armory. When the Portuguese withdrew from Angola on the independence day on November 11, 1975, the colonial phase ended on an inconclusive note of resolution due to this factionalism interlaced with ideological schisms among Angolan nationalists.

The Post-Colonial Phase

At midnight on November 10, 1975, the MPLA under Agostinho Neto, having consolidated in Luanda, proclaimed the Peoples Republic of Angola; while the UNITA/FNLA coalition proclaimed the independence of the Democratic Peoples Republic of Angola (DPRA). Both the United States and the Soviet Union were now supporting opposite factions openly. One estimate of U.S. support for UNITA/FNLA was \$14 million for weaponry specifically, the CIA admitted an expenditure to the tune of \$32 million to which it suggested that the Soviets spend \$80 million to promote MPLA armed effort through October 1975.⁵¹ With South Africa-UNITA units dug in the South, Cuban troops were airlifted to supplement MPLA defence in August;⁵² through "operation Carlota," the airlift of Cuban troops became a decisive factor in the MPLA effort.

⁵¹John A. Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978), p. 263.

⁵²Ibid., p. 273.

But the addition of South African forces on the side of UNITA/FNLA coalition virtually guaranteed their loss of credibility⁵³ both continentally in Africa and even among their Western sympathizers who might otherwise have wished to remain discrete supporters. On January 22, 1976, an OAU summit meeting which had been delayed to effect a reconciliation between the Angolan nationalist groups convened in Kampala, Uganda; by then the MPLA government was recognized by more than thirty nations and none had recognized the FNLA/UNITA government which was located at Huambo in the South of Angola. Before then the MPLA had captured the FNLA capital in Uige, and the UNITA/FNLA-South African collusion had turned around many hitherto neutral African nations like Nigeria, Ghana, and Tanzania. Nigeria, for example, citing specifically the South African connection, recognized the Peoples Republic of Angola on November 27, 1975. On the eve of the OAU summit, the U.S. President, Gerald Ford, dispatched an emissary to African countries, disavowing any collusion between it and South Africa in Angola. In a statement, the Nigerians rejected the 'fatuous attempt' by the U.S. government to insult the intelligence of African nations and totally "repudiates the false logic that equates the presence of the Cuban and Soviet advisers in Angola with that of the South African regular troops,

⁵³ Lawrence W. Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict (Ithaca: University Press, 1979), p. 256.

their fellow soldiers of fortune and motley mercenaries." Since the Nigerian statement reflected much of nationalist radical thinking in Africa, while conceding the weakness of Africa in the world system, the rest of its argument is quoted here:

In case the Ford Administration chooses not to remember, the U.S.S.R. and Cuba have made the cause of the Angolan people their own since the earliest days of the liberation struggle. It is also worth noting that the war for Angolan liberation had been the longest war of its type in Africa. Only the war in Vietnam which ended in victory for the nationalist and patriotic forces lasted longer. All through the heroic struggle of our Angolan brothers, successive United States Administration unrelentingly supported, morally, materially and otherwise, the fascist, repressive and oppressive Portuguese Governments. All of a sudden one hears crocodile tears being shed for peace in Angola! It is about time that friends of the benighted racist regimes and supporters of the degradation of Africans began to live with the realities of the present thinking in Africa. It should not be that difficult to draw a clear distinction between foreign countries invited by patriotic forces to assist in fighting for national independence and those racist adventurers who commit wanton aggression by invading African countries with the sole aim of undermining their independence, and exporting their discredited and inhuman social system. The Federal Military Government recognizes the MPLA-led government in Luanda as the legitimate Government of Angola. It appreciates and respects the prerogative of that government to seek assistance from any source in the world in exercise of its sovereignty. Further, it draws attention to that basic tenet of international relations - that is non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations. It is on account of the foregoing considerations that the Federal Military Government reiterates its firm decision to completely reject the 'directive' from the United States' President. It also wishes to express the hope and expectation that all other sister African states which have been subjected to such untimely pressure will also reject it to enable us to build the Africa of our choice. Gone are the days

when Africa will ever bow to the threat of any so-called super power.⁵⁴

The particularly strong objection Nigeria took to the U.S. attempt to influence, through the OAU Summit, and the African reaction to the military situation in Angola marks a historic departure from the "moderate" non-activist stance that had characterized Nigerian African policy since 1960. There has always existed indeed in Nigeria a radical nationalist faction, operating on the fringe of the conservative bourgeois political leadership. The Nigerian civil war of 1967-1970 produced a telling effect on the military-professional-bureaucratic bourgeoisie that prosecuted the war. This is because the hostile Western response to the federal attempt to contain the secession produced a healthy skepticism among many of the federal officers who led the war effort. From about 1972, certain top military officers, notably Colonels Murtala Mohammed, Olusegun Obasanjo and Sotomi began to attend seminars conducted by some scholars in Nigerian Universities and specifically the Nigerian Institute of International Affairs. The upshot of this encounter was a sensitization of these military officers to the imperatives of neo-colonial domination of Africa and particularly the protracted nature of the African struggle against settler colonialism in Southern Africa. These officers not only joined the Nigerian Society of

⁵⁴Late News Release No. 16, Federal Ministry of Information (Lagos, 1975).

International Affairs, but became executive members, taking part in conferences and presenting papers.⁵⁵ On July 29, 1975, General Yakubu Gowon was removed from power in a bloodless coup and a new government came in headed by Brigadier Murtala Mohammed with Obasanjo as the Chief of the General Staff and effective Prime Minister. Many of the scholars at the Institute of International Affairs now became their advisors. It is against this background that an activist African policy came out of Nigerian foreign policy. For example, Nigeria not only lobbied hard for the MPLA, but gave the new nation a grant of twenty million dollars.

Shortly after the recognition of Angola, the Obasanjo administration, which succeeded the Mohammed administration in 1976, nationalized the British owned British Petroleum (BP) in order to force the hands of the British government on Zimbabwe. The Nigerians lobbied to seat the Angolan government of MPLA while others like Zambia and Senegal began to talk of the "lion and its cubs." Kenneth Kaunda was sufficiently worried about his security that he flew to Washington to plead the case for Western aid to UNITA/FNLA while Senegal sponsored⁵⁶ the resolution for a

⁵⁵Alaba Ogunsanwo, "Nigeria's Foreign Policy Under Mohammed and Obasanjo: An Examination," in African Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1982), pp. 1-15.

⁵⁶Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, p. 256.

government that could include both UNITA and FLNA. In the end the OAU was deadlocked twenty-two votes for each resolution.⁵⁷ But by February 11, 1976,⁵⁸ the UNITA/FNLA 'capital' of Huambo fell to the MPLA forces, and the OAU recognized the MPLA government. In December, 1975, the U.S. Senate had also voted to terminate any more covert aid to the UNITA/FNLA group.⁵⁹ With the capture of Huambo, UNITA ceased to exist as a credible military force, its South African ally having withdrawn. The military situation also marked the consolidation of state power by the MPLA.

Destablisation and Counterrevolution

A constant and pernicious legacy of colonial hegemony in Africa which flows from conscious promotion of centrifugal tendencies by these colonial powers is mutual misconception and suspicion among ethnic groups. In Nigeria, for example, even though the British statutorily effected the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Nigeria in 1914, in reality Nigerians from the Northern and Southern parts of the country were almost virtually kept apart from 1900-1947, while British colonialism promoted differing social formations and institutions in the two regions. Efforts by Nigerians from different parts to cultivate/promote

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Henderson, Angola: Five Centuries of Conflict, p. 257.

⁵⁹ Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 278.

transcultural affinity and the cross-fertilisation of ideas, met with brutal objection. Individuals who tried to espouse this national orientation were dubbed "rabble-rousers" and were forcibly removed and sent back to their particular region of origin.⁶⁰ The MPLA faced this problem of ethnic cleavage fostered by the Portuguese and compounded by the contradiction of the leadership's social origin of mestizo/urban/intellectual, leading a largely rural populace. This situation was exacerbated by the privilege-chasing and communist tendencies of some of its leaders, who thought that

... they had the leadership of the country in their hands and that the unity of all classes was no longer possible. They thought they alone--and they personally above all--could lead the whole revolutionary process in Angola.⁶¹

Although the coup of August, 1977, led by Neto Alves, the MPLA government Interior Minister who challenged mestizos⁶² dominance and power in the state structure, may indeed be dismissed as coming from a 'disgruntled faction,'⁶³ the Neto government did learn a lesson⁶⁴ from it, by broadening the base of its mass support and combating factionalism within

⁶⁰Obafemi Awolowo, The Peoples Republic of Nigeria (Ibadan: Oxford University, 1968), Chapter 3.

⁶¹Michael Wolfers and James Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 163.

⁶²Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 279.

⁶³Michael Wolfers and James Bergerol, Angola, pp. 75-99.

⁶⁴Ibid., p. 162.

the MPLA. Immediately after the revolt was put down, the Neto government ceased its lethargy and complacency towards political and ideological work among the people, such that by 1983, there had been such a rapid incorporation of Angolans from different regions into the state structure so that there were only one white and six mesticos in the 65 member central committee.⁶⁵ As Marcum noted,

Any hope for building an integrated Angolan nation through consensual rather than coercive process must depend on conscious, sensitive and informed efforts to reduce communal tension by promoting interethnic and interracial understanding and respect. To bind the wounds of war and reconstruct a unified social state, the MPLA will need more than the weapons and men of the Soviet Union and Cuba. It will need to surmount the limits of its own social origin and reach out to those who continue to see it as an instrument of alien Portuguese/Cuban rule.⁶⁶

Apart from the problems of building a new society from the legacies of five hundred years of Portuguese colonial hegemony, it is the continuing threat of destabilization and counterrevolution by the U.S.-South Africa-UNITA axis that has defined the nature of the security of Angola. Mobutu used to be a member of this axis, both as an ally of the U.S. and in defense of his own class, in control of state power. The strategic geopolitical importance of Zaire in Western attempt to contain the forces of radical nationalism was recognized quite early. According to Wallerstein:

⁶⁵Gerald Bender, "The Continuing Crisis in Angola," Current History (March 1983).

⁶⁶Marcum, Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 279.

U.S. involvement in Zaire was the launching pad of a new U.S. attitude towards Southern Africa: Zaire was the first to flirt with the idea of drastic political realignments ... it is rather clear that a Lumumba government securely in power would have given extensive support to an Angolan national liberation movement. The potential of such support to Angola is analogous to what Tanzania later gave FRELIMO with two differences; it would have come much earlier on and from a country with far more resources to throw into the fray. It could have made a considerable difference to the whole history of liberation movements in Southern Africa The U.S. wanted what it eventually got; a politically stable, economically, conservative regime in Zaire whose only true interest in Angola is to help establish there a regime of exactly the same variety. Translated into the terms of the Angola liberation movements, this has meant obstruction of the MPLA.⁶⁷

Mobutu's obscurantist policy towards Angola continued even after the defeat of the Zaire/FNLA forces by the MPLA in October, 1975. The victorious MPLA government was interested in pursuing a policy of 'live and let live' with its northern neighbor and asked the government of Congo-Brazzaville to mediate between it and the Mobutu government, a move which resulted in a summit meeting in Brazzaville, less than three weeks after the MPLA defeated UNITA forces in its capital of Huambo. The meeting did set an agenda for future talks and economic cooperation. Rather than neutralize the forces of his FNLA ally, Roberto, who had taken up exile in Kinshasa,⁶⁸ Mobutu continued to function

⁶⁷ Immanuel Wallerstein, quoted in Wolfers et al., Angola in the Frontline, pp. 192-193.

⁶⁸ Marcum, The Angolan Revolution, Vol. II, p. 277.

as a conduit for CIA payments⁶⁹ to the FNLA leadership, give the FNLA logistical support in sporadic forays into Angola from the Angolan-Zairois border, and support separatists (FLEC) from the Angola province of Cabinda. It took Mobutu a year after the summit meeting with the Angolan President Neto to recognize the new Angola government - February, 1977.⁷⁰ The tension and animosity between the two states continued until May, 1977, when former Kantangese gendameries operating from Angola invaded the Shaba region of Angola, routing Mobutu's troops. The invasion was quashed by Morocco-Senegalese-Egyptian troops with the logistical assistance of France, Belgium and the United States. In September 1977, Neto charged that Zaire, along with South Africa, was planning a sabotage of its oil fields as well as a full scale military invasion, under an operation code named "Operation Cobra." The Zairois/FNLA forces had earlier invaded the Angolan town of Pangala,⁷¹ the same month Mobutu recognized the Angolan government. But it was the second Shaba uprising of June 1978 that finally taught Mobutu the lesson of good neighbourliness; his precarious and unstable rule in Zaire was so severely tested that, as noted in Chapter IV - it took a combined

⁶⁹John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (New York: Norton Co., 1978).

⁷⁰Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, p. 218.

⁷¹Ibid.

force of French Legionnaires, Belgian paratroopers and regular forces from Gabon, Senegal, Egypt and Sudan, with logistical support of the U.S., to put the insurrection down. After that a rapprochement was effected between Mobutu and Neto, through the offices of Donald McHenry of the U.S./UN Mission, in which both agreed to neutralize hostile forces in their respective domains while Angola agreed to reopen the Benguela railway line for Zaire's copper export.⁷² Mobutu paid a State visit to Angola in October, 1978.⁷³

As for South Africa and the United States, both continued to provide logistical, material, diplomatic and moral support for UNITA to continue to operate and conduct a guerrilla war against the Angolan State under MPLA. The U.S. continues to see that the continued existence of an MPLA government is not compatible with longer systemic interest of "containing" what it sees as Soviet adventurism and expansionism. America continues to take umbrage at the fact that 20,000 Cuban soldiers, supplemented by 7,000 technicians, 5,000 experts⁷⁴ from the Eastern bloc of nations have helped the MPLA keep its South African nemesis at bay. From the Carter administration (1977-1980), and Reagan (1980--) the

⁷²Henry Jackson, From Congo to Soweto (New York, 1980), p. 84.

⁷³Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, p. 221.

⁷⁴Washington Post, June 5, 1980.

American policy to the Angolan State is one of non-recognition, even though the maligned Cubans guard the oil installations of the American oil company Gulf against acts of sabotage by the South Africans. Yet American economic interest in Angola continues to grow; with Boeing Aircraft, Texaco, and Gulf Oil as the dominant ones, while French oil companies Total and Elf also maintain concessions for off-shore oil explorations. While American allies like West Germany, France, Britain, Portugal, and Japan have all recognized the MPLA government and maintain diplomatic relations with Luanda, the U.S. government of Ronald Reagan succeeded on July 10, 1985, in persuading the U.S. Congress to repeal the 1975 law - Clark Amendment, by which U.S. covert aid to UNITA was proscribed. As an MPLA government commentary on this development stated,

Once free of the moral, legal or financial obstacles contained in the Clark Amendment, the United States Government will surely want to give a new, more dangerous dimension to its involvement in Southern Africa, and change from covert military aid to open support of armed subversion and state terrorism.⁷⁵

The Reagan administration has characterized its Angolan policy as the "linkage" of Cuban assistance to Angola to South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia. The Angolan government has countered that, apart from the fact that the issues are unrelated,

⁷⁵ Ministry of External Relations, A Statement Regarding the Repeal of the Clark Amendment (Luanda: July 12, 1985).

The Peoples' Republic of Angola does not have the organized manpower resources with the required educational level or the available material and financial resources to wage a war against UNITA ... and simultaneously to replace Cuban troops and armaments at strategic points⁷⁶ in the South, Center, and North of the country.

As a matter of survival, Angola spends over 50% of its national budget on security and defence.⁷⁷

South Africa has been pivotal in efforts to destabilize the Angolan State. Angola dates repeated South Africa military incursions into the country from April 3, 1976.⁷⁸ The first South African-UNITA coordinated campaign started on July 29, 1977, and the invaders were able to occupy Cuangar, Derico, and Muscusso; the aim was to set up a "Black African and Socialist Republic of Angola" under Savimbi.⁷⁹ In August of 1981, South Africa launched one of its biggest military operations against Angola, the UN Security Council resolution on August 31 condemning the South African invasion was vetoed by the U.S. The then new Reagan administration, in the words of the President himself, regarded (and still does) South Africa as a friendly country--

⁷⁶Permanent Mission of the Peoples Republic of Angola, Message from the President of the People's Republic of Angola to the Secretary General of the United Nations on Southern Africa (New York: November 29, 1984).

⁷⁷Washington Notes on Africa, Washington Office on Africa (Washington, D.C.: Winter, 1981).

⁷⁸Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, p. 224.

⁷⁹Ibid., p. 22.

Can we abandon a country that has stood beside us in every war we ever fought? A country that strategically, is essential to the Free World in its production of minerals that we all must have.⁸⁰

In March 1981, five South African military intelligence officers paid a visit to the U.S. government, a development that contravened a 20-year policy that forbade such liaison. Between April 1976 and July 1985, South Africa conducted 17 raids inside Angola; the Angolan government has estimated the total losses and damages resulting from South African aggression from April 1976 to July 1985 at \$10 billion U.S. dollars.⁸¹ It is just not that the South African government is acting at the behest of the U.S. government, as a policeman for Western interests or guarantor of the Western civilization. South Africa has its own strategic interest in Southern Africa, in which it wishes to coopt the countries of the sub-region into an economic community of "constellation of states" dominated by the advanced economy of South Africa, thereby hindering autonomous development as envisaged by countries of South Africa Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC). South African strategic objective is clear; it is designed, when fully matured, to "tie the countries of the region into an

⁸⁰ Ronald Reagan, in a television interview with former CBS Television Anchor, Walter Chronkite, March 3, 1981.

⁸¹ Permanent Mission of Angola, Statement Regarding the Repeal of the Clark Amendment (New York, July 12, 1985), p. 3.

irreversible dependence on South Africa; to turn the free States of Southern Africa into little more than Bantustans."⁸²

Defeated in the struggle for power when its Huambo headquarters was taken by the MPLA forces on February 11, 1976, UNITA, under Savimbi, had become a willing ally of the U.S.-South African axis to destabilize Angola. Savimbi's UNITA has since 1976 on, with South African connivance, maintained bases in Namibia from where its forces conduct sporadic incursions into Angola. The biggest South African invasions, "Operation Smoke-shell" of 1980; the "Operation Protea" of 1981, and 1983; repeated sabotage of Benguela's railway that impedes Zairois-Zambian import-export traffic, were jointly coordinated with UNITA.⁸³ Savimbi himself visited the U.S. on November 30, 1981.⁸⁴ These repeated acts of sabotage have cost Angola very dearly; its trade balance deteriorated from \$471 million surplus in 1980 to a \$5 million deficit in 1981, although oil production rose 30% in 1983. Also, by 1983, with mounting defence expenditure, Angola asked the Euro-currency market for trade credits for imports, and borrowed

⁸²Report of the Southern African Developing Coordinating Conference, Maputo, November 1980, quoted in Washington Notes (Washington, D.C.: 1981), p. 2.

⁸³Wolfers and Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, pp. 227-234.

⁸⁴Washington Notes, Winter 1981 (Washington, D.C.), p. 5.

\$2.2 billion to meet its external commitments. It is in the light of these economic and security concerns of the Angolan government that one has to place the Lusaka Accord, reached between South African government and the government of Angola on February 16, 1984. The accord, mediated by the U.S. government, calls for a "phased South African withdrawal from Angolan territory in exchange for Angola's commitment to restrict SWAPO's activities within Southern Angola."⁸⁵ The Angolan government also hoped that by the agreement, "the Republic of South Africa would commit itself, from the very start, to cease all support of UNITA bands, and the UN authorities would have to verify the dismantling of UNITA bases on the Namibian territory."⁸⁶ Like the Nkomati Accord that Mozambique signed, these two developments manifest a hard-headed recognition by Angola, that the campaign of harassment, intimidation and destabilization waged by the U.S.-South African-UNITA axis, constitutes a veritable drain on its resources and an unacceptable deployment of these resources to meet contingencies of war.

Before the Lusaka Accord, South Africa had maintained a permanent military force in Southern Angola and there

⁸⁵Trans-Africa Forum, Issue Brief, "Angola Under Fire" (Washington, D.C., 1985).

⁸⁶Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of Angola, Message of the President of the People's Republic (New York, November 29, 1984), p. 6.

have been continuing post-agreement military raids into Angola. The first was only four months after South Africa pledged its commitment to a withdrawal of all its forces by initialing the Lusaka Agreement, i.e., June 1985. South Africa invaded Angola again on September 17, 1985.⁸⁷

The question that can be raised is why, after ten years of statehood in which all the outward trappings of sovereign independence are manifest, there exists a stage of siege in Angola? The answer to this question lies in the geopolitical strategic and ideological position and importance of Angola in the whole Southern Africa configuration. The ascendancy and consolidation of the Angolan revolution is a threat to the immediate interest of the racist enclave of South Africa and the long-term interest of the West. The same process of Western colonialism rationalized on race supremacy, that was ultimately successfully resisted with armed effort, radicalized the Angolan people to the point where the new Angolan society envisioned is not the neo-colonial state the African political class has created in much of the rest of Africa. The process of armed insurgency that brought about the Peoples Republic of Angola is in process in the racist colony of Namibia, whose Northern border is contiguous with Southern Angola. Angola is the base and sanctuary for Namibian freedom fighters and thus constitutes an immediate threat

⁸⁷ New York Times, October 17, 1985.

to South Africa. In the long run, the force of the example of a new social system that offers the possibility of real freedom and justice from the tyranny of want and despair of capitalism, must worry the Western powers who support and arm South Africa against the just aspirations of its African majority. The fact is, from 1960, when the process of formal European decolonization began, to the present, a period which we have earlier characterized as the neo-colonial epoch, the major preoccupation of the West in Africa, has been to design strategies and tactics to stem the tide of African revolutionary aspiration in a continent where Western hegemony has been pervasive and constant for 400 years. The United States, as the principal hegemonic defender and regulator understands this very well. It has for example, since 1981, now tied the Namibian question to Cuban presence in Angola.

In concrete terms, Angola represents a decisive attempt to rid an African nation of exploitative relations and domination of international capital. Consequently, United States policy of containment⁸⁸ and South Africa's policy of total onslaught or "total national strategy,"⁸⁹ in tandem, are premised on a need to demonstrate to the

⁸⁸Larry Bowman, "The Strategic Importance of South Africa to the United States," African Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 323 (1982).

⁸⁹Republic of South Africa, Department of Defense, White Papers on Defense (Simonstown: South African Navy, 1977), p. 5.

rest of Africa that, (1) Socialism or radical nationalism cannot work, i.e., will not be tolerated. Hence they arm UNITA to engage in a campaign of terror and intimidation to weaken the ability of the Angolan government and dilute its resoluteness to lay the foundation of a new society; (2) only the acceptance and ascendancy of the capitalist order, operating under the hegemonic aegis of the West is the minimum condition for lifting their policy of sustained hostility; (3) the possibility of realising a free independent Africa lies only in the reconciliation of African interest with the security and economic interest of the West.

The Angolan State, the Post-Colonial Economy, Pragmatism and Realism in an Insecure Political Environment

The constitution of the Peoples Republic of Angola talks of the establishment of "just social relations in all sectors of production" and the government suggests that its economy is in transition from a colonial plantation economy to a resistance economy and ultimately to a planned one. What are the three fundamental pillars of the Angolan economy? They are (1) the state economic units--the state sector, (2) the cooperatives--joint ventures, (3) the private enterprise. The constitution guarantees private activities and property, even those of foreigners, so long as they are useful to the country's economy and "to the interests of Angolan people."⁹⁰ The decisive sector of the

⁹⁰The Constitution of the People's Republic of Angola, Mission of the People's Republic of Angola, New York, 1984.

Angolan economy is the extractive sector--oil production and diamond mining. The dependence of Angola on the technological infrastructure of the capitalist multinational companies has led to an economic policy of pragmatism by the MPLA government. Angola earns \$1.5 million a day from oil alone and the U.S. Gulf Oil Company even though its 70% production has been reduced to 25% of the total is still the largest single producer of oil with "responsibility for about half the 500,000 barrel daily output planned for 1985"⁹¹ The long gestation and maturation period of construction of mining and extractive infrastructure has meant an alliance of expedience between a government that claims to be laying the foundation of a socialist society and the western multinational companies. Angola needs immediate and continuing availability of funds to survive and thus it cannot fight an economic war of liberation with Western multinationals while fighting off invasion from South Africa and repeated sabotage⁹² by UNITA. Angola's oil company SONANGOL established in 1976 and governed by the Oil Law of 1978, has entered into new production agreements with the oil companies. But the oil and diamond industries on which Angola depends are still dominated by Western

⁹¹Michael Wolfers and James Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline (London: Zed, 1983), p. 135; Michael Tanzer, The Race for Resources (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1980), pp. 179-181.

⁹²Gerald Bender, "The Continuing Crisis in Angola," Current History, March 1983.

multinational companies, namely Gulf, Texaco, Elf and Compagnie Francaise des Petroles. Belgian Petrofina has majority control of the Angolan refinery--Petrangol.⁹³ This refinery was once the object of South African Commando attack.⁹⁴

The prospects of early termination of UNITA/South Africa security problem for Angola are not foreseeable in the immediate future. South Africa-UNITA forces continue their campaign of harassment and disruption of Angolan economy. Angola has listed 4,000 violations of its air space by South Africa between 1980-1985, including 168 bombing raids and 230 landing of airborne troops and four naval landings.⁹⁵ On January 6, 1986, a UNITA/South African force ambushed an Angolan military convoy.⁹⁶ The Reagan administration and the U.S. conservative lobby have effectively corralled UNITA as one of its anti-communist national liberation movements, with which it hopes to confront "Soviet adventurism" worldwide. Its defence department is to provide "nonlethal excess supplies and equipment for relief purposes around the world."⁹⁷ These non-communist

⁹³ Bergerol and Wolfers, Angola, p. 136.

⁹⁴ New York Times, January 12, 1986.

⁹⁵ MPLA Second Congress Report, West Africa (December 23, 1985).

⁹⁶ New York Times, January 13, 1986.

⁹⁷ Washington Post, January 31, 1986.

liberation movements⁹⁸ obviously include apart from UNITA, the contrarevolutionary forces fighting the Sandinista government of Nicaragua, the Cambodian refugees in Thailand, the Afghans in Pakistan. It is arguable to say the least that any of these newly discovered liberation movements can dislodge the government they are being armed to fight, but they can keep the Western anti-communist agenda alive in their particular locale.

Jonas Savimbi of UNITA is a member of the elite leadership of this anti-communist agenda for Angola. He visited the United States in January 1986, to seek "antitank and antiaircraft missiles"⁹⁹ for his forces and met with the U.S. President and Secretaries of State and Defence. The U.S. policy is clearly to use UNITA as a ploy to pressure¹⁰⁰ the Angola government and the high profile given to Savimbi is part of that pressure. Meanwhile the consolidation of economic relations between the U.S. and Angola go on. The U.S. is Angola's largest trading partner, indeed Angola ranks only behind South Africa and Nigeria by the volume of U.S.-African trade. From \$856 million in 1982, the Angola-U.S. trade increased to \$1.1 billion in 1984. About 60% of Angolan oil production goes to the U.S. market.

⁹⁸"Jonas Savimbi's Welcome," Editorial, Washington Post, January 28, 1986.

⁹⁹Washington Post, January 31, 1986.

¹⁰⁰The CIA Contras in Nicaragua served the same purpose, see, "Against Arms for the Contras," Washington Post, February 5, 1985.

American lending institutions like Chase Manhattan, Bankers Trust, CitiBank, Morgan Guaranty and Manufacturers Hanover including the U.S. official Export-Import bank have lent Angolan state oil corporation \$450 million. Of this, Export-Import Bank contributed \$250 million.¹⁰¹

U.S. oil company, Chevron, has a total asset of about \$600 million in Angola and Western banks have put together a plan to invest \$1 billion¹⁰² in Angola in the next five years.

Ultimately, because of sheer economic inefficiency of operating apartheid (elaborate surveillance, diversion of resources to security needs) the West will jettison a white-controlled South Africa. This is because a chronically politically unstable South Africa cannot guarantee a favorable economic climate for Western investment. Apart from the access to South Africa's mineral deposits and the strategic geopolitical importance of the Cape Sea route as sea lane for transportation of petroleum from the Gulf region to the West; the pivotal reason for the political and economic attachment of the West to South Africa is the enormous profits their transnational companies are reaping from the settler-ruled enclave. As the table below shows, when compared to any other country in the world, the rate of return on U.S. investments in South Africa is better than six to one. Working under dehumanizing conditions and receiving

¹⁰¹New York Times, January 12, 1986.

¹⁰²New York Times, January 31, 1986.

penurious wage, the cheap African labor force enables the Western extractive conglomerates to return rates of profits unheard of since the epoch of primitive accumulation.

(Comparative) Rate of Return on Total Book Value
U.S. Firms' Direct Foreign Investment in Mining and Smeltry

TABLE III

| | <u>Canada</u> | <u>Latin America and Caribbean</u> | <u>South Africa</u> |
|---------|---------------|--|-------------------------|
| 1953-57 | 8.3% | 10.4% | 25.7% |
| 1958-62 | 5.9 | 14.5 | 20.8 |
| 1963-67 | 9.9 | 19.9 | 43.3 |
| 1968-72 | 5.3 | 12.8 | 53.6 |

Source: Robert Pollin, "The Multinational Mineral Industry in Crisis," Monthly Review April 1980, p. 28.

False altruism or regard for African suffering or morality have no place in this equation; apartheid is based on profitable cheap labor of the African majority. Specifically to Angola, its immediate security problem can only be resolved when the South African question is resolved. It is possible but not probable that the outcome of the South African struggle could lead to a majority government that could still be so ideologically hostile to Angola that it would continue to support armed effort to change it. In fact, inspite of the stalemate that has attended the attempts to free Namibia from South Africa's stranglehold, the possibility also exists for Namibia to become an independent nation before the attainment of majority rule in South Africa. If Namibia were to be free of South African control, i.e., controlled by its

African majority, led by South West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), Angola's security problem could be mitigated, i.e., (UNITA could no longer use Namibia as sanctuary). Quite clearly, for Angola, its future in the long run, lies in the dawn of a new era--the resolution of conflict based on racial hegemony and an unjust and inhuman socioeconomic system.

CHAPTER VI

THE REALITY OF EXTERNAL PRESSURES ON AFRICAN POLITY AND THE LIMITATIONS OF AFRICAN RESPONSE

In the preceding five chapters, much of our effort has been directed towards providing some elucidation to the interest-laden motivational factors for intervention in Africa generally, and in Angola and Zaire specifically. In this concluding chapter, our analysis will center on the internal dynamics in Africa that facilitate and perpetuate the phenomenon of external intervention as a recurring reality of African polity.

We pose this cardinal question. Why is Africa so prone and susceptible to pressures and influences emanating from countries removed thousands of miles from its shores? Our answer to this question will center on two main areas--

1. The profound structural weakness of the continent occasioned by the balkanized nature of its articulation with the world system makes the fragmented continent particularly vulnerable to external pressures.
2. The records of bankrupt post-colonial African leadership in connivance and collusion with the ruling class of African historical nemesis--the West--to perpetuate the subjugation of the resources of the continent to the needs of Euro-American strategic imperial domination.

The Nature of the African Political Class

After more than two decades of the demise of classical colonial occupation and the advent of constitutional independence in nearly all of Africa with the exception of the settler outpost of South Africa and its colony of Namibia, an objective assessment can be rendered of Africa's post-colonial elites. One does not necessarily have to render a verdict of indictment by going the route of statistics of wretchedness and despair perennially adumbrated by many scholars to demonstrate a record of dismal stewardship and performance by the African political class. We believe a more revealing way to understand this phenomenon is to situate their role and place in a neo-colonial Africa.

The evidence of two decades of African political independence is that the African post-colonial political class regards itself as the independence "inheritance elite--who saw political independence as the fruit of a completed struggle."¹ As political managers of a neo-colonial state, but with a very weak economic base, the acquisition of state power becomes the most fruitful and lucrative method of material acquisition and accumulation given the fact that the acquisition of state power also means political management of social wealth. The African political class led the movement for constitutional independence. The hated

¹R. W. Johnson, "Sekou Toure: The Man and His Ideas," in Peter Gutkind and Peter Waterman, African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: Monthly Review), pp. 329-333.

colonizer now physically gone, the political class steps into his shoes as his local representatives. Apart from facilitating "African economic retardation by draining African wealth and making it impossible to develop more rapidly the resources of the continent,"² colonial imperialism bequeathed to Africa an "underdeveloped middle class"³ that lacked critical material and intellectual resources to be the prototype of the bourgeoisie of the European industrial epoch of the 15th century. Their skills were mainly in commerce, and in the service professions such as law and administration. They therefore could not be a proper bourgeoisie that saved, invested and produced. They could not play the role of a "social force capable of producing a high level of development of a country's productive forces on the basis of its own choices."⁴ Conditioned by colonial education to ideological and intellectual subservience and psychological dependency, they have accepted that the embourgeoisement of their country is the road to what they see as the need for "development." For them modernization means Westernisation.⁵

²Walter Rodney, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar-es-Salaam: Tanzania Publishing House, 1976), p. 37.

³Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth (New York: Grove Press, 1968), p. 149.

⁴Ronamo Ledda, quoted by Jack Woddis, "Is there an - African National Bourgeoisie?" in P. Gutkind and P. Waterman (eds.), African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: Monthly Review), p. 268.

⁵O. Onoge, in P. Gutkind and P. Waterman, African Social Studies, p. 37.

Bereft of any cultural resilience and psychological and intellectual autonomy, external support becomes the only yardstick of recognition. According to Nzongola this psychological dependence was so pervasive among the Zairos - political class that "leaders began to depend so much on foreign advisors for their political ideas, programmes and strategies, that even after independence, this need for foreign technicians was elevated to the level of a cult."⁶

The most potent medium which the colonialist had used to ensure the survival of the neo-colonial state is through a process Galtung has characterized as "penetration,"⁷ i.e., to condition the African political class ideologically and make them dependent by having a vested interest in the neo-colonial state. The African bourgeoisie thence is "tied body and soul to foreign capital and its interests cannot exist or be defended independently."⁸ That is to say, the interest of foreign capital to maintain and retain the neo-colonial state and that of the African bourgeoisie to perpetuate it for its class rule are complementary. The African bourgeoisie has now become the "junior

⁶George Nzongola, "The Bourgeoisie and Revolution in the Congo," in Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1970), p. 528.

⁷John Galtung, The European Community: A Superpower in the Making (London: Allen and Unwin, 1973).

⁸Ledda, quoted in Woddis, "Is There an African Bourgeoisie?" in P. Gutkind and P. Waterman, African Social Studies: A Radical Reader (New York: Monthly Review), p. 268.

partners in governing the mass of unassimilated natives."⁹
In order to conceal the use of State power to promote its class interest and the patron-client relationship between it and the now physically absent colonialist, the political class tries to cover up its betrayal of the just aspirations of its people by talking about "negritude," "authenticity," "African Socialism."

When the forces opposed to neo-colonialism threaten the neo-colonial state, as in Zaire in 1964, 1977, and 1978 the African bourgeois leadership now calls on its patrons, by appealing to the symbiotic interest that binds them. Umba Di Lutete, Zairois ambassador to the United Nations during the Shaba I episode in 1977, put it so well, "... we thought that those who shared our ideas should come to our rescue and thus show (the people) that we were not isolated. We are very happy to see that they did come to help us."¹⁰ Thus, the African neo-colonial political class reveals itself finally to its own people as part of the infrastructure of neo-colonial penetration and intervention. Without the active collusion of the Binza Group--military (Mobutu) security police (Nendaka), internal affairs (Kandolo), the National Bank (Ndele), Foreign Affairs (Bomboko),¹¹ the

⁹George Padmore, Pan-Africanism or Communism (New York: Doubleday, 1962), p. 195.

¹⁰Interview, Umba Di Lutete, Zairois Ambassador to the UN, Africa Report (July/August 1977), p. 11.

¹¹Nzongola Ntalaja, Class Struggle and National Liberation in Africa (Roxbury: Omenana, 1982), p. 67.

UN-Western collaborative intervention would perhaps have had to be effected by reverting to classical colonialism or declaring Zaire a "protectorate" of the UN. By mortgaging their birthright as a front for UN-Western collaboration in Zaire in 1960-64, they frustrated the possibility of exposing the neo-colonial designs of the intervenor. Nor is the situation different in Angola.

In 1971, the FNLA/GRAE was acknowledged as the only nationalist movement by the OAU. The government of Angola in Exile (GRAE), was led by Holden Roberto. Roberto's nationalistic credibility had been boosted by the government of Guinea-Conakry when Roberto was included in the Guinean diplomatic corp in order to better present the case for Angolan independence to the world community in early 1960s. In reality, the head of the so-called Government of Revolutionary Angola in Exile with wide continental acceptability and revolutionary credentials, was an American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) operative on an annual salary.¹² Consistent with its long-range neo-colonial strategic design, the U.S. was conducting a two-face policy. It was arming Portugal to contain Angolan nationalist independence aspiration and co-opting the leadership of the nationalist organisation in order to penetrate the neo-colonial state it expects its client to inherit. By

¹² John Marcum, The Angolan Revolution II (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1978), p.17

the same token, Jonas Savimbi, the leader of the "Black Socialist Republic of Angola" was FNLA secretary. Savimbi's true identity became known after the Portuguese coup of April 1974 and after the memoir of Portuguese President Marcello Caetano was published. The Black President was then revealed as a long term Portuguese Security Police (PIDE) agent. UNITA's non-involvement in the armed phase of the struggle to liquidate Portuguese colonialism now became quite understandable. Except that Savimbi claimed to be operating in a liberated area in the Luso region of Angola: Savimbi did have his liberated area--the one ceded to him by Portuguese colonialism to bolster his nationalist front as a credible anti-colonialist force in Angola. When this neo-colonial gambit failed, Savimbi turned to South Africa,¹³ while he continued to claim his "anti-colonialism" had been inspired by Kwame Nkrumah and Abdel Nasser.

Nor is the case of Roberto and Savimbi as a part of the infrastructure of neo-colonial intervention unique. As the political managers of the neo-colonial state many French speaking African states have defence pacts with France which give France "over-flight rights and access to African airfields and ports for military purposes."¹⁴

¹³West Africa, August 20, 1984.

¹⁴Edward Corbett, The French Presence in Black Africa (Washington, D.C.: Black Orpheus Press, 1972), Chapter VI.

Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Gabon, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Niger, Senegal and Togo all have these treaties. The ideological and security affinity between the African political class and their Western patrons is often quite glaring; twice in 1983, the civil war in Chad where France continued to exert military economic and political influence after 1960, began to escalate with Libya and France now openly supporting the two contending factions. Western governments and media began to chorus about Libyan expansionism. As a result, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) Summit of 1983 failed twice to achieve a quorum when it was obvious the chairmanship would pass to Muammar Gaddafi of Libya. Yet the Franco-African Summit was attended by all the French-speaking nations including the 'non-traditional friends' of France like Nigeria and Sierra-Leone that same year. The same phenomenon of ideological affinity that underlies this patron-client and superordinate-subordinate relationship was manifested during Shaba episodes in Zaire and the establishment of the so-called Pan African security force.

It is the continuing assumption that Africa is, and must always remain part of the West European 'sphere of influence.' This assumption is hardly being questioned. Even some African states take it for granted.¹⁵

This clearly is what U.S. Vice President George Bush had in

¹⁵ Julius Nyerere, "French Troops in Africa," Africa Report (July-August 1978), p. 11.

mind in addressing the Kenya political class when he spoke of "shared goals, common principles and mutual interests."¹⁶ The U.S. berthing facilities and communication infrastructure in the Kenyan port city of Mombassa represent part of these common principles and shared interest. The West does not hide its appreciation for the African political class as part of the infrastructure of intervention. The Central African Republic (CAR) where units of France's force de frappe are stationed and where France replaces political leaders with little fanfare is a case in point. The CAR's first president, David Dacko was removed from office and lived in France; his replacement, the tragic comic Jean Bedel Bokassa was overthrown and replaced again by Dacko. Dacko was now replaced by Andre Kolingba. According to West Africa magazine of September 17, 1984, French Defence Minister Charles Hermi, presented this African President with the colours of the "Commander of the Legion of Honour" for, as he put it, "exceptional service to France."¹⁷ The French minister was visiting French troops and military installations in the CAR capital of Bangui and the City of Bouar. The two French military bases in a sovereign African country are used as rear bases to replenish French units in Chad. Caught between the justified aspirations of material betterment of

¹⁶George Bush, "A New Partnership with Africa," in Africa Report (January-February 1983), p. 39.

¹⁷West Africa (September 17, 1984), p. 1920.

masses of their own people and the status-quo oriented imperatives of the imperial system, the African political class refuses to commit class suicide for to identify itself with the interest of the people is to pave the way for the revolutionary liquidation of its own class.

Complementing this monopolization of state power and the use of the state machinery as part of the infrastructure of external intervention in Africa is the balkanized nature of African articulation with the world system. This collective fragmentation works to the African disadvantage in a system dominated by big and powerful actors. Africa's role is marginalized by this balkanization. This structural weakness had led to the half-hearted attempts at continental or quasi-continental integration as the East African Community (EAC), and the Southern African Development Conference (SADCC) have shown. But lacking any political commitment, the basic planning problems of these attempts have often been advanced as reasons for their non-practicality. The fragmented nature of African articulation with the world system leaves the balkanized polities of the continent working at cross purposes and often mutually excluding and counteracting one another in the international fora. And, sometimes, having defined their intracontinental interaction solely within the parameters of their respective colonial experience, the political class, faithful to the imperatives of the neo-colonial, trade, monetary and even strategic

infrastructure, comes down hard on putative African integrative attempts. For example, prior to the establishment of ECOWAS, Senegal continually denounced ECOWAS as unworkable due to the size of Nigeria, "Senegal is not in favor of participating in the present project for a 15-member West African Community, in which a single state (Nigeria) would clearly dominate the other 14."¹⁸ Firmly ensconced within the neo-colonial orbit, the African political class feels its insecurity heightened by any attempt at continent-wide or even regional cooperation. Nor does the citation of this Senegalese position suggest that we subscribe to crude economist argument of economic community as precursor to political integration in Africa. An economic argument in Africa can only be valid, after the national economies of African states have been liberated from the domination of Western transnational¹⁹ corporations. An attempt to pursue the integration of Africa economically will have to take into reckoning the neo-colonial²⁰ character of the African national economies.

¹⁸Elenga M'buyinga, "Africa's Economy in World Capitalism," in Pan Africanism or Neo-Colonialism: The Bankruptcy of the O.A.U. (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 109.

¹⁹We use the word 'transnational' here because often times these companies have only one parent country or even two; but their true ownership and origin is concealed by using the word "multinational;" see Bala Usman, For the Liberation of Nigeria (London: Beacon Books, 1979), pp. 52-58.

²⁰Claude Ake, A Political Economy of Africa (Longmans, Essex, 1981), Chapters 4, 5, 6; Ake, Revolutionary Pressures in Africa (London: Zed Press, 1978), Chapter 2.

Indeed such a project could easily become a monster. We might end up with a vast institution which we could not master and which would thus become a powerful means whereby the old metropolises could perpetuate or even intensify their imperialist exploitation and recolonization of the continent.²¹

With specific reference to politico-military intervention in Zaire and Angola, certain developments are discernible in the international system. It is quite unlikely, for example, that the United Nations operations in any given country can now be partisanly manipulated with such unbridled audacity as happened in Zaire in the period 1960-64. It is true that the ideological bi-polarity that characterized the international system in the era still exists. But, the United Nations General Assembly has since the 1960s lost its Western majority, it now consists of a majority that is "overwhelmingly non-white, non-western, underdeveloped and unschooled in the practice of national and international governance."²² Their being characterized 'unschooled' in some spurious practice of governance is perhaps a forlorn recognition of the remarkable political sophistication the new majority has displayed. They recognize that the United Nations system is more of a political institution than a diplomatic one. Their agenda is now

²¹M'buyinga, "Pan Africanism or Neo-colonialism," p. 13.

²²This is the characterization of Kurt Waldheim, the Austrian aristocrat who served as the Secretary-General of the UN Organisation from January 1972 to January 1982. See Kurt Waldheim, "The United Nations: the Tarnished Image," in Foreign Affairs (Fall 1984), p. 96.

pitted against the long-established practice of domination and manipulation of the erstwhile Western majority.

Their collective interest is focused more on bargaining for a restructuring of the international order than in stabilizing the imperial system. This is evident in the operational alliance they have organized within the United Nations system. The alliance--the Group of 77, represents over 100 third world nations.²³ To the West, the United Nations and indeed its specialized agencies have become dangerous fora; they are unresponsive to the furtherance of Western interest. The West recognized the enormous advantage of being able to exert some degree of influence over supranational institutions. For example, the United States consistently vetoed the candidacy of Salim Ahmed Salim of Tanzania who emerged as the candidate most likely to win the ballot to determine the new United Nations Secretary-General in 1981. Salim was Tanzanian Foreign Minister and had been a principal spokesman for the African Liberation Committee of the Organisation of African Unity, (OAU). After the United States refused to end its veto of Salim's candidacy, Javier Perez de Cuellar of Peru was nominated as a compromise candidate.

It is highly unlikely in the contemporary era that the United Nations can be rendered an instrument to further the interest of any ideological bloc in a direct military

²³Ibid.

operation as in Zaire in the 1960s. As this study has shown, and as the experience of Zaire has demonstrated to date, politico-military intervention may now be a multi-lateral affair between two entities, i.e., a target country and a constellation of states belonging to the same ideological orbit. A bilateral situation, i.e., involving one intervenor and a beleaguered local ally runs the risk of being labelled an aggression and thus possible condemnation in the international community. The more nations that share burden of intervention, the better for the intervenors, especially in the public perception and propaganda aspect. For example, the Western effort to stabilize the minority Christian Phalangist government of Amin Gemayel in Lebanon, was termed a "Multinational Peace-Keeping Force." Its multinationality gives the impression of collective concern, but this solidarity is based on shared values and commitment to install a Christian Maronite minority government in Lebanon allied to Israel.

The same can be said for the so-called African peace-keeping force in Zaire, acting as proxies for the NATO powers to defend the neo-colonial state in Zaire. The control of African states by a political class in ideological alliance with the West has constituted the bedrock of the resilience of the neo-colonial state in Africa. Multilateralism is based on shared valuations, beliefs and commitment to the defence of the preferred socio-economic order.

It would appear that the idea of multilateralism will be the lynchpin of the politico-military rescue effort, mounted by the core and their proxies on behalf of Mobutu's Zaire in the future. Meanwhile, Mobutu appears to be firmly in control of the neo-colonial state. His rule has been an unmitigated disaster for the 18 million Zairens, most of whom who suffer from malnutrition as acknowledged even by his sponsors,²⁴ while he devotes only 2% of Zairois national budget to health for the citizenry. At the inception of Mobutu's rule, health care constituted only 2.3% of the national budget of Zaire. After ten years of his rule, this miserly percentage had further dwindled to 1.5% of the total budget.²⁵ But Mobutu is propped up by the unfailing support of Western nations in desperate need of a strategic ally in the heart of Africa and whose country also provides strategic metals for western military-industrial complex. Mobutu recently celebrated twenty years²⁶ of his rule, his internal political opponents in disarray, contained or liquidated. His remaining vocal opposition, factionalized, fragmented and

²⁴ Guy Grant quotes from an unpublished IBRD report, "Economy of Zaire," Report No. 82-ZR, 4 Volumes (July 23, 1975), Vol. 2, p. 4 in Guy Grant, "Zaire 1978: The Ethical and Intellectual Bankruptcy of the World Systems," Africa Today (October-December 1978), p. 7.

²⁵ Open Letter to Citizen Mobuto Sese Seko, President-Founder of the Popular Movement of the Revolution, President of the Republic, by Thirteen National Assembly Representatives of the Zaire Parliament (English Translation), (Washington, D.C. Center for Development Policy, 1982).

²⁶ West Africa (December 2, 1985), p. 2523.

marginalized as a credible force in the efforts to regain the control of their nation. Many are domiciled in exile, ironically in countries that constitute the most consistent supporters of Mobutu, notably France, Belgium and the United States. Mobutu's rule in Zaire highlights two essential realities of neo-colonial Africa. The bankruptcy of political leadership and the antagonistic contradictions between the objective material interest of the people of Africa and the systemic interest of the West. Mobutu's Zaire, like many in Africa, is incapable of creating a viable state that can meet basic human needs of minimum comfort. Yet, efforts by Zairens to dislodge Mobutu and attempt to reconstruct their society must contend with two objective realities, i.e., the systemic interest of the Western world on one hand and the role and place of their nation in this system.

The Angolan situation is different. Here is a country, attempting to redefine itself, regain its history and create a new society after 500 years of colonialism. It attained political independence with the aid of the ideological formation (revolutionary socialism) that the West had waged a consistent and violent struggle against since its very first assumption of state power in 1917, i.e., the Russian revolution. But, for the strategic capability and the assistance delivery capacity of the Soviet Union and its allies, the assumption of state power by the MPLA on November 11, 1975 would have been well-nigh impossible. But Angola exists today under siege, the forces of colonialism now existing

in a different form have mounted a counter-attack. Angola exists in a paradox. It is a sovereign Republic recognized by all African states (many, albeit, who do not wish it well) but most who would like to help it defend itself but cannot. They cannot because of the structural weakness occasioned by the balkanized nature of the continent's articulation with international system. The other paradox is that Angola exercises political power, which is guaranteed by the presence of internationalist fraternal commitment of extra-African powers. The mainstay of the Angolan economy is petroleum, which is produced through the technological infrastructure of Western oil companies. This means that both the effective exercise of state power - decisive power, and the effective production of its main economic wealth (two fundamentals of sovereignty integrity) are dependent on external pillars of support.

In the short run, to do away with Western technological infrastructure will entail hardship and sacrifice which a nation under siege can ill afford. Oil technology, to be sure, is not a monopoly of any nation or group of nations, but Angola is hardly in a position to completely rebuild the infrastructural base of its petroleum industry while at the same time preoccupied with the security problems posed by South Africa/UNITA counter-revolutionary insurgency. Angola is being subjected to what has been

characterized as a "low key-low intensity warfare"²⁷ whose objective is to change the basic direction of the country. The Cuban internationalist troops in Angola are holding the line between the historical forces of reaction and enslavement of African people and a government that may be the first genuine systematic attempt to create a new nation out of the ruins of European colonialism in Africa.

The West's best chance of co-option of the Angolan state into its orbit lies in the continued existence of a white minority-ruled South Africa. But South Africa itself is under assault and for the first time, it now faces a low-level armed insurgency whose escalation might shift its security concerns away from Angola to its real enemy--the oppressed African majority in South Africa. The assumption of state power by the MPLA in November 1975 and the movement's military consolidation of power by February 1976 effectively prevented the likelihood of any Western political influence in post-colonial Angola. The only avenue, given the strategic and military configuration in Angola, open to the West now is military option. The low key-low intensity war of attrition against Angola is that military option in practice. Still for the West, the strategic and political factors we referred to in Chapter

²⁷ This is the characterization of the Editor of the Washington Times in a public affairs program titled, "Which Side Should We Support in Angola?" Firing Line February 2, 1986.

V appear to have doomed their counter-revolutionary effort in Angola. Savimbi seems to give credence to this position. According to the Washington Post, February 4, 1986, the UNITA leader concedes that he entertains no illusion that the MPLA government can be dislodged militarily. Giving further evidence of his widely-held image as a counterrevolutionary renegade and opportunist, he hopes the MPLA can be pressured into a coalition government that obviously will include him. South Africa may indeed conduct sporadic military forays into Angola; it may continue to save UNITA when its forces face imminent annihilation²⁸ when surrounded by the Angolan army, but South Africa, acting as proxy for the West, cannot and will not invade Angola with such sufficient force as to dislodge the MPLA from power. That is the military reality that has been facilitated by the aforementioned strategic and political conditions.

In conclusion, this study has attempted to lay bare the political and coercive armed aspects of external assault on two African countries, a phenomenon that we have characterized as being a polychromatic reality continentally. But ultimately the crisis of extra-African intervention is a political issue. It must be properly addressed at the political level. Until that consciousness is grasped which accepts the need, as a matter of survival, for a democratic

²⁸Washington Post, January 28, 1986.

continental politico-economic reality, Africa will in the foreseeable future continue to be a continent whose socio-economic and political institutions rather than serve the interest of its people, serve the interest of the forces that occasioned its balkanization and powerlessness. Coercive intervention then will continue to be the means of sustaining the status quo and keeping the continent and its people in their present subordinate position in the world system.

APPENDIX A

TABLE IV

AFRICA: PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS

TABLE IV

AFRICA: PRINCIPAL TRADING PARTNERS

ANGOLA (US \$MILLION)

| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
|--------------|---------|---------|
| US: | | |
| Netherlands: | 92.4 | 325.5 |
| Fed Rep Ger: | 11.7 | 37.5 |
| Portugal: | 80.0 | 5.8 |
| Belgium: | 64.8 | 6.6 |
| UK: | 38.7 | 6.2 |
| | 38.8 | |

BENIN (Million Francs CFA)

| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
|--------------|---------|---------|
| France: | | |
| UK: | 14,088 | 1,883 |
| W. Germany: | 7,672 | |
| Netherlands: | 4,955 | 638 |
| US: | 3,580 | 1,019 |
| Japan: | 3,333 | |
| Nigeria: | | 1,534 |
| | | 629 |

BOTSWANA

| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
|---------|---------|---------|
| *CUSA: | | |
| Africa: | 643,600 | 55,973 |
| UK: | 47,305 | 65,218 |
| Europe: | 16,914 | 56,967 |
| USA: | 12,974 | 253,339 |
| | 13,067 | 59,803 |

*(CUSA = Botswana, Swaziland, S.A. and Lesotho)

BURUNDI (Million Burundi Francs)

| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
|---------------|---------|---------|
| Belgium: | | |
| France: | 2,528.5 | 144.3 |
| Italy: | 1,376.5 | |
| West Germany: | | 105.9 |
| US: | 1,246.5 | 181.8 |
| UK: | 872.0 | 1,156.1 |
| Japan: | | 220.1 |
| | 960 | |

TABLE IV (Cont'd.)

| CAMEROON (Million Francs CFA) | | |
|---|-----------|---------|
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 108,896 | 55,590 |
| W. Germany: | 19,095 | 9,476 |
| Italy: | 10,623 | 13,801 |
| Japan: | 10,945 | |
| Netherlands: | | 48,804 |
| US: | 13,305 | 22,751 |
| CAPE VERDE (000 ESCUDOS) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Netherlands: | 342,588 | |
| Portugal: | 1,378,718 | 91,819 |
| UK: | 169,878 | 599 |
| USA: | 168,162 | |
| Zaire: | | 2,980 |
| CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (Million Francs CFA) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 8,565 | 12,635 |
| W. Germany: | 1,145 | |
| Belgium: | | 3,110 |
| UK: | 485 | |
| USA: | 535 | 690 |
| Netherlands: | 480 | |
| Spain: | | 480 |
| CHAD (Million Francs CFA) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 10,597.2 | 683.8 |
| Netherlands: | 2,116.3 | |
| Congo: | | 174.1 |
| Nigeria: | 2,805.1 | 1,976.0 |
| Cameroon: | 1,364.2 | 251.7 |
| COMORO (Million French Francs) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 33.6 | 28.8 |
| Germany: | | 1.5 |
| Kenya: | 7.6 | |
| Pakistan: | 6.8 | |
| MAYONETTE (000 Francs) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 86,540 | 2,144 |
| South Africa: | 14,376 | |

TABLE IV (Cont'd.)

| CONGO (Million Francs CFA) | | |
|--------------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 28,233 | |
| Germany: | 3,095 | 1,178 |
| Italy: | 3,369 | 10,630 |
| Belgium: | 1,154 | 1,206 |
| Japan: | 1,753 | |
| Brazil: | | 5,740 |
| USA: | | 2,310 |
| DJIBOUTI (Million Djibouti Francs) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Benelux: | 2,593 | 1,459 |
| France: | 25,004 | |
| UK: | 2,071 | |
| Japan: | 2,486 | |
| EQUATORIAL GUINEA (Million Birkwele) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Spain: | 6,375 | 2,170 |
| Germany: | | 87 |
| Netherlands: | | 81 |
| ETHIOPIA (000 Birr) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| USSR: | 441,821 | |
| USA: | 63,829 | 216,045 |
| UK: | 122,810 | |
| Germany: | 157,877 | 133,571 |
| France: | 52,111 | 44,311 |
| Djibouti: | | 77,591 |
| Japan: | | 62,172 |
| CABON (Million Francs CFA) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 76,983 | 62,855 |
| USA: | 7,998 | 51,166 |
| Netherlands: | 5,136 | |
| Argentina | | 27,715 |
| Germany: | 5,982 | |
| Brazil: | | 21,013 |
| Japan: | 5,136 | |
| GHANA (000 Cedis) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| UK: | 470,116 | 402,713 |
| USSR: | | 542,587 |
| USA: | 250,602 | 190,585 |
| Nigeria: | 301,946 | |
| Japan: | 114,349 | 227,892 |
| Italy: | 91,405 | |
| Germany: | | 253,739 |

TABLE IV (Cont'd.)

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------|
| GUINEA (Million Syllis) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| EEC: | | |
| USA: | 2,301 | 1,260 |
| | 743 | 345 |
| GUINEA BISSAU (Million Pesos) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 212.3 | |
| Netherlands: | 138.4 | 29.0 |
| Portugal: | 583.0 | 101.3 |
| Sweden: | 156.9 | |
| Spain: | | 95.2 |
| Switzerland: | | 87.5 |
| USSR: | 130.4 | |
| IVORY COAST (Million Francs CFA) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 203,066 | 80,340 |
| USA: | 47,356 | 4,030 |
| UK: | 16,826 | |
| Italy: | 23,808 | 6,840 |
| Japan: | 31,936 | 5,810 |
| KENYA (KS Million) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| UK: | 2,707.6 | 1,444.0 |
| USA: | 1,087.2 | |
| Uganda: | | 1,106.7 |
| Germany: | 1,510.2 | 1,218.0 |
| Italy: | 458.0 | |
| Japan: | 1,391.2 | |
| Netherlands: | | 562.6 |
| LESOTHO (000Maloti) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| SACU: | 295,763 | |
| SACA: | | 12,955 |
| EEC: | 5,345 | |
| Europe: | | 3,580 |
| Other Europe: | | 21,082 |
| LIBERIA (\$ 000) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| USA: | 142,100 | 123,500 |
| Saudi: | 91,200 | |
| France: | | 52,500 |
| Germany: | 48,600 | 132,400 |
| Netherlands: | 40,400 | |
| Italy: | | 70,300 |
| UK: | 25,200 | |
| Belgium: | | 27,600 |

TABLE IV (Cont'd.)

| MADAGASCAR (Million Francs MG) | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | | |
| Germany: | 47,157 | 17,452 |
| Belgium: | 12,595 | 5,570 |
| Japan: | 3,673 | |
| Italy: | | 7,730 |
| Netherlands: | 5,802 | |
| USA: | | 2,941 |
| | 5,118 | 10,092 |
| MALAWI (K 000) | | |
| S. Africa: | | |
| Netherlands: | 117,131 | |
| UK: | | 25,026 |
| USA: | 49,245 | 70,345 |
| Germany: | 10,478 | 24,204 |
| Japan: | 23,342 | 23,404 |
| Zimbabwe: | 17,761 | |
| | | 16,618 |
| MALI (Million Mali Francs) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | | |
| Ivory Coast: | 48,069 | 13,157 |
| Germany: | 16,957 | 9,906 |
| Senegal: | 9,096 | 5,690 |
| Japan: | 6,630 | |
| USA: | | 1,358 |
| UK: | 3,353 | |
| | | 4,093 |
| MAURITANIA (Million Ouguiya) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | | |
| EEC: | 4,107.8 | 2,312.3 |
| Senegal: | 2,526.3 | 3,119.8 |
| Spain: | 1,477.8 | |
| Others: | | 996.1 |
| | 4,273.0 | 2,108.4 |
| MAURITIUS (Million Rupees) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| UK: | | |
| France: | 446.5 | 2,123.2 |
| Bahamas: | 511.7 | 854.4 |
| USA: | 754.4 | |
| Australia: | | 323.1 |
| Germany: | 303.9 | |
| Japan: | | 160.5 |
| Italy: | 204.4 | |
| | | 78.2 |

TABLE IV (Cont'd.)

| MOZAMBIQUE (Million Meticars) | | |
|---------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Germany: | | |
| USA: | 1,575 | |
| S. Africa | 399 | 1,322 |
| Portugal | 2,062 | |
| UK: | | 992 |
| Japan: | 758 | 399 |
| Iraq: | | 260 |
| Netherlands: | 961 | |
| | | 279 |
| NIGER (Million Francs CFA) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | | |
| Nigeria: | 25,012 | 17,270 |
| Germany: | 2,661 | |
| UK: | 3,023 | |
| Japan: | | 7,440 |
| Ivory Coast: | 2,084 | |
| Netherlands: | | 4,975 |
| | 1,738 | |
| NIGERIA (Million Naira) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Germany: | | |
| USA: | 1,973.3 | 571.0 |
| Japan: | 1,381.3 | 4,010.0 |
| Netherlands: | 1,356.6 | |
| UK: | | 1,052.4 |
| France: | 2,750.2 | |
| Italy: | 888.0 | 874.4 |
| | | 270.7 |
| RWANDAN (Million Rwanda Francs) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | | |
| Germany: | 2,771 | |
| Iran: | 2,247 | 118 |
| Japan: | 2,117 | |
| Netherlands: | 2,885 | |
| Belgium: | 2,372 | |
| Kenya: | | 659 |
| Italy: | | 932 |
| USA: | | 163 |
| | | 55 |
| SAO-TOME (000 Escudos) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Angola | | |
| Germany: | 37,901 | 1,590 |
| Belgium/Luxembourg: | 3,682 | 13,885 |
| Netherlands: | 3,991 | 3,947 |
| France: | | 93,440 |
| Portugal: | 9,458 | |
| Japan: | | 59,331 |
| | 3,751 | |

TABLE IV (Cont'd.)

| SENEGAL (Million Francs CFA) | | |
|--------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 74,950 | 32,276 |
| Nigeria: | 16,378 | |
| Germany: | 7,467 | 2,531 |
| Iraq: | 12,998 | |
| Greece: | | 2,352 |
| Guinea-Bissau: | | 3,297 |
| Thailand: | 13,388 | |
| Ivory Coast: | | 7,578 |
| UK: | 11,936 | |
| Netherlands: | | 5,969 |
| SIERRA LEONE (Le 000) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Germany: | 20,962 | 20,720 |
| Netherlands: | 28,011 | 20,616 |
| USA: | 20,349 | 29,025 |
| UK: | 63,598 | 61,856 |
| France: | 15,416 | |
| SOMALIA (000 Somali Shillings) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| UK: | 935,900 | |
| Italy: | | 58,975 |
| Germany: | 430,548 | 1,209 |
| Saudi Arabia: | | 803,631 |
| Italy: | 662,839 | |
| Djibouti: | | 3,209 |
| USA: | 141,823 | |
| Ethiopia: | 146,853 | |
| SOUTH AFRICA (Million Rand) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| USA: | 2,655.3 | 1,519.8 |
| UK: | 2,161.2 | 1,193.0 |
| Germany: | 2,365.8 | 775.1 |
| Japan: | 1,961.8 | 1,409.7 |
| France: | 877.4 | |
| Italy: | | 381.7 |
| SUDAN (S 000) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| UK: | 116,650 | |
| Italy: | | 22,888 |
| Germany: | 73,982 | 16,228 |
| Netherlands: | 60,429 | 21,391 |
| Japan: | 59,651 | |
| USA: | | 23,687 |
| PRC: | | 16,688 |
| France: | 58,518 | 15,561 |

TABLE IV (Cont'd.)

| TANZANIA (Million Shillings) | | |
|-----------------------------------|---------|---------|
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| UK: | | |
| USA: | 1,684.8 | 757.9 |
| Japan: | | 404.7 |
| Germany: | 969.3 | |
| Hong Kong: | 939.5 | 559.4 |
| Italy: | | 154.0 |
| Sweden: | 529.8 | |
| | 258.6 | |
| TOGO (Million Francs CFA) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | | |
| UK: | 30,938 | 7,297 |
| Belgium: | 8,980 | |
| Germany: | | 2,128 |
| Netherlands: | 8,437 | 4,863 |
| Spain: | 6,755 | 13,094 |
| Yugoslavia: | 4,688 | |
| | | 3,080 |
| UGANDA (000 Shillings) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Kenya & Tanzania: | 420,316 | |
| Australia: | | 70,596 |
| Italy: | 99,611 | |
| Germany: | 139,839 | 78,103 |
| India: | 167,334 | |
| Netherlands: | | 311,701 |
| Japan: | | 219,750 |
| UK: | 53,950 | 394,523 |
| USA: | | 341,949 |
| BURKINA-FASA (Million CFA Francs) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| France: | 36,388 | 2,632 |
| Ivory Coast: | 14,117 | 3,807 |
| Germany: | 4,244 | 1,346 |
| Netherlands: | 4,893 | |
| Japan: | 4,169 | |
| ZAIRE (Million Zaires) | | |
| | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| Belgium: | | |
| France: | 1,109.7 | 3,415.8 |
| USA: | 667.0 | 488.0 |
| Germany: | 540.0 | 1,009.7 |
| Japan: | 402.5 | |
| | | 375.7 |

TABLE IV (Cont'd.)

| ZAMBIA (K' 000) | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
|----------------------|---------|---------|
| UK: | 194,774 | 135,551 |
| Germany: | 60,535 | 81,308 |
| USA: | 60,570 | 110,282 |
| Japan: | | 160,402 |
| S. Africa | 136,342 | |
| Japan: | 43,540 | |
| PRC: | | 28,085 |
| ZIMBABWE (Z \$' 000) | IMPORTS | EXPORTS |
| S. Africa: | 239,448 | 137,817 |
| UK: | 167,983 | 87,946 |
| USA: | 103,588 | 63,519 |
| Germany: | 88,563 | 64,606 |
| France: | 54,102 | |
| Netherlands: | | 36,641 |

Source: Africa South of the Sahara, 1984-85.
 Europa Publications Ltd.
 18 Bedford Square
 London, WC 1B, England

For some of these countries, the figures for the export-import trade are not up-to-date. All the same, our argument of the continent being a market for Euro-American exports remains. Angola, for example, inspite of the hostility of the United States and South Africa, has moved up to be the U.S. third largest trading partner in Africa. The trade infrastructure from the colonial era has not been dismantled.

APPENDIX B

TABLE V

PERCENTAGE OF VULNERABILITY-CUM-DEPENDENCE
OF EEC, JAPAN AND US ON SELECTED
STRATEGIC METAL FROM AFRICA

TABLE V

PERCENTAGE OF VULNERABILITY-CUM-DEPENDENCE OF EEC,
JAPAN AND US ON SELECTED STRATEGIC METAL FROM AFRICA

| <u>METAL</u> | <u>US % OF IMPORT</u> | <u>EEC % OF IMPORT</u> | <u>JAPAN % OF IMPORT</u> |
|--------------|---------------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------|
| Chromium | 46 | 100 | 100 |
| Cobalt | 48 | 100 | 100 |
| Manganese | 47 | 100 | 88 |
| Copper | -- | 98 | 90 |
| Phosphate | -- | 10 | 10 |

Adopted from:

Source: Olasupo Adedokun, "Franco-African Relations and the Use of Intervention As An Instrument of Foreign Policy Objectives: A Critical Study of the Victims of French Foreign Policy Objectives," (Ph.D. dissertation, Atlanta University, 1982), based on:

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